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In which we give a short overview of this 
dissertation and discuss the underlying 
theories and applied methodologies.
Parts of this chapter were adapted from Chapters 2, 4, & 6 of this dissertation, and from:
Borst, J.P., Taatgen, N.A., & Van Rijn, H. (in preparation). Using 
Cognitive Architectures to Analyze fMRI Data of Complex Tasks. In A. 
Johnson & R. W. Proctor (Eds.), Neuroergonomics: Cognitive neuroscience 












This dissertation was partly written using an application called Concentrate1. Concentrate 
is not a normal program, it does not let you write, draw, or send emails. No, it actually 
does not do anything. What it does is the opposite: it prevents you from doing too 
many things at the same time, it prevents you from too much multitasking. While it 
is often said that our “modern world is a multitasking world” (e.g., Salvucci, Taatgen, 
& Borst, 2009, p. 1), it has become more and more clear that multitasking is not 
necessarily a good thing. Many studies have shown that while we spend much of 
our time performing multiple tasks at the same time (e.g., Carrier, Cheever, Rosen, 
Benitez, & Chang, 2009; González & Mark, 2004), in general this leads to a decrease 
in performance (e.g., Alm & Nilsson, 1994; Brookhuis, de Vries, & de Waard, 1991; 
Gillie & Broadbent, 1989; Monk, Trafton, & Boehm-Davis, 2008). In fact, my promotor 
once said that one of the things that could explain the success of great scientists is their 
ability to monotask, their ability to concentrate on one thing at a time. That is where 
the aptly named program Concentrate comes into this thesis: it forced me to monotask, 
and thereby enabled me to finish this dissertation.
The topic of this dissertation is human multitasking, and in particular the so-called 
problem state bottleneck: one of the reasons why multitasking is often counter-productive. 
While in general humans are extremely good at multitasking – when do we truly do 
one task at a time? – in certain situations our ability to multitask breaks down. On the 
one hand, multitasking is obviously limited by physical constraints. We simply cannot 
look at two things at the same time, as texting cyclists prove daily during my ride to 
work. More interestingly, there are also limitations in our cognitive system that hinder 
multitasking. One of these is the problem state bottleneck: a limitation in processing 
intermediate representations that are necessary for a task. To give an everyday example, 
imagine you go to the living room to pick up John Anderson’s latest book. You store the 
intermediate representation for this task – pick up Anderson’s book – in your problem 
state resource, and walk to the living room. On the way, a friend calls you to ask where 
you are going to have dinner tonight. After finishing the call you find yourself standing 
in the living room, without the faintest notion about what you were going to pick up 
there. According to the theory that I will present in this dissertation, this is caused by 
a limitation in processing intermediate representations in our brain: the problem state 
bottleneck.
To support the idea of a problem state bottleneck, I will present several experiments 
and a computational theory of how intermediate representations are processed in our 
minds. As support for this theory, I will not only look at behavioral data, but also relate the 
theory to neuroimaging data. However, before turning to the problem state bottleneck, 
I will first give a short overview of existing multitasking theories. Multitasking has been 
investigated for over a century, and especially the threaded cognition theory (Salvucci 
& Taatgen, 2008, 2011) is of great importance for the current work. This theory will 
therefore be discussed in some detail below. Furthermore, both threaded cognition and 
1
 http://getconcentrating.com/
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the models in this dissertation were implemented in the cognitive architecture ACT-R 
(e.g., Anderson, 2007). I will therefore also briefly introduce cognitive architectures 
and ACT-R, followed by a discussion of how cognitive architectures can be combined 
with neuroimaging research. I will end this introduction with an overview of the other 
chapters.
Multitasking Theories
As early as 1931, Telford investigated interference due to human multitasking. He 
introduced the psychological refractory period (PRP) paradigm, and showed that 
people are slower to respond to the second of two tasks when these tasks have to be 
performed concurrently. Since Telford, many theories have been put forward to explain 
interference effects in multitasking (see for overviews, Meyer & Kieras, 1997a; Salvucci 
& Taatgen, 2008). Theories on multitasking can be divided into three general groups: 
bottleneck theories, resource theories, and cognitive control theories. Bottleneck theories 
assume fixed bottlenecks in human cognition that can only process one task at a time, 
causing interference when used by multiple tasks concurrently (e.g., Broadbent, 1958; 
Keele, 1973; Pashler, 1994; Welford, 1952). Theorists have identified several different 
bottlenecks, ranging from perceptual bottlenecks (e.g., Broadbent, 1958), to response-
selection bottlenecks (e.g., Pashler, 1984; 1994), to motor bottlenecks (e.g., Keele, 
1973). To unify these different bottleneck accounts, resource theories were introduced. 
These theories assume that attention can be flexibly employed, and that multitasking 
interference occurs when cognitive resources are required by multiple tasks at the 
same time, but not when tasks require different resources (e.g., Kahneman, 1973; 
Navon & Gopher, 1979; Wickens, 1984, 2002). A third research tradition focuses on 
executive processing and cognitive control to explain multitasking interference (e.g., 
Baddeley, 1986; Cooper & Shallice, 2000; Meyer & Kieras, 1997a, 1997b; Norman 
& Shallice, 1986). In these theories, multitasking interference arises because of 
scheduling problems between tasks. That is, while tasks could in principle be carried 
out concurrently, executive control mechanisms enforce a certain task order, leading 
to interference. Using a cognitively bounded rational analysis, Howes, Lewis, and Vera 
(2009) have recently shown that to best account for at least the classical PRP effect 
(Schumacher et al., 1999; Telford, 1931) a theory needs cognitive control mechanisms, 
a motor bottleneck, and a response-selection bottleneck.
Based on the large body of data collected since the 1930s, detailed computational 
cognitive models of multitasking have been developed, ranging from concurrent 
multitasking (e.g., Kieras, Meyer, Ballas, & Lauber, 2000; Salvucci, 2005) to task 
switching (e.g., Altmann & Gray, 2008; Gilbert & Shallice, 2002; Monsell, 2003; 
Sohn & Anderson, 2001) to sequential multitasking (e.g., Altmann & Trafton, 2007; 
Salvucci, Monk, & Trafton, 2009). These computational models make it possible to 
predict the amount of interference between tasks on a quantitative level. Threaded 
cognition, a recent theory of human multitasking, combines all elements above and 
was implemented as a computational model (Salvucci & Taatgen, 2008, 2011). In 
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combination with the cognitive architecture ACT-R (Anderson, 2007), it made a specific 
prediction that is the basis of this dissertation: it predicted the problem state bottleneck.
Threaded Cognition’s Prediction
Threaded cognition is a general theory of human multitasking (Salvucci & Taatgen, 
2008, 2011; Salvucci, Taatgen, et al., 2009). It assumes multiple different bottlenecks, 
and states that while multiple tasks can be performed concurrently, every resource in 
human cognition can only process one task at a time and therefore acts as a bottleneck 
when required by multiple tasks concurrently (cf. Byrne & Anderson, 2001). Depending 
on the requirements of the tasks at hand, these bottlenecks lead to different patterns of 
interference. Thus, the key assumption of threaded cognition is that although several 
tasks can be active at the same time, a particular resource can only be used by a single 
task at a time.
For instance, if two tasks want to use the visual system at the same time, only one of 
them can proceed and the other task will have to wait. In the case of the visual system 
this is quite obvious: we can only look at one object at a time. However, the same 
mechanism is assumed to hold for more central resources such as memory. According 
to threaded cognition, if two tasks want to retrieve a fact from memory at the same 
time, only one of them can proceed and the other task will have to wait. On the other 
hand, no interference is predicted if one task uses the visual system while another 
task retrieves a fact from memory. Thus, as long as the resource requirements of the 
different tasks do not overlap in time, threaded cognition predicts no interference, but 
as soon as a particular resource is concurrently needed by two or more tasks, that 
resource will act as a bottleneck and delay the execution of the combined process. This 
aligns with the intuition that if two tasks require the same cognitive constructs, the 
tasks will interfere (e.g., talking and reading both require our language faculties, while 
talking and walking require different resources).
It was shown that threaded cognition could account for interference caused by two 
peripheral bottlenecks (vision, motor) and two cognitive bottlenecks (procedural and 
declarative memory; Salvucci & Taatgen, 2008).  In addition, based on its integration 
in the cognitive architecture ACT-R (e.g., Anderson, 2007), one more source of 
multitasking interference was predicted: the so-called problem state resource2. The 
problem state resource is used to maintain intermediate representations that are 
necessary for performing a task. For example, when calculating ‘2 + 3 ∑ 4’ mentally, 
one might use the intermediate representation ‘2 + 12’. According to the ACT-R theory, 
only a single intermediate representation can be maintained at a time, which should 
lead to interference when multiple representations are required concurrently.
Previously, we have presented results (Borst & Taatgen, 2007) that illustrated the 
potential role of the problem state resource as a bottleneck in multitasking. In that 
study, participants had to enter an address in a simulated navigation device while 
driving a simulated car. Both tasks had two versions: one that required maintaining 
2
 The imaginal buffer in ACT-R terminology.
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intermediate representations, and one in which there were no intermediate results. 
When both tasks required an intermediate representation, performance was slower 
and more error-prone than could be explained by the difficulty of the separate tasks 
alone, indicating a bottleneck in processing intermediate representations. However, 
the setup of that study was relatively under-constrained, making it difficult to derive 
precise conclusions. In this dissertation I will build on these results, and develop more 
precise experiments to investigate the problem state bottleneck. To account for the 
results of these experiments, I will present cognitive computational models that were 
implemented in the cognitive architecture ACT-R, and validate those models using 
neuroimaging data. I will now give a brief overview of these methodologies.
Methodologies
Cognitive Modeling & Cognitive Architectures
In 1973, Allen Newell boldly argued that psychology focuses too much on isolated 
tasks, and as a result does not progress much beyond solving ‘small questions’: 
He was worried that psychology would never integrate the results of the many 
separate experiments into a unified theory of human cognition (Newell, 1973). As a 
solution, he proposed cognitive architectures: unified theories of cognition in which 
computational processing models can be developed for a wide variety of tasks. The use 
of computational models forces one to specify theories at a very precise level, while 
developing different models within one theory ensures that models do not explain 
isolated phenomena, but that basic mechanisms are shared between tasks. Currently, 
there are several cognitive architectures in development, for instance Newell’s SOAR 
(Newell, 1990), EPIC (Meyer & Kieras, 1997a), and ACT-R (Anderson, 2007). 
Following Newell’s suggestion, in this dissertation we implemented all models in 
the cognitive architecture ACT-R (Anderson, 2007). This means that the underlying 
resources of the presented models were validated previously, and could now be used 
to investigate our theory of the problem state bottleneck (e.g., Cooper, 2007; Newell, 
1990). Moreover, because the architecture specifies how humans move the mouse or 
retrieve a fact from memory, we could develop models of complete tasks (in contrast 
to single mechanisms), enabling a direct comparison between human and model 
data. This is especially important for models of multitasking behavior, in which the 
interaction between cognitive and peripheral resources often causes the observed 
behavior (Kieras & Meyer, 1997; Van Maanen, Van Rijn, & Borst, 2009). In the next 
section we will introduce ACT-R, and explain how it maps onto the multiple resource 
theory of threaded cognition.
ACT-R
Figure 1.1 shows an overview of the ACT-R architecture (Anderson, 2005, 2007; 
Anderson, Bothell, et al., 2004). ACT-R assumes that the human cognitive system 
can be described as a system of largely independent modules (cognitive resources) 
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that interact through a central production system. It can perceive outside information 
through its visual module and its aural module (not shown in Figure 1.1), and act in 
the world through its manual module, which operates ‘the hands’ of ACT-R. To store 
information it uses a declarative memory store and a procedural memory store, while 
the control state maintains the current goal of the model. The problem state resource 
is used to store intermediate representations of a task, and is the main interest of this 
dissertation. According to our theory, it can only maintain at most one representation 
at a time, and therefore acts as a bottleneck in multitasking. In general, threaded 
cognition assumes that every ACT-R module constitutes a bottleneck: all modules can 
only proceed in a serial fashion, and therefore cause multitasking interference when 
required by multiple tasks concurrently (Byrne & Anderson, 2001; Salvucci & Taatgen, 
2008, 2011).
Note that Figure 1.1 only shows the core modules of the architecture (the aural 
and vocal module are not shown). Other (or alternative) modules have also been 
developed, for instance to account for timing (Taatgen, Van Rijn, & Anderson, 2007; 
Van Rijn & Taatgen, 2008), blending in declarative memory (Lebiere, Gonzalez, & 
Martin, 2007), and robot perception (Trafton, Bugajska, Fransen, & Ratwani, 2008). 
Furthermore, while the ACT-R architecture mainly functions on a relatively high level 
(Newell’s cognitive and rational bands, Newell, 1990; see also Anderson, 2002), of 
many modules more detailed lower-level versions have been proposed, for instance for 
declarative memory (Van Maanen, Van Rijn, & Taatgen, in press), procedural memory 















Figure Core modules of the ACT-R cognitive architecture.1.1
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Model-Based Neuroimaging
For a long time, the field of information processing psychology that argued for cognitive 
architectures essentially ignored the brain (Anderson, 2007). For instance, Newell states 
in 1980 that “symbolic behavior (and essentially rational behavior) becomes relatively 
independent of the underlying technology. Applied to the human organism, this 
produces a physical basis for the apparent irrelevance of the neural level to intelligent 
behavior.” (Newell, 1980, p. 175). However, since the 1990s cognitive psychologists 
recognize the importance of the system in which intelligence is realized, and started 
connecting cognitive architectures to neuroimaging data. Anderson made this 
very explicit in his definition of a cognitive architecture in 2007 (p. 7): “A cognitive 
architecture is a specification of the structure of the brain at a level of abstraction that 
explains how it achieves the function of the mind.”
One of the reasons for connecting cognitive architectures to neuroimaging data 
is that many models have a complexity that cannot be fully justified on the basis of 
behavioral measurements alone (e.g., Myung, 2000; Pitt & Myung, 2002; Roberts & 
Pashler, 2000). That is, there are so many degrees of freedom in developing a model 
that models are often under-constrained by behavioral data. To strengthen the 
constraints on cognitive models that are developed in the cognitive architecture ACT-R, 
a methodology was developed for mapping model activity on brain activity (for a 
concise explanation, see Anderson, Fincham, Qin, & Stocco, 2008). This way, models 
are not only constrained by behavioral data, but also by neuroimaging data. Figure 1.1 
roughly shows the mapping between ACT-R’s modules and the brain (for details, see 
Chapter 4 and 5).
Usually, the connection between ACT-R’s modules and fMRI data is implemented 
using predefined Regions-Of-Interest, which provide a mapping between the brain and 
components of the architecture (Anderson, 2007; Anderson et al., 2008). For instance, 
activity in the motor resource of ACT-R should correspond to neural activity in a 
predefined region in the motor cortex (see Figure 1.1). We applied this methodology in 
Chapter 4 of this dissertation to investigate whether our model made plausible fMRI 
predictions.
More recently, a new methodology has emerged in fMRI research: model-based 
fMRI (e.g., Gläscher & O’Doherty, 2010; O’Doherty, Hampton, & Kim, 2007). This 
analysis technique shows regions in the brain where neural activity significantly 
correlates with model activity. In Chapter 5, we applied this technique for the first time 
to a model developed in a cognitive architecture. Model-based fMRI is a promising new 
method, because it gives a functional explanation of fMRI data by directly linking the 
data to model constructs (which naturally perform required functions of the model). 
Functional neuroimaging, especially fMRI, has often been criticized of not contributing 
anything significant to our understanding of the mind as there is no direct mapping 
between data and function (e.g., Coltheart, 2004; Coltheart, 2006; Fodor, 1999; Harley, 
2004; Page, 2006; but see e.g., Aue, Lavelle, & Cacioppo, 2009; Friston, 2009; Hagoort, 
2008; Henson, 2005, 2006; Jonides, Nee, & Berman, 2006; Logothetis, 2008). As 
Fodor put it forcefully: “If the mind happens in space at all, it happens somewhere 
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north of the neck”, on which basis he discounted most fMRI research from explaining 
anything about our cognitive system (Fodor, 1999). However, especially by combining 
model-based fMRI with models grounded in a cognitive architecture (which we have 
shown is possible in Chapter 5), we can at least partly avoid these criticisms, and use 
fMRI to learn more about the functioning of our cognitive system.
Overview of this Dissertation
As stated above, this dissertation is about the problem state bottleneck. I will present 
behavioral, model-based, and neuroimaging support for the existence of this bottleneck. 
First, I will present three behavioral experiments and accompanying cognitive models 
in Chapter 2. These experiments provide initial support of a problem state bottleneck. 
In Chapter 3, the behavioral support is extended with an experiment that shows how 
the problem state bottleneck can be bypassed. In addition, pupil dilation data will 
be presented in Chapter 3, to show that the bottleneck is associated with an increase 
in mental workload. In Chapter 4 and 5, I turn to neuroimaging data to validate the 
cognitive model that was presented in Chapter 1. First, in Chapter 4, a region-of-interest 
analysis is applied to test a priori predictions of the cognitive model. Second, in 
Chapter 5, the novel model-based fMRI analysis technique is used to show where in 
the brain the different resources of the model are most likely represented. To conclude, 
in Chapter 6, our final theory of how intermediate representations are processed in the 
mind will be presented. This theory will be backed up with data presented in the other 
chapters of this thesis, and with data of two new behavioral experiments.
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Chapter
2
The Problem State: 
A Cognitive Bottleneck 
in Multitasking
In which we present first support for a 
single-sized problem state resource in the 
form of three behavioral experiments.
This chapter was previously published as:
Borst, J.P., Taatgen, N.A., & Van Rijn, H. (2010). The Problem State: 
A Cognitive Bottleneck in Multitasking. Journal of Experimental 

































The main challenge for theories of multitasking is to predict when and how 
tasks interfere. Here we focus on interference related to the problem state, a 
directly accessible intermediate representation of the current state of a task. 
On the basis of Salvucci and Taatgen’s (2008) threaded cognition theory, 
we predict interference if two or more tasks require a problem state, but not 
when only one task requires one. This prediction was tested in a series of 
three experiments. In Experiment 1, a subtraction and text-entry task had to 
be carried out concurrently. Both tasks were presented in two versions: one 
that required maintaining a problem state and one that did not. A significant 
over-additive interaction effect was observed, showing that the interference 
between tasks was maximal when both tasks required a problem state. The 
other two experiments tested whether the interference was indeed due to 
a problem state bottleneck, instead of cognitive load (Experiment 2; an 
alternative subtraction and text entry experiment) or a phonological loop 
bottleneck (Experiment 3; a triple-task experiment that added phonological 
processing). Both experiments supported the problem state hypothesis. To 
account for the observed behavior, computational cognitive models were 
developed using threaded cognition within the context of the cognitive 
architecture ACT-R (Anderson, 2007). The models confirm that a problem 
state bottleneck can explain the observed interference.
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Introduction
Some tasks can be performed together effortlessly, like walking and talking, while 
other tasks interfere with each other, like car driving and phoning, while again 
other combinations of tasks are nearly impossible to do concurrently, like writing 
a manuscript and talking to a colleague. Intuitively, it seems clear why some tasks 
interfere with each other and some do not: the more overlap in cognitive constructs 
between tasks, the more interference. For instance, writing a paper and talking to a 
colleague both use language faculties, resulting in major interference between the 
tasks.
Psychologists have been formally investigating multitasking behavior at least since 
the 1930s (e.g., Telford, 1931; see Meyer & Kieras, 1997a for an excellent review). 
Based on the large body of research collected since the 1930s, detailed cognitive 
models of multitasking have been developed, ranging from concurrent multitasking 
(e.g., Kieras et al., 2000; Salvucci, 2005) to task switching (e.g., Altmann & Gray, 
2008; Gilbert & Shallice, 2002; Sohn & Anderson, 2001; see also Monsell, 2003) 
to sequential multitasking (e.g., Altmann & Trafton, 2007). These computational 
models make it possible to predict the amount of interference between tasks on a 
quantitative level. To unify several areas of multitasking, Salvucci and Taatgen (2008) 
recently proposed a new theory of multitasking behavior, threaded cognition, which 
accounts for concurrent multitasking as well as for sequential multitasking (see also 
Salvucci, Taatgen, et al., 2009). Threaded cognition was implemented in the cognitive 
architecture ACT-R (Anderson, 2007), enabling researchers to make formal models of 
multitasking behavior.
In threaded cognition, tasks can use several distinct cognitive resources, such as 
vision, manual operations, or memory. These resources can operate in parallel, but 
are themselves serial in nature (cf. ACT-R, Anderson, 2007; Byrne & Anderson, 2001). 
Because of this seriality, a resource can only be involved in one operation at a time, but 
multiple resources can be active at the same time. This within-resource seriality but 
between-resource parallelism holds regardless of whether the resources are recruited 
for a single task (e.g., physically moving a disc in a Towers of Hanoi problem while 
at the same time using memory to plan the next move) or whether the resources are 
recruited for different tasks (manually tuning the car-audio system while at the same 
time visually processing the road in front of the car). Thus, the key assumption related 
to multitasking in threaded cognition is that although several tasks can be active at 
the same time, a particular resource can only be used by a single task at a time. For 
instance, if two tasks want to use the visual system at the same time, only one of them 
can proceed and the other task will have to wait. In the case of the visual system this is 
quite obvious: we can only look at one object at a time. However, the same mechanism 
is assumed to hold for more central resources, like memory. For example, if two tasks 
want to retrieve a fact from memory at the same time, only one task can proceed; the 
other task will have to wait. On the other hand, no interference is predicted if one task 
wants to use the visual system, and one task wants to retrieve a fact from memory. 
Thus, as long as the resource requirements of the different tasks do not overlap in 
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time, threaded cognition predicts no interference, but as soon as a particular resource 
is concurrently needed by two or more tasks, that resource will act as a bottleneck and 
delay the execution of the combined process. This aligns with the intuition that if two 
tasks require the same cognitive constructs, the tasks will interfere. 
Salvucci and Taatgen (2008) discussed two peripheral bottlenecks (the visual 
and motor system) and two central cognitive bottlenecks (declarative and procedural 
memory; cf. “attentional limitations”, Pashler & Johnston, 1998). In this article, we 
discuss a third central cognitive resource that can result in significant interference, 
both in terms of decreased speed and increased errors: the problem state. The 
problem state resource is used to maintain intermediate mental representations that 
are necessary for performing a task. For instance, while solving an algebra problem 
like 2x - 5 = 8, the problem state can be used to store the intermediate solution 2x = 
13. The problem state resource is assumed to be limited to only one coherent ‘chunk’ 
of information (Anderson, 2005, 2007), and will therefore cause interference when 
multiple tasks concurrently require its use. However, not all tasks require the use of a 
problem state. If no intermediate results need to be stored (e.g., solving one step of the 
algebra problem 2x = 8 immediately results in the required answer) or all necessary 
information is present in the world (e.g., if the intermediate steps can be selected from 
and are displayed on a computer screen), there is no need for maintaining a mental 
representation. 
Previously, we have presented results (Borst & Taatgen, 2007) that illustrated the 
potential role of the problem state resource as a bottleneck in multitasking. In this 
study, participants had to type in an address in a simulated navigation device while 
driving a simulated car. The task required switching back and forth between driving 
and operating the navigation device. Both tasks had two versions: one that required 
maintaining intermediate results, and one in which there were no intermediate results. 
More specifically, in the driving task participants had to memorize the turns to take at 
the next intersections in one condition, while in the other condition arrows pointed 
out the route. In the navigation task, the two conditions differed in whether the 
participants had to memorize the full address before entering it, or whether the device 
would show what letter to press next. When both difficult conditions were combined, 
performance was much slower and more error-prone than could be explained by the 
difficulty of the separate tasks alone. That study suggested that combining certain 
tasks yield additional costs in terms of time and errors. However, the setup of the study 
was relatively under-constrained, making it difficult to derive precise conclusions.
In the current article, we investigate whether the problem state resource constitutes 
a bottleneck in a more constrained setting. In the first experiment, participants 
performed a complex dual-task. Data of this experiment are in line with predictions 
derived from a problem state bottleneck–based theory. However, to test whether the 
results of Experiment 1 were caused by cognitive load effects (e.g., Logan, 1979), 
Experiment 2 controls for cognitive load over the different conditions, while in 
Experiment 3 another possible explanation involving the phonological loop was 
investigated. Experiments 2 and 3 both provide corroborating support for a problem 
state bottleneck account. The experimental findings are supported by computational 
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cognitive models, which show that a problem state bottleneck can explain the observed 
interference effects. Before we describe the experiments, we will introduce the problem 
state resource and the threaded cognition theory in more detail.
The Problem State Resource
In our terminology, the problem state resource is used for storing intermediate 
information that is necessary for performing a task. Information in the problem state 
resource is directly accessible for the task at hand, while it takes time to retrieve facts 
from declarative memory (cf. ACT-R, Anderson, 2007). For instance, while mentally 
solving an algebra problem like 3x - 12 = 0, the problem state can be used to store the 
intermediate solution 3x = 12; and when asking for directions, the problem state can 
be used to store at which street you should turn to arrive at your destination. If this 
information is present in the world, that is, if you work out an algebra problem on 
paper or follow road signs to a destination, it is not necessary to maintain a problem 
state.
The concept of the problem state stems from a series of neuroimaging experiments 
by Anderson and colleagues, who found BOLD activity in the posterior parietal cortex 
that correlates with the transformation of mental representations (e.g., Anderson, 
2005; Anderson, Albert, & Fincham, 2005; Anderson, Qin, Sohn, Stenger, & Carter, 
2003; Sohn et al., 2005). They concluded on this basis that a separate resource exists 
for maintaining and transforming mental representations. 
The problem state construct is closely linked to mental states as used by Altmann 
et al. in their cognitive control model and memory for goals theory to explain task 
switching and task interruption behavior (Altmann & Gray, 2008; Altmann & Trafton, 
2002, 2007). However, where in their case mental representations constitute both the 
goal and the problem state of a task, in threaded cognition (also in the current version 
of ACT-R, e.g., Anderson, 2005, 2007) these mental representations have been split 
into a goal state that only maintains the state of the current goal, and a problem state 
that maintains temporary intermediate information necessary for doing the task (but 
see Salvucci, Taatgen, et al., 2009, about how these theories can be reconciled). The 
problem state is also related to the ‘episodic buffer’ in Baddeley’s (2000) extension 
of the classical working memory model of Baddeley and Hitch (1974). This buffer 
serves the function of a “limited capacity temporary storage system that is capable 
of integrating information from a variety of sources” (p. 421), which was previously 
part of the ‘central executive’ (Baddeley, 2003). This construct is very similar to ACT-
R’s problem state resource, in the sense that both systems can integrate information 
from different sources (perceptual and long-term memory) and temporarily store the 
outcome for further processing. 
The Threaded Cognition Theory
Threaded cognition (Salvucci & Taatgen, 2008) is an integrated theory of human 
multitasking. In threaded cognition, every task is represented by a so-called cognitive 
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thread. For instance, in the case of driving a car and operating a navigation device, one 
thread would represent steering the car and another thread would represent operating 
the navigation device. A thread is associated with the goal of a task, which serves as 
a key to mobilize associated task knowledge (e.g., declarative and procedural memory 
that is necessary for performing the task). Although multiple threads can be active at 
a time, only a single procedural processor is available; thus, although multiple threads 
are active in parallel, only one thread can use the procedural processor at a time 
(compare this to multiple programs running on a single CPU on a computer: while the 
CPU can only process one instruction at a time, programs act as if they were executed 
concurrently). Furthermore, if a thread needs to use a cognitive resource such as vision 
or memory, it can only be selected for execution if that resource is available. Thus, while 
the threads act in parallel and are not governed by any supervisory executive control 
structure, they are constrained by the available resources. (For a similar approach, but 
from a more mathematical point of view, see Liu, Feyen, & Tsimhoni, 2006.) 
The threaded cognition theory is implemented in the cognitive architecture ACT-R 
(Anderson, 2007). ACT-R describes human cognition as a set of independent modules 
that interact through a central production system. For instance, it uses visual and 
aural modules for perception and a motor module to interact with the world. Besides 
these peripheral modules, ACT-R also has a number of central cognitive modules: the 
procedural module that implements the central production system, the declarative 
memory module, the goal module, the timing module (Taatgen et al., 2007; Van Rijn 
& Taatgen, 2008) and the problem state module1. All modules operate in parallel, but 
each module in itself can only proceed serially (Byrne & Anderson, 2001). Thus, the 
visual module can only perceive one object at a time and the memory module can only 
retrieve one fact at a time.
A task is represented in ACT-R by the contents of the goal module and the problem 
state module (Anderson, 2007). In the case of solving an algebra problem like 8x - 5 = 7, 
the goal module can hold for instance ‘algebra - unwinding’, while the problem state 
module can be used to hold the intermediate solution 8x = 12. Thus, the goal module 
holds the current state of a task, while the problem state module holds intermediate 
information necessary for performing the task. In line with the serial processing in 
the other modules, the goal module can only hold a single goal and the problem state 
module can only hold a single problem state at a time.
Threaded cognition extends ACT-R by allowing for multiple parallel goals, and thus 
multiple tasks (threads), to be active. This translates into the assumption that the goal 
module in ACT-R can represent several goals at the same time. However, the other 
modules can still only do one thing at a time, which means that they can only be used 
by one thread at a time. The modules are shared on a first-come-first-served basis: a 
thread will ‘greedily’ use a module when it needs it, but also will let go of it ‘politely’, 
that is, as soon as it is done with it. The seriality of the modules results in multiple 
potential bottlenecks: when two threads need a module concurrently, one thread will 
have to wait for the other.
1
Sometimes referred to as ‘imaginal module’ or ‘problem representation module’.
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In Figure 2.1 an example processing stream of a dual-task in threaded cognition is 
shown: white boxes depict a task in which a key-press is required in response to a visual 
stimulus, and grey boxes depict a task in which a vocal response is required in response 
to an auditory stimulus. The x-axis represents time and boxes represent the period of 
time during which a resource is used. Both tasks start by activating production rules 
to initiate attending the respective stimuli, after which the encoding process starts in 
both the visual and the aural module. The grey area marked A indicates interference, 
caused by the concurrent request for the procedural module after the respective 
encoding steps. As the visual–manual task already uses the procedural module, the 
auditory–vocal task has to wait. Thus, if multiple threads require a resource at the 
same time, interference is observed.
Salvucci and Taatgen (2008) presented cognitive models that account well for 
dual-tasking in a number of different domains, ranging from simple Psychological 
Refractory Period (PRP) tasks to driving a car and using a cell phone concurrently. 
These models showed that bottlenecks in perceptual and motor resources in addition 
to bottlenecks in two more central cognitive resources (procedural and declarative 
memory) account for a wide range of multitasking interference phenomena (but see 
for a more detailed account of interference in the motor system e.g., Albert, Weigelt, 
Hazeltine, & Ivry, 2007; Diedrichsen, Hazeltine, Kennerley, & Ivry, 2001). Although 
multiple bottlenecks are identified, not all bottlenecks result in the same interference 
profiles. The severity of the interference depends on the particular resource: procedural 
memory is very fast and therefore only leads to delays in the order of 50 ms (but see 
Taatgen, Juvina, Schipper, Borst, & Martens, 2009, for an example where interference 
caused by the procedural resource explains counter-intuive results in an attentional 
blink dual-task). On the other hand, interference due to declarative memory and 
the visual and motor system leads to pronounced decreases in speed in the order of 
200–500 ms.
Salvucci and Taatgen (2008) did not investigate the role of the problem state 



















Figure Example processing stream in threaded cognition. White boxes depict a visual–
manual task, grey boxes an auditory–vocal task. The ‘A’ represents interference, 
caused by both threads needing the procedural resource at the same time.
2.1
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representations and because this maintenance is required for relatively long periods 
of time (i.e., several seconds), we hypothesize that the problem state is a important 
source of interference in multitasking. We will now turn to three experiments that test 
this hypothesis.
Experiment 1: Subtraction & Text-Entry
In Experiment 1, participants had to perform two tasks concurrently: a subtraction 
task and a text-entry task. Both tasks were presented in two versions: an easy version 
in which there was no need to maintain a problem state, and a hard version where 
participants had to maintain a problem state from one response to the next. Thus, the 
experiment has a 2 ∑ 2 factorial design (Subtraction Difficulty ∑ Text-Entry Difficulty). 
As threaded cognition claims that the problem state resource can only be used by 
one task concurrently, we hypothesized that when a problem state is required in both 
tasks (the hard–hard condition), participants will be significantly slower or make more 
errors than in the other conditions. On the other hand, if just a single task requires a 
problem state, no interference is to be expected on behalf of the problem state. Thus, 
we expected an over-additive interaction effect of task difficulty.
Method
Participants
Fifteen students of the University of Groningen participated in the experiment for 
course credit (10 female, age range 18–31, mean age 20.1). All participants had normal 
or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. Informed consent as approved by the Ethical 
Committee Psychology of the University of Groningen was obtained before testing.
Design	
During the experiment, participants had to perform a subtraction task and a text-entry 
task concurrently. The subtraction task was shown on the left side of the screen, the 
text-entry task on the right (see Figure 2.2). Participants had to alternate between the 
two tasks: after a digit, the subtraction interface was disabled, forcing the participant to 
subsequently enter a letter. After entering a letter, the text-entry interface was disabled 
and the subtraction interface became available again.
The subtraction task is shown on the left side of Figure 2.2. Participants had to solve 
10-column subtraction problems in standard right to left order; they had to enter the 
digits with their left hand using the keyboard. In the easy, no problem state version, 
the upper term was always larger or equal to the lower term; these problems could 
be solved without borrowing. In contrast, the hard version (as shown in Figure 2.2) 
required participants to borrow six times. The assumption is that participants use their 
problem state resource to keep track of whether a borrowing is in progress.
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The second task in the experiment is text-entry. The interface is shown on the right 
in Figure 2.2: by clicking on the on-screen keypad 10-letter strings had to be entered. 
In the easy version of the text-entry task, the strings were presented one letter at a time. 
Participants saw one letter appear on the screen (for example the ‘I’ in Figure 2.2) and 
had to click the corresponding button on the keypad. As soon as a button was pressed, 
the text-entry keypad was disabled and the mouse pointer was hidden to prevent 
participants from putting the pointer on the next letter. When the text-entry task 
was re-enabled, the mouse pointer appeared again in the location where it had been 
hidden.2 Participants could only enter the next letter after the next subtraction column 
was responded to. After 10 letters had been entered, the trial ended automatically. In 
the hard version, a 10-letter word appeared at the start of a trial. When the participant 
clicked on the first letter, the word disappeared and had to be entered without feedback 
(thus, participants could neither see what word they were entering, nor what they had 
entered, the text-entry screen remained blank until the end of the trial). Otherwise, 
both conditions were identical. In the hard version, we assume that participants need 
their problem state resource to keep track of what word they were entering and at 
which position they are (e.g., “informatie, 4th position”).
As is shown in Figure 2.2, participants could earn points (punten in Dutch). 
Participants started out with 200 points. While performing the tasks, the counter at 
the top of the screen decreased by 2 points per second. For every correct letter or digit 
10 points were added to the total (addition was done after finishing the complete trial). 
2
 Participants could have used the mouse to indicate what the last letter was that they entered. However, that would have made 
it harder to find our results, as that means that they would have maintained less information mentally (only the word, not the 
position within the word).
Figure Screenshot of Experiment 1.2.2
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At the end of a trial a feedback display was shown to the participants, indicating how 
many points they gained per task in the current trial. In effect, to score a high amount 
of points participants had to act both quickly and accurately.
Stimuli	and	Apparatus
The stimuli for the subtraction task were generated anew for each participant. The 
subtraction problems in the hard version always featured six borrowings, and resulted 
in 10-digit answers. The 10 letter words for the hard version of the text-entry task 
were handpicked from a list of high frequent Dutch words (CELEX database, Baayen, 
Piepenbrock, & Van Rijn, 1993), to ensure that similarities between words were kept 
to a minimum. These stimuli were also used in the easy text-entry task, except that 
the letters within the words were scrambled (under the constraint that a letter never 
appeared twice in a row). Thus, participants entered random sequences of letters. 
This did not introduce difficulties, because the participants never saw the complete 
letter-sequences but had to enter the letters one-by-one. By scrambling the words, we 
controlled for letter-based effects, while preventing the use of alternative strategies to 
predict the next letter.
The experiment was presented full screen on a 19-inch monitor. The width of both 
the subtraction interface and the text-entry interface measured 9 centimeters, while 
the space between the two tasks was 10 cm; the height of the interfaces was 4.8 cm (see 
also Figure 2.2). Participants were sitting at a normal viewing distance, about 75 cm 
from the screen.
Procedure
A trial started with the appearance of the two tasks. Participants could choose which 
task to start with; after the first response they were required to alternate between 
the tasks. After the last response of a task within a trial a feedback display appeared, 
showing how many letters or digits had been entered correctly. After giving the last 




















Figure Processing stream of replacing a problem state. PS = problem state.2.3
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Before the experiment, participants completed 6 practice trials for the separate tasks, 
and 4 for the dual-task. The experiment consisted of three blocks. Each block consisted 
of four sets of three trials per condition. These condition-sets were randomized within 
a block, with the constraint that the first condition of a block was different from the 
last condition in the previous block. Thus, the participants had to perform 36 trials, 
presented semi-randomly. The complete experiment lasted approximately 45 minutes. 
Halfway the experiment participants could take a short break.
Model
We will first describe the computational cognitive model3 that we developed for the task, 
after which the behavioral and modeling results will be presented side by side. The 
model was developed in the ACT-R cognitive architecture (Anderson, 2007; Anderson, 
Bothell, et al., 2004), using threaded cognition (Salvucci & Taatgen, 2008).
Of particular importance for the tasks at hand is ACT-R’s problem state module. 
This module can hold a problem state, accessible at no time cost. However, changing 
a problem state takes 200 ms (Anderson, 2007). Because the problem state module 
can only hold one chunk of information, the module’s contents have to be exchanged 
frequently when multiple tasks require a problem state. When the problem state is 
replaced, the previous problem state is automatically moved to declarative memory so 
that it can be restored when the other thread needs it. Figure 2.3 displays an example 
processing stream of problem state replacement. The white boxes represent Task A 
that requires the problem state resource, while the grey box represents the problem 
state of Task B, occupying the resource at the start of the example. First, the white 
task notes (“notice wrong PS”) that the problem state resource does not contain its 
own associated problem state, and therefore initiates a process to retrieve this problem 
state from declarative memory. This retrieval takes a certain amount of time, after 
which a production rule (“restore PS”) fires to start restoring the retrieved problem 
state to the problem state resource. This takes a fixed 200 ms. After this initialization 
process, the white task can start with its actual operation. The total time to replace 
the problem state resource is thus 200 ms plus the time for the retrieval plus 100 ms 
for the “notice wrong PS” and “restore PS” production rule executions. Thus, when 
multiple tasks need the problem state resource, the execution time of tasks is increased 
considerably per change of task. An additional effect of this exchange of problem states 
is that because problem states need to be retrieved from memory, it is possible that a 
task retrieves an older, and thus incorrect problem state from memory, resulting in 
behavioral errors. 
The two tasks in the experiment were implemented as two threads: a subtraction 
thread and a text-entry thread. Both threads use the visual module to perceive the 
stimuli and the manual module to operate the mouse and the keyboard. In the easy 
condition of the subtraction task, the model perceives the digits, retrieves a fact from 
memory (e.g., 5 - 2 = 3) and enters the difference. In the hard condition, the general 
3
 Available for download at http://www.ai.rug.nl/~jpborst/models/.
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process is the same. However, if the model retrieves a fact from memory and notices 
that the outcome is negative (e.g., 3 - 6 = -3), the model will add 10 to the upper term, 
store in its problem state that a borrowing is in progress, and retrieve a new fact 
(13 - 6 = 7). When the model encounters a negative subtraction outcome for the first 
time in a trial, it notes in its goal state that it is performing the hard version of the task 
(“subtraction – hard”). This ensures that the model checks for the appropriate problem 
state at the start of each subsequent response-sequence (as the problem state indicates 
whether a borrowing is in progress). If a borrowing is in progress, the model first 
subtracts 1 from the upper term before the initial retrieval is made. 
In the easy version of the text-entry task, the model perceives the letter and clicks on 
the corresponding button. In the hard version, the model has to know the target word 
and the current position within that word. Thus, it requires the problem state resource 
to store what word it is entering and at which position of the word it is (“informatie, 
4th position”). If the model performs a trial in the hard condition, it will use the word 
and position in its problem state to come up with the next letter. To simulate the 
spelling processes required to come up with “letter 5 from the word informatie”, we 
have assumed that an additional declarative retrieval is necessary that links the current 
position to the next letter. As spelling words is not the focus of this article, we did not 
model this in detail, but instead assumed an additional retrieval. After the model has 
determined the next letter, it clicks the appropriate button and updates its problem 
state to reflect that it is one position further in the word. 
The ACT-R theory predicts the time it takes to perceive a stimulus, to press a key 
and to move the mouse, and to retrieve facts from declarative memory, which makes 
it meaningful to incorporate these parts of the task in the model. These elements 
of ACT-R have been tested and validated separately, many examples can be found at 
http://act-r.psy.cmu.edu/. Instead of discussing all details here, we refer the reader to 
Anderson (2007) for more information.
Because the model requires two problem states that need to be exchanged at 
each trial in the hard–hard condition, and either zero (easy–easy) or one (easy–hard, 
hard–easy) in the other conditions, it predicts an over-additive effect of task difficulty 
on response times. Possibly, the number of errors will also increase, depending on 
whether older and incorrect problem states are retrieved frequently.
Results
Only the data of the experimental phase were analyzed. Two participants did not 
adhere to task instructions and were removed from the dataset. Outliers in response 
times faster than 250 ms and slower than 9000 ms were removed from the data, after 
which we removed data exceeding 3 standard deviations from the mean per condition 
per participant (in total, 2.0% of the data was removed). All reported F- and p-values 
are from repeated-measure ANOVAs, all error bars depict standard errors, effects 
were judged significant if they reached a .05 significance level. Accuracy data were 
transformed using an arcsine transformation before performing ANOVAs. Figure 2.4 
shows the main results, black bars depict experimental data, grey bars model data.
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Response	Times
Response time on the text-entry task was defined as the time between entering 
a digit in the subtraction task and clicking on a button of the text-entry task. First 
responses of each trial were removed. The upper left panel of Figure 2.4 shows the 
results. First, an interaction effect between Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry 
Difficulty (F(1,12) = 22.15, p < .001, η
p
2 = .65) was found. Next, we performed a simple 
effects analysis, showing an effect of Text-Entry Difficulty when subtraction was hard 
(F(1,12) = 10.78, p < .01, η
p
2 = .47), and an effect of Subtraction Difficulty when text-
entry was hard (F(1,12) = 47.16, p < .001, η
p
2  = .80). The other simple effects did not 
reach significance: Text-Entry Difficulty when subtraction was easy (F(1,12) = 1.88, 
p = .20, η
p
2  = .14) and Subtraction Difficulty when text-entry was easy (F(1,12) = 3.35, 
p = .09, η
p
2  = .22). Thus, there was an over-additive interaction effect of task difficulty 
on response times of the text-entry task; participants were slowest to respond in the 
hard–hard condition, no other effects were found.
Figure 2.4, upper right panel, shows the average response times on the subtraction 
task. This is the time between clicking a button in the text-entry task and entering a 
digit in the subtraction task. Again, first responses of a trial were removed, as were 
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Figure Results of Experiment 1. RMSD = root mean squared deviation.2.4
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those are in effect easy responses. An interaction effect between Subtraction Difficulty 
and Text-Entry Difficulty was observed (F(1,12) = 6.24, p = .03, η
p
2  = .34). A simple 
effects analysis revealed that all simple effects were significant: Subtraction Difficulty 
when text-entry was easy (F(1,12) = 69.04, p < .001, η
p
2  = .85), Subtraction Difficulty 
when text-entry was hard (F(1,12) = 111.64, p < .001, η
p
2  = .90), Text-Entry Difficulty 
when subtraction was easy (F(1,12) = 11.65, p < .01, η
p
2  = .49),  and Text-Entry Difficulty 
when subtraction was hard (F(1,12) = 11.81, p < .01, η
p
2  = .50). Thus, the more difficult 
the tasks, the higher the response times, with an over-additive effect in the hard–hard 
condition, reflected by the interaction.
Accuracy
Figure 2.4, lower left panel, shows the accuracy on the text-entry task, in percentage 
correctly entered letters. Both main effects were significant: Subtraction Difficulty 
(F(1,12) = 7.31, p = .02, η
p
2  = .38) and Text-Entry Difficulty (F(1,12) = 21.57, p < .001, 
η
p
2  = .64). The interaction effect between Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry 
Difficulty shows a trend towards significance (F(1,12) = 4.65, p = .052, η
p
2  = .28). Thus, 
accuracy on the text-entry task decreased as a function of both Text-Entry Difficulty and 
Subtraction Difficulty, with a trend towards a stronger decrease when both tasks were 
hard.
In the lower right panel of Figure 2.4, the accuracy on the subtraction task is shown. 
Here, a significant interaction effect between Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry 
Difficulty was observed: F(1,12) = 10.50, p < .01, η
p
2  = .47. A simple effects analysis 
subsequently revealed that three simple effects reached significance: Text-Entry 
Difficulty when subtraction was hard (F(1,12) = 6.68, p = .02, η
p
2  = .36), Subtraction 
Difficulty when text-entry was easy (F(1,12) = 7.17, p = .02, η
p
2  = .37), and Subtraction 
Difficulty when text-entry was hard (F(1,12) = 87.7, p < .001, η
p
2  = .88). Text-Entry 
Difficulty when subtraction was easy did not reach significance (F(1,12) = 3.64, p = .08, 
η
p
2  = .23). Thus, when subtraction was hard accuracy was lower, but this effect was even 
stronger when text-entry was hard as well.
Model
The grey bars in Figure 2.4 show the results of the model. It resembles the empirical 
data closely (R2- and Root Mean Squared Deviation-values are displayed in the graphs). 
The model shows the same interaction effects as the data, both in response times and 
accuracy. To fit the model, we estimated how long memory retrievals take4 and how 
often incorrect memories are retrieved (i.e., retrieving problem states from declarative 
memory in the hard–hard condition, but also arithmetic errors like 9 - 6 resulting in 2 
instead of 3). The incorrect retrievals were modeled in a similar fashion as in Anderson, 
4
ACT-R’s latency factor was set to .3 and activation noise to .1. Furthermore, subtraction facts were divided into two groups, 
one group of facts having a minuend under 10, and one group above 10. A third group was formed by the addition facts. The 
activation levels for those three groups of arithmetic facts were scaled to fit the participant group’s behavior. The exact values of 
these parameters can be found in the model code online at http://www.ai.rug.nl/~jpborst/models/.
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Reder and Lebiere’s (1996; see also Lebiere, 1999) model that accounts for arithmetic 
errors. All other parameters were kept at the default values of ACT-R 6.0 (Anderson, 
2007; see also Anderson, Bothell, Lebiere, & Matessa, 1998).
As explained in detail above, the interaction effect in the model data is driven by 
the problem state bottleneck in the hard–hard condition. The model also accounts 
for the different reaction time patterns in the two tasks: in the subtraction task there 
is a large main effect of Subtraction Difficulty, while there is no such effect in the 
response times of the text-entry task. The model accounts for this by assuming that in 
the hard subtraction task, participants have to retrieve multiple facts from declarative 
memory to be able to enter a digit, as opposed to the easy subtraction task, in which 
only one fact has to be retrieved. In the text-entry task, on the other hand, there is no 
such difference between the easy and the hard task: in the easy version the model has 
to look at the display to see what letter it has to enter, while in the hard version it has 
to retrieve an order fact from memory and use information from its problem state to 
enter a letter. The timing of those processes is similar, resulting in the absence of a 
main effect of Text-Entry Difficulty on the response times in the text-entry task (cf. the 
upper left panel of Figure 2.4).
The model keeps track of the task condition in its goal state (“subtraction – hard”, 
see the model description above). This state was set as soon as the thread noticed that 
it was performing a hard trial: initially it was always set to easy, but when the model 
came across a borrowing in the subtraction task or a complete word in the text-entry 
task, it would be set to hard. Did the participants also keep track of the task condition? 
We compared response times of subtraction columns from the hard condition in 
which no borrowing is in progress and in which no new borrowing is necessary (i.e., 
in every way comparable to columns in the easy condition, except that a borrowing 
has occurred more than one column back; for instance the left-most column of Figure 
2.2), to columns of the easy subtraction condition. The difference in response time 
(2256.3 vs. 1466.3 ms) is significant (paired t-test, t(12) = -10.10, p < .001). This seems to 
indicate that participants were sensitive to the context of the current trial (i.e., the task 
condition): the task in these no-borrow columns in the hard subtraction conditions 
is exactly the same as in the easy subtraction task, only the context is different. This 
is consistent with the model’s keeping-track account, which always checks whether a 
borrowing is in progress in the hard trials but not in the easy trials. For the model, this 
results in a difference in response times between hard responses that are comparable 
to the easy task and easy responses, although the difference is smaller (1762.4 vs. 
1583.8 ms).
Discussion
The interaction effects in the data are in agreement with our model predictions: an 
over-additive effect of task difficulty on response times and error rates (a trend in the 
case of accuracy on the text-entry task). As described above, the model accounts for 
these interaction effects by proposing a problem state bottleneck that results in higher 
response times on the one hand (caused by constantly replacing the problem state) and 
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higher error rates on the other (caused by retrieving older, incorrect problem states). The 
errors in the other conditions are caused by sometimes retrieving wrong facts from 
memory (i.e., 9 - 6 results in 2 instead of 3, see Anderson et al., 1996; and Lebiere, 
1999).
Another interesting observation is the effect of condition of one task on the other 
task. More specifically, there is a significant effect of Text-Entry Difficulty on the 
reaction times of the subtraction task when subtraction was easy, and a marginal 
significant effect (p = .09) of Subtraction Difficulty on reaction times of the text-entry 
task when text-entry was easy. As can be seen in Figure 2.4, the model captures these 
effects. In the model, these effects are due to the time costs associated with updating 
the problem state at the end of a step in the respective hard conditions. For instance, 
after entering a digit in the hard subtraction task, the model updates its problem state 
to indicate that it finished a step in the subtraction task. The text-entry task only starts 
when this problem state update is finished, causing a slight delay in the start of the 
text-entry task.
Alternative	strategies
Except for an account based on a problem state bottleneck, there might be other 
possible explanations for the interaction effects. For example, participants might have 
employed different task strategies depending on the task condition. However, in the 
case of the text-entry task it is not easy to come up with alternative strategies because 
the task is so straightforward. In the easy condition, participants have to read a letter 
and click a button, which does not seem to allow for multiple strategies. In the hard 
text-entry condition, participants have to memorize the word, as they do not receive 
any feedback at all. Furthermore, they have to keep track of where they are within a 
word, for instance by memorizing the position or the last letter they entered. While 
the model does memorize the position, alternative strategies exist such as memorizing 
the last entered letter and reconstruct the position from that information. However, 
irrespective of which strategy was used, participants will have to keep track of the 
current position in some way, for which we assume they have to use their problem 
state. 
In the case of the subtraction task there is at least one possible alternative strategy. 
Participants could have used the display to determine whether or not a borrowing is in 
progress instead of maintaining a problem state (i.e., looking at the previous subtraction 
column, if the lower term is higher than the upper term, a borrowing is in progress). 
If this had been the overall strategy, it would have had the same impact on both the 
hard subtraction – easy text-entry and hard subtraction – hard text-entry conditions. In 
that case, one would not expect to find an interaction effect, as the problem state is not 
used for the subtraction task. However, it is possible that participants only switched to 
this strategy in the hard–hard condition: thus using a problem state strategy as long as 
text-entry is easy, and switching to an interface strategy when text-entry became hard. 
This would incur a time cost in the hard–hard condition, and would thus have resulted 
in a similar interaction effect as we found. To rule out this alternative explanation, 
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we controlled for this in Experiment 3 by masking previous columns, yielding, as 
we will see, the same results. Obviously, alternative strategies also exist for solving a 
borrow-in-progress. For instance, one could subtract one from the upper term of the 
next column, or add one to the lower term, giving the same results. However, in both 
cases it is necessary to keep track of whether a borrowing is in progress, resulting in 
similar latency predictions.
Is	a	problem	state	bottleneck	necessary?
As the threaded cognition theory already proposes a number of bottlenecks, is an 
additional problem state bottleneck necessary to account for the observed interaction? 
The over-additive interaction is caused by a resource that is required in both hard 
conditions, but not in the other conditions. As the hard conditions require additional 
information to be kept available, a bottleneck should be related to this additional 
information maintenance. The bottleneck associated with production rule execution 
cannot offer an explanation for the found interactions, because production rule activity 
cannot store information without using another resource. A possible alternative 
explanation is that ‘problem states’ are stored as declarative memory chunks and are 
retrieved when needed, instead of having a separate problem state resource. In such a 
model, however, one would not expect to find an interaction effect because declarative 
memory is never concurrently required by the two tasks, as the participants have to 
alternate between the tasks. Thus, in that case the first task would retrieve its problem 
state from declarative memory and give a response, after which the second task 
would retrieve its own problem state from declarative memory and give a response, 
etc. Because declarative memory is in that case never required by both tasks at the 
same time, it cannot explain the effect of one task on the other task. Thus, we would 
predict a simple additive effect of conditions, not an interaction effect. As the two 
peripheral bottlenecks cannot be used to store information, we argue that a problem 
state bottleneck is the most plausible option to account for the human data.
Cognitive	load	effects
While we argued above that a problem state bottleneck is the most plausible account 
within the ACT-R-based threaded cognition theory, there is an extensive psychological 
literature on cognitive load that can also explain the results of Experiment 1. For 
instance, it is shown that memory load causes an increase in reaction time in tasks as 
simple as visual search (e.g., Logan, 1979; Woodman, Vogel, & Luck, 2001) and tone 
classification (Jolicœur & Dell’Acqua, 1999). Thus, in that sense it is not surprising 
that maintaining an additional memory load (problem state) influences another task 
with a memory load, resulting in the over-additive interaction effect. To rule out the 
possibility of cognitive load causing the interaction effect, Experiment 2 was designed. 
The dual-task setup of Experiment 1 was slightly modified by requiring the participants 
to switch tasks only after every two responses in each task. Thus, Experiment 2 also 
includes responses where no problem state switch is required, but where a memory 
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load representing the state of the other task still has to be maintained (see Figure 2.5). 
This means that the cognitive load is equal (the memory load of the other task) on both 
responses, while the problem state only has to be switched for the first response and 
is still available for the second response. According to a cognitive load account, the 
interaction effect should be present on both responses, but according to a problem 
state bottleneck account, the interaction effect should only be present on the first 
response, and disappear on the second.
Experiment 2: 
Subtraction & Text-Entry – Two Responses Per Switch
Experiment 2 was designed to test whether the problem state bottleneck can be 
observed when controlling for cognitive load effects. The design of the experiment 
was the same as Experiment 1, except that participants now had to give two responses 
on each task before switching to the other task. Thus, the new experiment has 
a 2 ∑ 2 ∑ 2 design (Subtraction Difficulty ∑ Text-Entry Difficulty ∑ Switch). Switch 
responses are the first responses on a task, directly after switching from the other task; 
non-switch responses are the second responses on a task, following a response in the 
same task (cf. task switching). Figure 2.5 shows the experimental setup, detailing when 
a memory / cognitive load is present, and when problem state changes are required 
in the hard–hard condition. On the basis of the problem state bottleneck hypothesis 
and the outcome of Experiment 1, we predict an over-additive interaction effect in 
the switch condition (because the problem state has to be replaced for each response 
in the hard–hard condition), but simple additive main effects in the non-switch 
condition (because the problem state does not have to be replaced in any condition, 
as the previous response was given in the same task). Because the memory load is 
the same on switch and non-switch responses (whether a borrowing is in progress for 
subtraction / what the word and position are for text-entry), a cognitive load account 
would predict identical effects for both switch and non-switch responses. Thus, we did 
not introduce additional cognitive load, but merely removed problem state changes on 
the non-switch responses, enabling the comparison between a cognitive load account 
and a problem state account.
Method
Participants
Fifteen students of the University of Groningen who did not take part in Experiment 
1 participated in the experiment for course credit (9 female, age range 18–23, mean 
age 19.8). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. Informed 
consent as approved by the Ethical Committee Psychology of the University of 
Groningen was obtained before testing.
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Design,	Stimuli,	&	Procedure
Design, stimuli and procedure were identical to Experiment 1, except that participants 
were now required to alternate after every two responses, thus they had to enter two 
digits, two letters, two digits, et cetera. 
Model
The model of Experiment 1 was extended to enable it to respond in the situation where 
a response directly followed a response within the same task.5 Furthermore, we scaled 
retrieval times of declarative facts and number of incorrect retrievals to match the new 
participant group’s cognitive arithmetic ability, as we did in Experiment 1.6
Results
Only the data of the experimental phase were analyzed. One participant did not adhere 
to task instructions and was removed from the data set. The same exclusion criteria 
were used as in Experiment 1 (3.8% of the data was rejected). If not noted otherwise, 
analyses were the same as in Experiment 1. Figures 2.6 and 2.7 show the main results 
for response times and accuracy.
Response	Times
In line with our hypothesis, ANOVAs on response times showed significant three-way 
interactions of Subtraction Difficulty ∑ Text-Entry Difficulty ∑ Switch on both the 
response times of the text-entry task (F(1,13) = 29.99, p = .001, η
p
2  = .70) and the 
subtraction task (F(1,13) = 5.96, p = .03, η
p
2  = .31). Therefore, the following analyses 
were performed separately on the switch and non-switch data.
5
 While the model was extended, we could have used this new model for Experiment 1 without affecting the results; the situation 
in which a response can be followed by a response on the same task just never occurs in Experiment 1.
6
 ACT-R’s latency factor and activation noise were not changed (respectively .3 and .1). The activation levels of the three groups 
of arithmetic chunks of Footnote 4 were adjusted for the new group of participants.
Time
Task Switch
Problem State Change X X X
Memory Load X X X X X X
digit digit digitdigitletter letter etc.Task
X X X
t .   
Subtraction Text Entry
Figure Experimental setup of Experiment 2. Grey boxes represent the subtraction task, white 
boxes the Text Entry task. The black Xs show the problem state and memory load in the 
hard–hard condition: on the switch responses there is both a problem state change 
and a memory load, while on the non-switch responses only a memory load is present.
2.5
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The upper panels of Figure 2.6 show the response times on the text-entry task. On 
the left the switch data are shown, on the right the non-switch data. As predicted, an 
interaction effect of Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty was found on the 
switch trials (F(1,13) = 19.8, p < .001, η
p
2  = .60). A simple effects analysis subsequently 
revealed significant effects of Text-Entry Difficulty when subtraction was easy 
(F(1,13) = 27.6, p < .01, η
p
2  = .68), Text-Entry Difficulty when subtraction was hard 
(F(1,13) = 59.2, p < .001, η
p
2  = .82), Subtraction Difficulty when text-entry was easy 
(F(1,13) = 13.2, p < .01, η
p
2  = .50), and Subtraction Difficulty when text-entry was hard 
(F(1,13) = 135.1, p < .001, η
p
2  = .91). Thus, response times on the switch responses of 
the text-entry task increased with task difficulty, with an over-additive interaction 
effect when both tasks were hard. An analysis of the non-switch responses of the 
text-entry task (upper right panel) showed that only the main effect of Text-Entry 
Difficulty reached significance, (F(1,13) = 377.53, p < .001, η
p
2  = .97). The main effect of 
Subtraction Difficulty (F < 1) and the interaction effect between Subtraction Difficulty 
and Text-Entry Difficulty (F(1,13) = 2.4, p = .15, η
p
2  = .16) were not significant. Note that 
response times decreased with Text-Entry Difficulty, instead of increasing.
The two lower panels of Figure 2.6 show response times on the subtraction 
task. The left panel shows the switch responses. An ANOVA revealed a significant 
interaction effect of Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty (F(1,13) = 6.9, 
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Figure Response time data of Experiment 2. RMSD = root mean squared deviation.2.6
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p = .02, η
p
2  = .35). Subsequent simple effects analyses showed significant effects of Text-
Entry Difficulty when subtraction was easy (F(1,13) = 19.1, p < .001, η
p
2  = .59), Text-Entry 
Difficulty when subtraction was hard (F(1,13) = 14.7, p < .01, η
p
2  = .53), Subtraction 
Difficulty when text-entry was easy (F(1,13) = 104.9, p < .001, η
p
2  = .89), and Subtraction 
Difficulty when text-entry was hard (F(1,13) = 185.5, p < .001, η
p
2  = .93). Thus, response 
times on the switch responses of the subtraction task increase with task difficulty, 
with an over-additive interaction effect, resulting in the highest response times in the 
hard–hard condition. The non-switch response times are shown in the lower right 
panel of Figure 2.6. Only the main effect of Subtraction Difficulty was significant 
(F(1,13) = 305.2, p < .001, η
p
2  = .96), the main effect of Text-Entry Difficulty and the 
interaction effect were not significant, Fs < 1. Thus, non-switch response times were 
lower when the subtraction task was easy.
Accuracy
Figure 2.7 shows the accuracy data of Experiment 2. An ANOVA on the text-entry 
data shows only a significant main effect of Text-Entry Difficulty (F(1,13) = 9.7, 
p < .01, η
p
2  = .43). The main effect of Switch (F(1,13) = 2.23, p = .16, η
p
2  = .15) and 
Subtraction Difficulty (F(1,13) = 1.46, p = .25, η
p
2  = .10) were not significant, neither 
were the interaction effects between Switch and Subtraction Difficulty (F < 1), Switch 
and Text-Entry Difficulty (F(1,13) = 3.29, p = .09, η
p
2  = .20), Subtraction and Text-Entry 
Difficulty (F < 1), and the three-way interaction between Switch, Subtraction Difficulty 
and Text-Entry Difficulty (F(1,13) = 3.52, p = .08, η
p
2  = .21). Thus, accuracy on the 
text-entry task was lower when text-entry was hard.
Along the same lines, an analysis of the subtraction data only revealed a significant 
main effect of Subtraction Difficulty (F(1,13) = 40.7, p < .001, η
p
2  = .76). The main effects 
of Switch (F(1,13) = 2.55, p = .13, η
p
2  = .16) and Text-Entry Difficulty (F < 1) did not reach 
significance, neither did the interaction effects of Switch and Subtraction Difficulty 
(F <  1), Switch and Text-Entry Difficulty (F < 1), Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry 
Difficulty (F(1,13) = 1.53, p = .24, η
p
2  = .11), or the three-way interaction between Switch, 
Subtraction Difficulty, and Text-Entry Difficulty (F < 1). Again, subtraction accuracy 
only decreased when the subtraction task became hard.
Model
The model fits well to the response time data (Figure 2.6, grey bars, R2- and RMSD-
values are shown in the graphs). It shows on the one hand the interaction effects in 
the switch responses, caused by the problem state replacements for each response, and 
on the other hand no interaction effects in the non-switch responses. Furthermore, it 
reflects the decrease in response times on the text-entry task non-switch responses, 
when text-entry was hard (the reason why the model shows these effects is discussed 
below). The model also follows the accuracy data closely (Figure 2.7): In general 
capturing the (non-significant) interaction effects in the hard–hard conditions, but 
slightly over-estimating these effects in the text-entry task.
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Discussion
As predicted by the model, an over-additive interaction effect was found on the switch 
response times in both tasks, but not on the non-switch response times. The model 
explains this by assuming a problem state bottleneck, requiring the replacement of 
the problem state in the hard–hard condition of the switch responses. In the non-
switch responses, on the other hand, the problem state never has to be switched: it 
is still present from the previous response. A cognitive load account would predict 
an interaction effect both in the switch and the non-switch responses, because the 
memory load of the other task is present in both cases (see also Figure 2.5). However, 
as no interaction effect was observed on the non-switch trials, cognitive load of the 
other task does not seem to have caused the effects observed in Experiment 1 and in the 
switch trials in Experiment 2. On the other hand, the model fit shows that a problem 
state bottleneck account accounts well for the data. Note that we equated cognitive load 
here with memory load (as for example, Logan, 1979), while there is no consensus in 
the literature to what exactly constitutes cognitive load. Nonetheless, irrespective of 
the operationalization of cognitive load, Experiment 2 still gives additional support 
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Figure Accuracy data of Experiment 2. RMSD = root mean squared deviation.2.7
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to a problem state account: When the problem state does not have to be changed, the 
interaction effect that shows problem state interference disappears.
A second interesting effect is the lower average response time of the hard non-switch 
text-entry responses, as compared to the easy non-switch responses (upper right panel 
of Figure 2.6). The model explains this decrease by the fact that in the hard condition 
it is already known what word has to be entered, and thus also what the next letter 
is that has to be clicked. Therefore, the model does not have to look at the display of 
the text-entry task to see what it has to enter, as in the easy version, but can directly 
search for the correct button and click it. For the switch responses, this decrease in 
response time is not present, because in that case the model starts the hard text-entry 
task by retrieving spelling information from declarative memory to determine which 
letter it has to enter next. On the non-switch responses, the model already initiates 
the retrieval of the spelling information while clicking the mouse for the previous 
response, enabling faster responses.
Furthermore, participants were also in general faster on the non-switch responses 
than on the switch responses. This effect can be explained by the fact that it is necessary 
to redirect vision and attention to the other task on the other side of the screen on the 
switch responses, while this is not necessary on the non-switch responses (cf. task 
switching).
Phonological	Loop
Experiment 2 has shown that a memory load probably did not cause the interference 
effects in the data. However, another possible explanation is that the problem state 
information in the hard tasks was verbally mediated, and that the phonological loop 
(e.g., Baddeley & Hitch, 1974) acted as a bottleneck, instead of the problem state 
resource. That is, if problem state information is rehearsed in the phonological loop, it is 
possible that there is some overhead in retrieving information when more information 
has to be rehearsed in the hard–hard condition. This alternative account would result 
in an interaction effect. To test whether the phonological loop is used for storing the 
problem state information, a third experiment was performed. While Experiment 
2 was aimed at the maintenance of the information in working memory without 
rehearsal, Experiment 3 specifically targets possible rehearsal of the information. In 
this experiment a listening comprehension task was added to the subtraction and text-
entry dual-task, overloading the phonological loop.
Experiment 3: Triple-tasking
For Experiment 3, a listening comprehension task was added to the subtraction and text-
entry task: in half of the trials participants had to listen to short stories while performing 
the other tasks. At the end of a trial, participants had to answer a multiple-choice 
question about these stories. The experiment has a 2 ∑ 2 ∑ 2 design (Subtraction 
Difficulty ∑ Text-Entry Difficulty ∑ Listening). Adding a continuous listening task 
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results in the phonological loop being constantly filled with verbal information. If a 
phonological loop bottleneck was the reason for the interaction effects in Experiments 
1 and 2, adding the listening task should produce similar effects in the easy–hard and 
hard–easy conditions as we previously saw in the hard–hard condition, because now 
it is also in use by multiple tasks in these conditions. Thus, if the problem state is 
maintained in the phonological loop, we should now find interference effects as soon 
as one problem state is stored alongside the information of the listening task (in the 
easy–hard and hard–easy conditions). If, on the other hand, the interaction effects were 
caused by a problem state bottleneck, one would expect the same patterns in the data 
as found in Experiment 1, with possibly higher response times and error rates over 
all conditions due to increased cognitive load. Furthermore, our model proposes that, 
as long as no additional use of the problem state resource is introduced, the problem 
state bottleneck is independent of the number of tasks and of the amount of cognitive 
load. Therefore, adding the listening task to the experiment should not influence the 




Twenty-three students of the University of Groningen who did not participate in 
Experiments 1 and 2 participated in Experiment 3 for course credit; one participant had 
to be excluded because of technical difficulties, resulting in 22 complete datasets (17 
female, age range 18–47, mean 22.0). A different set of 6 students participated in the 
listening baseline experiment (5 female, age range 18–21, mean 19.3). All participants 
had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and normal hearing. Informed consent 
as approved by the Ethical Committee Psychology of the University of Groningen was 
obtained before testing.
Design
The subtraction and text-entry tasks remained unchanged, apart from one thing: 
columns in the subtraction task that were solved were masked with #-marks, preventing 
display-based strategies (see the Discussion of Experiment 1). The listening task 
consisted of listening to a short story during each trial, about which a multiple-choice 
question was asked at the end of the trial. After answering the question, participants 
received accuracy feedback, to ensure they kept focusing on the stories. The design of 
the baseline experiment was similar, but instead of the subtraction and text-entry tasks 
a fixation cross was shown.
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Stimuli
Stimuli for the subtraction and text-entry task were the same as in Experiment 1, 
except that six additional words were selected. The listening task was compiled out 
of two official Dutch listening comprehension exams (NIVOR-3.1/3.2, Cito Arnhem 
1998). The story length ranged between 17 and 48 seconds (M = 30.4, SD = 10.9). The 
multiple-choice questions consisted of three options. Two example questions are:
You would like to buy a new washing machine. When will you get a discount?
A. If you pay cash. 
B. If you buy an extended warranty. 
C. If you buy a dryer as well.
You are visiting a laboratory with colleagues. What should you do with your lab coat 
when you leave? 
A. Put it in the yellow container. 
B. Put it in the green container. 
C. Reuse it.
These questions can be answered without making inferences, but do require attention 
for the complete duration of the story (i.e., the color of the container in the second 
question is only said once; participants only see the question after they heard the text).
Procedure
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1 if not noted otherwise. In this experiment, 
participants had to start each trial with the subtraction task. In the listening condition, 
playback of the story was initiated simultaneously with the presentation of the 
subtraction task. Thus, the listening task had to be performed concurrently with the 
subtraction and text-entry tasks. The multiple-choice question for the listening task 
was presented either after the feedback screens of the other tasks, or after the story was 
completely presented, whichever came last. The feedback screen for the listening task 
was presented for 4 seconds after answering the question. Participants were instructed 
that the listening task was the most important task, and had to be given priority over 
the other tasks, while still performing the other tasks as quickly and accurately as 
possible.
Participants practiced 4 example stories. The experiment consisted of 4 blocks of 
12 trials each, 48 trials in total, in a similar setup as Experiment 1. Either the first two 
blocks were combined with the listening task, or the last two blocks, counterbalanced 
over participants. The order of the stories was randomized. The complete experiment 
lasted approximately 60 minutes.
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Model
The same model as for Experiment 1 was used for the subtraction and text-entry tasks, 
adjusted for the differences in arithmetic skills between participant groups as was 
done to calibrate the model to the skill level of the participants in Experiment 2. That 
is, we adjusted retrieval times of declarative facts and number of incorrect retrievals to 
match the new group of participants.7
To model the listening task, we added a third thread to the model. This thread 
aurally perceives words, retrieves spelling and syntactic information from memory, 
and builds simulated syntactic trees. The same approach was used by Salvucci and 
Taatgen (2008) to model the classical reading and dictation study by Spelke, Hirst, 
and Neisser (1976), and by Van Rij, Hendriks, Spenader, and Van Rijn (2009) and 
Hendriks, Van Rijn and Valkenier (2007) to account for developmental patterns in 
children’s ability to process pronouns. This model is a simplified version of Lewis 
and Vasishth’s model of sentence processing (2005; Lewis, Vasishth, & Van Dyke, 
7
 ACT-R’s latency factor and activation noise were again left unchanged  (respectively .3 and .1). The activation levels of the 
three groups of arithmetic chunks of Footnote 4 were adjusted for the new group of participants.
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2006) that constructs syntactic trees for sentence processing. For the current model 
that kind of linguistic detail is unnecessary, as we are mostly interested in how the 
tasks influence one another. Thus, it suffices to account for the use of procedural and 
declarative memory in the listening task.
For each word, the aural module processes the word, four procedural rules fire, and 
two facts are retrieved from memory, which results in about 320 ms processing time 
per word, which is fast enough to keep up with the speaking rate of 372 ms per word 
on average.8 Because ACT-R’s aural module is used to perceive the words, using a 
phonological loop-based strategy is prevented as this strategy is implemented in ACT-R 
as a combination of the aural and vocal modules (Huss & Byrne, 2003). No control or 
executive mechanisms were added to the model: the interleaving of the tasks was left 
to threaded cognition. Answering the multiple-choice questions was not modeled, as 
this would have required linguistic processing at a level of complexity that is beyond 
the scope of this paper.
Results
The same exclusion criteria were used as in Experiment 1 (2.4% of the data was 
rejected). One question from the listening task was removed, as it was consistently 
answered incorrectly. If not noted otherwise, analyses were the same as in Experiment 
1. Because the stories did not always last for the complete trials of the subtraction 
and text-entry task, some responses on these tasks were made without participants 
listening to a story. Therefore, we only took responses into account that were made 
while the story was present.9
Response	Times
Figure 2.8, upper panel, shows response times on the text-entry task, on the left without 
and on the right with the listening task. As there is no main effect of Listening, nor any 
interaction effects involving Listening (all Fs < 1, except for the interaction between 
Listening and Subtraction Difficulty: F(1,21) = 1.9, p = .18, η
p
2  = .08), we collapsed over 
Listening. The interaction between Text-Entry Difficulty and Subtraction Difficulty was 
significant (F(1,21) = 38.78, p < .001, η
p
2  = .65); a simple effects analysis showed effects 
of Text-Entry Difficulty when subtraction was hard (F(1,21) = 37.17, p < .001, η
p
2  = .64), 
Subtraction Difficulty when text-entry was easy (F(1,21) = 30.89, p < .001, η
p
2  = .60), and 
Subtraction Difficulty when text-entry was hard (F(1,21) = 80.60, p < .001, η
p
2  = .79). 
Text-Entry Difficulty when subtraction was easy did not reach significance (F(1,21) = 3.0, 
p = .10, η
p
2  = .13). Thus, there was no effect from the listening task on the response 
times of the text-entry task. Irrespective of the listening task, response times increased 
8
 Note that the model is capable of listening to speech faster than 320 ms/word, because the audio module can already start 
processing the next word while the current word is processed.
9
 Because this results in an unequal number of observations per cell, we also fitted linear mixed effects models (Baayen et al., 
2008). The linear mixed effect models confirmed the ANOVA results. For reasons of consistency, we decided against reporting 
these additional statistics in the main text, but refer the reader to the Appendix for more details.
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when subtraction was hard, with an additional increase when text-entry was also hard, 
resulting in the interaction effect.
The lower panel of Figure 2.8 shows response times on the subtraction task, on 
the left without, and on the right in combination with the listening task. An ANOVA 
showed that the three-way interaction between Listening, Subtraction Difficulty, and 
Text-Entry Difficulty did not reach significance (F(1,21) = 3.2, p = .09, η
p
2  = .13), but 
the main effect of Listening did (F(1,21) = 4.97, p = .04, η
p
2  = .19). Furthermore, all 
two-way interactions reached significance: between Listening and Subtraction 
Difficulty (F(1,21) = 9.33, p < .01, η
p
2  = .31), between Listening and Text-Entry Difficulty 
(F(1,21) = 5.98, p = .02, η
p
2  = .22), and between Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry 
Difficulty (F(1,21) = 14.3, p < .01, η
p
2  = .40). A subsequent simple effects analysis of 
Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty when the listening task had to be 
performed revealed significant effects of Text-Entry Difficulty when subtraction was 
hard (F(1,21) = 7.12, p = .01, η
p
2  = .25), Subtraction Difficulty when text-entry was easy 
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(F(1,21) = 347.1, p < .001, η
p
2  = .94), and Subtraction Difficulty when text-entry was hard 
(F(1,21) = 175.3, p < .001, η
p
2  = .89). Text-Entry Difficulty when subtraction was easy did 
not reach significance (F(1,21) = 3.8, p = .07, η
p
2  = .15). When the listening task did not 
have to be performed, all simple effects were significant: Text-Entry Difficulty when 
subtraction was easy (F(1,21) = 26.9, p < .001, η
p
2  = .56),  Text-Entry Difficulty when 
subtraction was hard (F(1,21) = 27.1, p < .001, η
p
2  = .56), Subtraction Difficulty when 
text-entry was easy (F(1,21) = 337.2, p < .001, η
p
2  = .94), and Subtraction Difficulty when 
text-entry was hard (F(1,21) = 226.7, p < .001, η
p
2  = .92). Furthermore, Listening had 
a significant effect when both subtraction and text-entry were easy (F(1,21) = 4.37, p = 
.05, η
p
2  = .17) and when subtraction was hard and text-entry easy (F(1,21) = 10.5, p < .01, 
η
p
2  = .33), but not when subtraction was easy and text-entry was hard or when both tasks 
were hard (Fs < 1). To summarize, response times on the subtraction task increased 
when the listening task had to be performed and with task difficulty of the subtraction 
and text-entry tasks. Furthermore, the effects of Text-Entry Difficulty were smaller 
when the listening task had to be performed, while the effects of Subtraction Difficulty 
were larger when the listening task had to be performed (as shown by the two-way 
interaction effects). An over-additive interaction effect of Subtraction Difficulty and 
Text-Entry Difficulty was present, both when the listening task had to be performed 
and when it did not have to be performed.
Accuracy
In Figure 2.9 the accuracy data of Experiment 3 is displayed. The upper panels show 
the accuracy on the Text-Entry task. As there was neither an effect of Listening, nor 
any interaction effects involving Listening (all Fs < 1), we collapsed over Listening. 
The subsequent ANOVA showed an interaction effect of Subtraction Difficulty and 
Text-Entry Difficulty (F(1,21) = 6.55, p = .02, η
p
2  = .24). Three of the four simple effects 
were significant: Text-Entry Difficulty when subtraction was easy (F(1,21) = 7.81, p = .01, 
η
p
2  = .27), Text-Entry Difficulty when subtraction was hard (F(1,21) = 33.1, p < .001, 
η
p
2  = .61), and Subtraction Difficulty when text-entry was hard (F(1,21) = 16.0, p < .001, 
η
p
2  = .43). Subtraction Difficulty when text-entry was easy did not reach significance 
(F < 1). Thus, accuracy on the text-entry task was lower when text-entry was hard, with 
an over-additive effect when subtraction was hard as well.
The lower panels of Figure 2.9 show the accuracy data on the subtraction task. 
Again, there were no significant effects involving Listening (all Fs < 1, except for 
the main effect of Listening: F(1,21) = 1.91, p = .18, η
p
2  = .08), thus we collapsed over 
Listening. The ANOVA showed a significant interaction effect of Subtraction Difficulty 
and Text-Entry Difficulty (F(1,21) = 6.6, p = .02, η
p
2  = .24). Three simple effects reached 
significance: Subtraction Difficulty when text-entry was easy (F(1,21) = 47.2, p < .001, 
η
p
2  = .69), Subtraction Difficulty when text-entry was hard (F(1,21) = 127.4, p < .001, 
η
p
2  = .86), and Text-Entry Difficulty when subtraction was hard (F(1,21) = 10.9, p < .01, 
η
p
2  = .34). Text-Entry Difficulty when subtraction was easy was not significant (F < 1). 
Thus, accuracy on the subtraction task was lower when subtraction was hard, and even 
lower when text-entry was hard as well.
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Figure 2.10, left panel, shows the accuracy data of the listening task. The leftmost bar 
shows the results of the listening baseline experiment (i.e., participants only performed 
the listening task): 89% correct. Adding the other tasks had little effect, except when 
both the subtraction and the text-entry task were hard. The interaction between 
Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty was significant (F(1,21) = 7.42, p = .01, 
η
p
2  = .26); as were the simple effects of Text-Entry Difficulty when subtraction was hard 
(F(1,21) = 9.18, p < .01, η
p
2  = .30) and Subtraction Difficulty when text-entry was hard 
(F(1,21) = 14.75, p < .001, η
p
2  = .41), driving the interaction effect. The simple effects of 
Text-Entry Difficulty when subtraction was easy (F(1,21) = 1.73, p = .20, η
p
2  = .08) and 
Subtraction Difficulty when text-entry was easy (F < 1) were not significant.
Model
As can be seen in Figure 2.8, the response times of the cognitive model fit well to the 
human data, both in combination with and without the listening task (R2 and RMSD 
values are shown in the graphs). The accuracy data in Figure 2.9 is also accounted for, 
especially in the text-entry task the model follows the data closely. For the subtraction 
task the effects are slightly under-predicted: the effects in the data are larger, especially 
when the listening task is present.
The right panel of Figure 2.10 shows the percentage of words processed by the 
model. The model can only process words when declarative memory is available. Thus, 
when words are presented while declarative memory is in use by the other tasks, words 
cannot be processed, and will be substituted by new words entering the auditory buffer. 
This happens most often in the hard–hard condition, as problem states have to be 
retrieved from declarative memory for the other tasks on each step of a trial, blocking 
the resource. Obviously, a percentage of processed words cannot be translated directly 
into number of correctly answered questions, but the model shows a similar pattern of 
performance (R2 = .68).
Discussion
In Experiment 3 we added a listening comprehension task to the two tasks used in 
the previous experiments. The same interaction effects were found as in Experiments 
1 and 2, both when the listening task was present and when it was not. Experiment 3 
was designed to test whether a problem state bottleneck caused the interference effects, 
as opposed to a phonological loop bottleneck. If it was a phonological loop bottleneck 
that caused the interference, overloading the phonological loop by adding the listening 
task should cause interference effects not only in the hard–hard condition, but also in 
the hard–easy and easy–hard conditions of the other tasks. The only effect we found 
that pointed in this direction was the increase of reaction times of the subtraction task 
when subtraction was hard and the listening task had to be performed (Figure 2.8, 
lower panel). However, this effect is accounted for in the model by declarative memory 
interference instead of phonological loop or problem state interference (see below). 
As the other three conditions did not increase in reaction times, this implies that the 
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phonological loop did not cause the interference in Experiment 1 and 2, and provides 
additional support to a problem state account.
Generally speaking, the listening task had surprisingly little influence on the 
subtraction and text-entry tasks: the response times only increase by a small amount in 
the subtraction task. Interestingly, while we did not think about this effect beforehand, 
and did not model it explicitly afterwards, this increase in response times emerged 
naturally from our model. A close inspection of the model revealed that it is caused by 
the continuous use of declarative memory by the listening task. Threaded cognition 
causes the tasks to be closely interleaved, which means that most of the time there is 
little interference. However, when the subtraction task needs to use declarative memory 
when it is in use by the listening task, this will cause a slight delay in execution, causing 
the increase in response times. This effect is more pronounced when the subtraction 
task was hard, as shown by the two-way interaction between Listening and Subtraction 
Difficulty. The model explains this by the need for more declarative retrievals in the 
hard subtraction task as compared to the easy subtraction task, which leads to more 
interference with the declarative retrievals of the listening task. For the text-entry task 
a similar effect would be expected, except for the fact that the text-entry task is much 
less memory intensive (i.e., less memory retrievals have to be performed) than the 
subtraction task. That is why the model does not predict an increase in reaction times 
for the text-entry task, which is consistent with the human data.
The listening task was involved in one more effect: the interaction effect between 
Listening and Text-Entry Difficulty on the response times of the subtraction task 
(Figure 2.8, lower panel). That is, the effect of Text-Entry Difficulty was smaller when 
the listening task had to be performed. An opposite effect would have been expected 
when the interference effects of Experiment 1 and 2 were caused by a phonological loop 
bottleneck, because in that case, the phonological loop would have caused interference 
in combination with only one hard task, as explained above. The current model does 
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observed in the data. However, as this paper focuses on the effects of the problem state 
manipulations, and the purpose of the experiment was to rule out any auditory loop 
related explanation (which would have caused an opposite effect), we decided against 
adding a post-hoc explanation to the model.
The effects of the subtraction and text-entry task on listening comprehension were 
also surprisingly small: a decrease in listening accuracy scores was observed only when 
both other tasks were hard. The model explains this finding by the assumption that 
declarative memory is in high demand by the subtraction and text-entry tasks when 
both these tasks are hard, because problem states have to be retrieved from declarative 
memory on each step of a trial. Therefore, a word is sometimes replaced by the next 
presented word in the auditory buffer before it is processed using declarative memory. 
As there is not sufficient time in the hard–hard condition to process all words, this 
will presumably result in more mistakes on the listening comprehension task in this 
condition.
In conclusion, our threaded cognition model proposed that adding this particular 
third task should not influence the results of the other tasks dramatically. This 
turned out to be the case, even while the continuous listening task is, arguably, quite 
demanding. The patterns in the data were comparable to the data of the previous 
experiments, while the small increase in response times was explained by the increased 
use of declarative memory.
General Discussion
In this paper, we tested the hypothesis that the problem state resource acts as a 
bottleneck in multitasking. Experiment 1 consisted of two tasks that had to be carried 
out concurrently, both with and without a problem state. This resulted in an over-
additive interaction effect of task difficulty (i.e., the requirement of two problem states 
led to higher response times), confirming the hypothesis. In Experiments 2 and 3, we 
tested whether this interaction effect was due to cognitive load or to a phonological loop 
bottleneck, respectively, instead of to a problem state bottleneck. Experiment 2 showed 
that the interaction effect is not due to a simple memory load effect, but instead is 
related to a switch of task context. This corroborates the problem state hypothesis. In 
Experiment 3, the phonological loop was overloaded by adding a story comprehension 
task. This did not have a major influence on the effects found in Experiment 1, lending 
additional support to a problem state bottleneck account of the data. Based on these 
three experiments and general ACT-R assumptions about memory, modularity and 
performance, we conclude that the problem state resource indeed acts as a bottleneck 
when it has to be used by multiple tasks concurrently.
Nevertheless, it should be possible to formulate alternative models explaining these 
data sets, and we therefore cannot claim the data prove the existence of a problem 
state bottleneck. The strength of the current account over any post-hoc fit of the data 
is that we tested an a priori prediction made by the threaded cognition theory before 
running the experiment. First, we ran Experiment 1 to test a qualitative prediction of a 
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problem state bottleneck. Without having to add additional assumptions to the model, 
it accounted for the interference effects that we found. Subsequently, we tested the two 
most plausible alternative accounts of the data in Experiments 2 and 3. With the same 
basic model as used for Experiment 1, we were able to account for the data of these 
experiments. Thus, based on a theory-driven model we were able to predict the effects 
of Experiment 1, and could subsequently account for data of two related experiments.
The Problem State and Working Memory
There is a relation between the problem state and the classical notion of working 
memory (e.g., Baddeley, 1986; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974): both are used for temporarily 
maintaining mental representations. In the ACT-R architecture, working memory 
does not exist as a separate system. Instead, working memory is represented by a 
combination of (a) the contents of the declarative memory buffer and the problem 
state buffer and (b) highly active chunks in declarative memory (Anderson, 2005; 
Daily, Lovett, & Reder, 2001; Lewis & Vasishth, 2005; Lovett, Daily, & Reder, 2000). 
In this scheme, the buffer contents are accessible at no time cost, and thus constitute 
directly accessible ‘true working memory’: the ‘focus of attention’ (e.g., Cowan, 1995; 
Garavan, 1998; Oberauer, 2002). With a size of two this is comparable to theories 
positing an extremely limited working memory size (e.g., Garavan, 1998; McElree, 
2001). On the other hand, highly active chunks in declarative memory are accessible, 
but at a small time cost. If these items have just been added, as in common working 
memory or immediate memory experiments, the number that can be reliably retrieved 
is around 4 to 9 (e.g., Anderson et al., 1998; Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2008). This is 
more comparable to theories with a working memory size of 4 to 9 (e.g., Cowan, 2000; 
Miller, 1956; Morey & Cowan, 2004). The combination of (a) having a small amount 
of directly accessible items and (b) a number of easily accessible items at a small time 
cost, is in line with a number of recent theories (e.g., Jonides et al., 2008; McElree, 
2001; Oberauer, 2002).
The problem state acts in this framework as the location where new information 
is stored. This new information can either originate from perceptual processes 
(the to-be-entered word in the text-entry task), from a result of processing existing 
information (the carry-flag in the subtraction task), or from changing existing 
information (for example, processing 2x + 5 = 8 to 2x = 3). This is potentially important 
for many dual- or multitask situations, as it is often necessary to maintain new 
information. As we have argued that the problem state acts as a bottleneck, this could 
have a considerable influence on tasks in which multiple sets of information have to 
be maintained at the same time.
Threaded Cognition
While our hypothesis was inspired by the threaded cognition theory, one could wonder 
whether threaded cognition is a necessary part of the models. It is indeed possible to 
think of a way of modeling our experiments using only ACT-R. The merit of threaded 
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cognition, though, is that we were not forced to come up with a supervisory control 
structure to model the tasks.10 This would have been possible, as is best shown by 
existing multitasking models without threaded cognition (e.g., Anderson, Taatgen, & 
Byrne, 2005; Salvucci, 2006; Taatgen, 2005). However, these models represent all tasks 
in a single goal representation. This is hard to defend if the tasks in the experiment 
are tasks that the participants are already proficient in, like driving or multi-column 
subtraction. The importance of using threaded cognition is that the existing threads 
can be reused if, for instance, the subtraction task would be combined with driving. 
This seems to be the way humans would handle this: our participants would seemingly 
not have to learn a new supervisory control structure if they had to solve subtraction 
problems while driving (see, for a more in-depth discussion of this issue, Kieras et al., 
2000; Salvucci, 2005; Salvucci & Taatgen, 2008). Case in point is our Experiment 3, in 
which we were able to add an additional thread for the listening task, without having 
to change anything in the existing model. The interaction of the three threads, without 
any supervisory control, turned out to be a good predictor of the participants’ behavior: 
Even the slight increase in reaction times in the listening condition was accounted for 
by the model, while not predicted by the authors beforehand.
One potential criticism of threaded cognition is that it allows for an unlimited set 
of goals that is not susceptible to decay. Altmann and Trafton (2002) have successfully 
argued against the construct of the goal stack, which had the same problem. Instead, 
Altmann et al. (Altmann & Gray, 2008; Altmann & Trafton, 2002) have proposed that 
only a single goal can be active at a time, and multiple goals have to be handled by 
swapping out the current goal with goals retained in declarative memory. Salvucci and 
Taatgen (2008), however, found that such a procedure would be too slow to account 
for certain Psychological Refractory Period experiments. The model we have presented 
here is consistent with both the Salvucci and Taatgen approach, as well as with the 
Altmann et al. approach. Instead of swapping out the goal as such, though, the contents 
of the problem state resource are swapped out. The main difference is our assumption 
that not all tasks require a problem state. Although we have not applied the strategic 
encoding strategies that Altmann et al. use in their models, this would certainly be 
possible if a task would necessitate it (see also Salvucci, Taatgen, et al., 2009).
Single vs. Multiple Bottlenecks
In this article we have introduced the notion of multiple bottlenecks, and it is therefore 
useful to contrast it with a single bottleneck approach (e.g., Pashler, 1994). Explaining 
multitasking interference with multiple bottlenecks can be considered as a refinement 
of a single bottleneck account. Single-bottleneck accounts consider central cognition 
as a uniform system that can only be engaged in a single action at a time. Although 
this offers accurate accounts of many combinations of simple tasks, the more complex 
tasks discussed in this article need a more refined theory. Multiple-bottleneck models 
10
 One could argue that executive control plays a role in threaded cognition, the threads act in a ‘greedy and polite’ way after 
all. However, this is a task-unspecific form of executive control, not customized for the tasks at hand, and not influencing the 
interleaving of the tasks directly.
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allow parallel processing of certain combinations of tasks, as long as they use different 
central resources. In Experiment 3, for example, the listening task almost continuously 
engages central cognition, but because central cognition is subdivided into separate 
resources it is still possible to do the other tasks by properly interleaving them, 
resulting in only a minor impact on performance.
The three bottlenecks or resources we focus on in this article have different 
impacts on performance, which is mainly due to the time scale on which they operate. 
Interference in the fastest system, the procedural resource is usually very limited and 
in the order of tens of milliseconds, and therefore hardly noticeable in the experiments 
discussed here (although it is in perfect time sharing experiments, Salvucci & Taatgen, 
2008, and attentional blink experiments, Taatgen et al., 2009). Interference in the 
declarative memory resource is usually limited to the maximum duration of a memory 
retrieval, which is never more than a couple of hundreds of milliseconds in our 
experiments. This produces small amounts of interference, especially noticeable in 
the listening task in Experiment 3. The problem state resource, finally, can produce 
considerable interference, because threads need this resource over longer periods of 
time. Using threaded cognition it is possible to predict quantitatively how much two 
tasks will interfere with each other. Single bottleneck models usually do not deal with 
experiments in which a problem state needs to be maintained over longer periods of 
time, but nevertheless the problem state behaves like a bottleneck in the same way as 
procedural bottlenecks in for example perfect time-sharing experiments. We therefore 
do not see multiple bottlenecks as a refutation of the single bottleneck theory, but 
rather as a refinement in the details and an extension in time scale. 
Implications of a Problem State Bottleneck
Why is the problem state bottleneck important for real life situations? A clear example 
can be found in our previous research, in which participants had to steer a simulated 
car and operate a navigation device at the same time (Borst & Taatgen, 2007). It was 
shown that as soon as participants had to use a problem state for both tasks, their 
performance decreased considerably. This can be tied back to real life: as soon as 
information is not readily available in the world, performance levels will decrease if 
two tasks require the maintenance of intermediate information. Thus, it is preferable 
to have at most one task that requires the use of a problem state in a multitasking 
situation. As a design guideline this means that, for example in cars, a secondary 
device should present its information to the user, instead of requiring the user to 
maintain intermediate representations.
However, if there is an ongoing task that requires the use of problem 
representations, and it is known that it will be interrupted (including self-interruptions), 
human-computer interface designers should try to ensure that the task is interrupted 
at a point without a problem state. If that is not possible, the user should at least be 
given the opportunity to rehearse the problem state before the task is suspended. For 
example, when your work is interrupted by a phone call, most people would let the 
telephone ring a couple of times before picking it up, and only interrupt their work at 
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a point where it is easy to resume it afterwards. Trafton, Altmann, Brock, and Mintz 
(2003) formally showed this effect: if users were warned 8 seconds before their task was 
interrupted, they were significantly faster in resuming the original task than users who 
were interrupted without a warning. According to our problem state bottleneck theory, 
the warning gave users the opportunity to rehearse their problem state before being 
interrupted, while that was impossible in the non-warning condition, enabling faster 
resumptions after the interruptions (see Salvucci, Taatgen, et al., 2009, for simulations 
of this experiment).
Conclusion
In summary, the three experiments showed that the problem state resource acts as 
bottleneck in multitasking. Because the intermediate representations that are stored 
as a problem state often have to be maintained for several seconds or more, this 
bottleneck can result in considerable interference between tasks, and therefore has to 
be taken into account when designing environments for multitasking. 
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Appendix: More Detailed Analysis of Experiment 3
In this appendix we discuss an alternative analysis of the data of Experiment 3. Because 
the stories in Experiment 3 did not always last for the complete trials of the subtraction 
and text-entry task, some responses on these tasks were made without participants 
listening to a story. Therefore, we only took responses into account that were made 
while the story was present. Because this results in an unequal number of observations 
per cell, we also fitted linear mixed effects models to analyze the data (e.g., Baayen, 
Davidson, & Bates, 2008). As the results of the linear mixed effect models are very 
similar to those of the ANOVAs, we have included the ANOVA results in the body 
of the manuscript for reasons of consistency. The results of the linear mixed effects 
models are reported here.
Response Times
Figure 2.8, upper panels, shows response times on the text-entry task, on the left 
without and on the right in combination with the listening task. A linear mixed effects 
model was fitted to the response time data, with Listening, Subtraction Difficulty, and 
Text-Entry Difficulty as fixed effects and Subject as a random effect. The model shows 
significant contributions of Listening (β = 88.83, t(7836) = 2.84, p < 0.01), Subtraction 
Difficulty (β = 278.1, t(7836) = 9.30, p < 0.001), the Listening ∑ Subtraction Difficulty 
interaction (β = -142.7, t(7836) = -3.03, p < 0.01), and of the Subtraction Difficulty ∑ 
Text-Entry Difficulty interaction (β = 489.7, t(7836) = 11.57, p < 0.001). Comparing 
this model to a model without the interaction between Subtraction Difficulty and Text-
Entry Difficulty shows that the first model is to be preferred (χ2(2) = 206.1, p < 0.001), 
indicating a significant contribution of the interaction term. Thus, response times 
were higher when the listening task had to be performed and when the subtraction 
task was hard, while the combination of the listening and the hard subtraction task 
caused response times to decrease. Most importantly, an over-additive interaction 
effect of Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty was found, irrespective of 
the listening task. The difference with the ANOVA results reported in the main text 
is the small influence of the listening task on response times. Although this would 
argue against collapsing over the Listening conditions for the ANOVA, collapsing over 
Listening does not change the main outcome of the analysis, nor does it influence 
our conclusions. Therefore, we opted to keep the main text a consistent whole, and 
collapsed over Listening.
The lower panels of Figure 2.8 show response times on the subtraction task. Again, 
a linear mixed effects model was fitted to the data. Listening, Subtraction Difficulty, 
and Text-Entry Difficulty were added as fixed effects, while Subject was entered 
as random effect. All main effects contributed significantly to the response times: 
Listening (β = 112.5, t(7854) = 2.51, p = 0.01), Subtraction Difficulty (β = 1276, t(7854) 
= 29.37, p < 0.001), and Text-Entry Difficulty (β = 164.8, t(7854) = 3.82, p < 0.001), 
as did all interaction effects except Listening ∑ Text-Entry Difficulty: Listening ∑ 
Subtraction Difficulty (β = 344.0, t(7854) = 5.1, p < 0.001), Subtraction Difficulty ∑ 
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Text-Entry Difficulty (β = 494.8, t(7854) = 8.0, p < 0.001), and the three-way interaction 
of Listening ∑ Subtraction Difficulty ∑ Text-Entry Difficulty (β = -356.9, t(7854) = -3.68, 
p < 0.001). A comparison between this model and a model without the Subtraction 
Difficulty ∑ Text-Entry Difficulty interaction showed that the first model fits better 
to the data (χ2(2) = 67.34, p < 0.001), indicating a significant contribution of the 
Subtraction Difficulty ∑ Text-Entry Difficulty interaction. Comparing this model to 
a model without the three-way interaction showed that the first model again fits the 
data better (χ2(1) = 13.1, p < 0.001), thus, also the three-way interaction contributes 
significantly to the model. This means that response times were higher when the 
listening task had to be performed, when the subtraction task was hard, and when 
the text-entry task was hard; and that the effect of subtraction difficulty is larger in the 
presence of the listening task. Furthermore, there is a significant interaction between 
Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty, which is larger without the listening 
task than with the listening task. The main difference with the results of the ANOVA 
is the significant three-way interaction between Listening, Subtraction Difficulty, and 
Text-Entry Difficulty. The three-way interaction shows that the effect of the interaction 
between Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty is smaller when the listening 
task has to be performed. However, even in the presence of the three-way interaction, 
the two tasks still interact, which is in accordance with our modeling results.
Accuracy
In Figure 2.9 the accuracy data of Experiment 3 is displayed. The upper panel shows 
the accuracy on the text-entry task. A binomial linear mixed effects model was fitted to 
the data with Listening, Subtraction Difficulty, and Text-Entry Difficulty as fixed effects, 
and Subject as a random effect. It shows only a significant effect of Text-Entry Difficulty 
(β = -2.9, z(7836) = -2.74, p < 0.01). Thus, accuracy on the text-entry task was lower 
when the text-entry task was difficult. The ANOVA reported in the main text also found 
a significant interaction between Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty.
The lower panels of Figure 2.9 show the accuracy data on the subtraction task. A 
binomial mixed effects model with Listening, Subtraction Difficulty, and Text-Entry 
Difficulty as fixed effects and Subject as a random effect showed that only Subtraction 
Difficulty contributes significantly to the model (β = -2.4, z(7854) = -6.1, p < 0.001). 
Thus, accuracy on the subtraction task decreased with Subtraction Difficulty. Again, 
the ANOVA also found a significant interaction effect of Subtraction Difficulty and 
Text-Entry Difficulty.
Figure 2.10, left panel, shows the accuracy data of the listening task. The leftmost bar 
shows the results of the listening baseline experiment (i.e., participants only performed 
the listening task): 89% correct. Adding the other tasks had little effect, except when 
both the subtraction and the text-entry task were hard. Fitting a binomial linear mixed 
effects model with Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty as fixed effects and 
subject as random effect, shows a significant interaction effect between Subtraction 
Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty (β = -1.2, z(507) = -2.55, p = 0.01). However, because 
the stories lasted sometimes longer than the other two tasks, parts of the stories were 
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attended without performing the other tasks. If we add the proportion overlap between 
the stories and the other tasks to the linear model, this does not significantly improve 
the first model (χ2(4) = 3.74, p = .44). Thus, adding the overlap did not change the 
outcome of the analysis, leaving only a significant decrease in accuracy when both the 
subtraction and the text-entry task were hard.





In which we show that the problem state bottleneck 
causes an increase in mental workload and that it can be 
bypassed by presenting information in the environment. 
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Objective: In this paper we investigate whether external support can prevent 
negative effects of the problem state bottleneck in human multitasking.
Background: Previously, it was shown that the problem state resource – a 
central element in working memory that maintains current task information 
– can only be used for one task at a time. When the problem state resource 
is required for multiple tasks concurrently, performance decreases.
Method: To see whether external support reduces the effects of the problem 
state bottleneck, we measured performance and pupil dilation (to assess 
mental workload) during an experiment that manipulated the use of the 
problem state resource.
Results: It was shown that the effects of the problem state bottleneck on 
response times and accuracy diminished when problem state information 
was presented externally. However, we did not find a difference in mental 
effort between the two conditions. A cognitive model was used to show that 
the participants behaved rationally: they only used the information in the 
environment when more than one problem state was required to do the 
task, thus only when it improved their performance.
Conclusion: We conclude that external support can be used to bypass the 
problem state bottleneck, but that external support is only beneficial when 
multiple problem states are required to do a task.
Application: These results should be taken into consideration when 
designing interfaces and tasks: users should at most need a single mental 
representation to carry out a task. Otherwise, response times and number 
of errors will increase.
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Introduction
Multitasking is all around us. González and Mark (2004) have shown that people switch 
on average every 3 minutes between tasks in a typical office environment. In addition, 
a recent study showed that every generation ‘multitasks’ more than the previous 
generation in their free time (Carrier et al., 2009). However, it is also well known that 
performance on individual tasks suffers from multitasking. In the field of sequential 
multitasking (i.e., switching between tasks, Salvucci, Taatgen, et al., 2009), theorists 
have focused on the disruptive effects of interruptions (e.g., Gillie & Broadbent, 1989; 
Monk et al., 2008). Likewise, the concurrent multitasking literature has identified 
several processing bottlenecks that lead to decreased performance when two tasks are 
performed at the same time (e.g., Broadbent, 1958; Keele, 1973; Pashler, 1994; Salvucci 
& Taatgen, 2008; Wickens, 1984, 2002). One cause of multitasking interference, both 
in concurrent and sequential multitasking, is the problem state bottleneck (Borst, 
Taatgen, & Van Rijn, 2010).
 The problem state is defined as the element in working memory that can be used 
without any time cost (Anderson, 2005), unlike other elements in working memory 
(see e.g., McElree, 2001). It is used to represent intermediate information in a task, 
for example, ‘3x = 15’ when solving ‘3x - 5 = 10’. Previously, we have shown that the 
problem state resource can contain at most one chunk of information, and therefore 
causes multitasking interference when required by multiple tasks at the same time 
(Borst, Taatgen, & Van Rijn, 2010). In a dual-task paradigm, participants needed a 
problem state for none, one, or both of the tasks. In the condition where subjects 
needed a problem state for both tasks, performance decreased considerably both in 
reaction times and accuracy as compared to the other conditions. Supported by a 
cognitive model, this was taken as an indication of a problem state bottleneck. Further 
evidence for a problem state bottleneck was provided by Salvucci and Bogunovich 
(2010), who showed that when subjects had to switch between an e-mail and a chat 
task, they chose switch points at which they did not have to maintain a problem state. 
Given that the problem state bottleneck can lead to a decrease in performance, 
both in laboratory and real-life settings, we investigated how this bottleneck can be 
bypassed. In this article we describe an experiment in which participants had to 
perform two tasks at the same time. The first condition of the experiment is a replication 
of our previous study (Borst, Taatgen, & Van Rijn, 2010), and should result in problem 
state interference. In the other condition, we presented supporting information on 
the screen, thereby offloading possible internal representations to the environment 
(e.g., Kirsh, 1995). We hypothesized that the interference effects disappear in this 
condition. A second question that we address in this article is whether the problem 
state bottleneck causes an increase in mental workload, and whether this possible 
increase disappears with external support. To assess the level of mental workload 
during the experiment we measured pupil dilation (e.g., Beatty, 1982). Finally, to show 
that a problem state bottleneck can account for the observed behavior, we present a 
computational cognitive model. In the remainder of this article, we first describe the 
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used methodology, followed by the results of the experiment, the model description 
and results, and a general discussion.
Method
In the experiment, based on earlier experiments by Borst, Taatgen, and Van Rijn (2010), 
participants had to perform two tasks concurrently: a subtraction task and a text-entry 
task. Both tasks were presented in two versions: an easy version in which there was 
no need to maintain a problem state, and a hard version in which participants had 
to maintain a problem state from one response to the next. In the current paper 
we extended the original setup with a condition in which the problem state of the 
subtraction task is displayed on the screen (the support condition), reducing the need 
for mentally maintaining a problem state in the hard subtraction condition. Thus, the 
experiment had a 2 ∑ 2 ∑ 2 factorial within-subjects design (Subtraction Difficulty ∑ 
Text-Entry Difficulty ∑ Support).
Pupil Dilation
To assess mental workload, pupil dilation was measured throughout the experiment. 
Since the 1960s, pupil size is known to reflect mental activity (e.g., Hess & Polt, 1964) 
and memory load (e.g, Kahneman & Beatty, 1966). In 1982, based on a large body of 
research, Beatty argued that pupil dilation could be used as a physiological measure 
of mental effort, because it reflects “within-task, between task, and between-individual 
variations in processing demands” (Beatty, 1982, p. 276; see for a more recent review, 
Steinhauer & Hakerem, 1992). From an applied perspective, Iqbal and colleagues used 
pupil dilation to study mental workload in a route planning and in a document editing 
task (Iqbal, Adamczyk, Zheng, & Bailey, 2005). The use of pupil dilation allowed them 
to track mental workload throughout the tasks, and identify opportunities to interrupt 
users on points of low workload. In the current task we measured pupil dilation to see 
if the decrease in performance when participants have to use multiple problem states 
concurrently is linked to an increase in mental effort, and if this possible increase 
disappeared when participants receive external support in the subtraction task.
Participants
Thirty-three students of the University of Groningen participated in the experiment 
for course credit or monetary compensation of 110. Four participants were rejected 
because they scored less than 75% correct where the other participants scored >95% 
correct. Two participants were rejected because they did not adhere to task instructions, 
and three because of recording problems of the eye tracker. This leaves 24 complete 
datasets (17 female, age range 18-43, mean age 20.5). All participants had normal 
or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. Informed consent as approved by the Ethical 
Committee Psychology of the University of Groningen was obtained before testing.
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Design
During the experiment, participants had to perform a subtraction task and a text-entry 
task concurrently. The subtraction task was shown on the left side of the screen, the 
text-entry task on the right (see Figure 3.1). Participants had to alternate between the 
two tasks: after entering a digit, the subtraction interface was disabled, forcing the 
participant to subsequently enter a letter. After entering a letter, the text-entry interface 
was disabled and the subtraction interface became available again.
The subtraction task is shown on the left side of Figure 3.1. Participants had to 
solve 10-column subtraction problems in standard right to left order. However, at each 
point in time, only a single column was visible. Although the problems were presented 
column by column, the participants were instructed that the separate columns in a 
trial were part of a 10-column subtraction problem (in the practice phase participants 
started out with a normal 10-column layout, only later they switched to solving the 
problems column by column). Participants had to enter the digits by clicking on the 
on-screen keypad with the mouse. In the easy, no problem state version, carrying was 
never needed because the upper digit was always larger or equal to the lower one. In 
contrast, the hard version required participants to carry six times out of 10 possible 
columns. The assumption is that participants use their problem state resource to store 
whether a carry is in progress.
The interface for the text-entry task is shown on the right in Figure 3.1. Participants 
had to enter 10-letter strings by clicking on the on-screen keyboard. In the easy version 
these strings were presented one letter at a time and participants had to click the 
Figure The experiment in the support condition. The ‘|’ indicates that there is currently no carry, 
it will turn into a ‘1’ when a carry has to be processed. Note that in the real experiment 
one of the tasks would be disabled at any given moment.
3.1
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corresponding button on the keyboard. In the hard version, a 10-letter word was 
presented once at the start of a trial. Once a participant clicked on the first letter, the 
word disappeared and the remaining letters had to be entered one at a time, without 
feedback. Thus, after the initial presentation of the word in the hard condition, 
participants could neither see what word they were entering, nor what they had already 
entered.
Because participants had to alternate between the two tasks after every response, 
they had to keep track of whether a carry was in progress for the subtraction task and 
what the word was for the text-entry task while performing the other task.
In the support condition a marker on the screen indicated whether a carry was in 
progress in the subtraction task. Figure 3.1 shows this condition. The ‘|’ indicates that 
there is currently no carry in progress. However, as soon the previous column resulted 
in a carry (e.g., after a column like 3 - 4), the ‘|’ turned into a ‘1’. Thus, in the support 
condition it was not necessary to keep track of the problem state mentally: when a ‘1’ 
was shown on screen, there was a carry in the previous column.
Stimuli and Apparatus
The stimuli for the subtraction task were generated anew for each participant. The 
subtraction problems in the hard version always featured six carries, and resulted in 
10-digit answers. The 10 letter words for the hard version of the text-entry task were 
handpicked from a list of high-frequency Dutch words (CELEX database; Baayen et 
al., 1993) to ensure that similarities between words were kept at a minimum. These 
stimuli were also used in the easy text-entry task, except that the letters within the 
words were scrambled (under the constraint that a letter never appeared twice in a 
row). Thus, participants were presented pseudo-random sequences of letters that they 
had to enter one-by-one in the easy condition. By scrambling the words, we controlled 
for letter-based effects, while preventing the use of strategies to predict the next letter. 
The experiment was presented full screen on a 20.1" monitor. Participants were 
sitting at a normal viewing distance, about 70 cm from the screen. For recording pupil 
dilation an Eyelink 1000 table-mounted eye tracker of SR Research was used. We 
recorded one eye, with a sampling frequency of 500 Hz. To improve measurements, 
participants were seated with their heads positioned in a padded head- and chin-rest.
Procedure
Each trial started with the presentation of a calibration circle for the eye tracker. After 
the calibration circle a fixation cross was presented for 6 seconds, to allow pupil dilation 
to return to baseline. The fixation cross was followed by two horizontally aligned 
colored circles representing the tasks. The color of the circles indicated the difficulty 
levels of the tasks (on the left for the subtraction task, on the right for the text-entry 
task; green for easy, red for hard). The circles stayed on the screen for 1 second, 
followed by a fixation cross for 600 ms, after which the subtraction and text-entry 
tasks appeared. Participants had to begin with the subtraction task, and then alternate 
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between the two tasks. After completing both tasks, a feedback screen was shown for 2 
seconds, indicating how many letters and digits were entered correctly. Before the next 
trial started, a fixation screen was shown for 2 seconds.
The experiment consisted of a practice block and two experimental blocks. One of the 
experimental blocks contained the support condition; the order was counter-balanced 
over participants. The practice block consisted of 12 single task trials (4 subtraction 
trials with 10 columns visible, 4 subtraction trials with one column visible, and 4 text-
entry trials), followed by a block of 4 multitasking trials: all combinations of subtraction 
and text-entry (easy-easy, hard-easy, easy-hard, and hard-hard). Both experimental blocks 
consisted of 28 multitasking trials. Before the second block the subtraction task was 
practiced again, to familiarize the participants with using the carry indicator if they 
did not use this in the first block, or with performing the task without the indicator in 
the other case. Subtraction and text-entry conditions were randomized within a block. 
The complete experiment consisted of 56 experimental trials, and lasted for about 
90 minutes. In between blocks participants could take a short break. At the start of 
the multitask practice block and the two experimental blocks the eye tracker was (re)
calibrated.
Results
We will discuss the results of the experiment on the basis of our experimental questions. 
First, we will discuss how the No-Support condition gives experimental support for a 
problem state bottleneck. We will then turn to the Support condition, to see if the 
effects of the problem state bottleneck disappear for the subtraction task when external 
support is provided. Finally, we will discuss mental workload.
We only analyzed the data from the experimental phase of the task. A response time 
in the subtraction task is defined as the time between a response in the text-entry task 
and a response in the subtraction task; a response time in the text-entry task as the 
time between a response in the subtraction task and a response in the text-entry task. 
First responses of each trial were removed. Outliers were removed from the data (RTs 
< 250 ms or > 10,000 ms), after which we removed data exceeding three standard 
deviations from the mean per condition per participant (in total 2.2% of the data 
was removed). All F- and p-values are obtained from repeated measure ANOVAs; all 
error bars depict standard errors. Accuracy data were transformed using an arcsine 
transformation before being submitted to the ANOVA. We will not discuss all effects 
in the text, but only the ones relevant to our questions. However, all ANOVA results 
are listed in Tables 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5.
The Problem State Bottleneck: Replication
The No-Support condition of the current experiment is a replication of Experiment 1 in 
Borst, Taatgen, & Van Rijn (2010), which was the first in a series of three experiments 
that we used to argue in favor of a problem state bottleneck. The current results replicate 
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the effects in the original data. The left panels of Figure 3.2 show the response times in 
the No-Support condition (ANOVA results are listed in Table 3.1). On top the response 
times on the subtraction task are shown. First, we see a large increase in response 
times with Subtraction Difficulty: when subtraction was hard, response times were much 
higher than when subtraction was easy. More interestingly, when both tasks were 
hard, there was an additional increase in response times, as shown by a significant 
over-additive interaction effect between Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty. 
This interaction effect was taken as an indication of a problem state bottleneck: when 
participants had to maintain a problem state for both tasks, response times increased 
considerably as compared to when they had to maintain a problem state for only one 
task.
A similar effect can be seen in the response times on the text-entry task (Figure 
3.2, left side, lower panel). Here, response times were lower when text-entry was hard 
than when text-entry was easy (we discuss this effect in the model section below). 
However, response times increased when subtraction was hard as well: the hard-hard 
condition. Again, because an additional problem state is required in the other task, we 
see an increase in response times on the current task. Statistically, this is shown by a 
significant interaction effect between Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty.
The accuracy data of both tasks also show this effect, as shown in Figure 3.3, left 
panels (ANOVA results in Table 3.2). While accuracy naturally decreases with task 
Figure Response times. Easy/Hard means Easy Subtraction – Hard Text-Entry, etc. 























































































































































































difficulty of the task itself, it decreases even more when the other task is hard as well 
(shown by significant interaction effects between Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry 
Difficulty).
Summarizing, we see that response times increase and accuracy decreases when 
participants had to maintain two problem states as compared to zero or one. Previously, 
these interaction effects were taken as an indication of a problem state bottleneck. The 
question is now whether these interaction effects disappear in the subtraction task when 
external support is provided.
External Support: Bypassing the Bottleneck
The right panels of Figure 3.2 show the response times in the Support Condition. With 
respect to the response times on the subtraction task, a significant three-way interaction 
between Support, Subtraction Difficulty, and Text-Entry Difficulty (Table 3.3) shows that 
the two-way interaction between Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry is smaller in the 
Support condition than in the No-Support condition. Thus, participants were faster 
in the hard-hard condition with Support than without Support. However, as can be 
seen in Figure 3.2 and Table 3.1, the two-way interaction between Subtraction Difficulty 















































































































































Figure Accuracy. Easy/Hard means Easy Subtraction – Hard Text-Entry, etc. Error 
bars are standard errors.
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participants show an increase in response times in the hard-hard condition. Thus, the 
effect of the problem state bottleneck decreases, but does not fully disappear.
With respect to the response times of the text-entry task, we also observed a significant 
three-way interaction effect of Support, Subtraction Difficulty, and Text-Entry Difficulty. 
When external support was provided for the subtraction task, the effects of the 
problem state bottleneck also decreased in the text-entry task: participants were faster 
in the hard-hard condition. However, also here the two-way interaction effect between 
Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty is still present with external support.
The right panels of Figure 3.3 show the accuracy data in the Support condition. Here 
we see that the two-way interaction effect completely disappears for the subtraction 
task (the three way interaction is significant, Table 3.3). Thus, participants no longer 
show the decrease in accuracy in the hard-hard condition: the effect of the problem 
state bottleneck disappeared. In the text-entry task there was no difference between the 
RT No-Support RT Support
Source F(1,23) p η
p




Subtraction Difficulty 357.9 < .001 .94 531.3 < .001 .96
Text-Entry Difficulty 22.0 < .001 .49 15.0 < .001 .40
Subtraction ∑ Text-Entry 20.0 < .001 .47 14.5 < .001 .39
Text-Entry Task
Subtraction Difficulty 133.6 < .001 .85 46.4 < .001 .67
Text-Entry Difficulty < 1 – – 2.6 .12 .10
Subtraction ∑ Text-Entry 26.5 < .001 .53 8.6 .007 .27
RT = response times.
Table ANOVA results of the response time data; separate for Support and No-Support.3.1 
Acc No-Support Acc Support
Source F(1,23) p η
p




Subtraction Difficulty 80.4 < .001 .77 36.8 < .001 .62
Text-Entry Difficulty 45.0 < .001 .66 < 1 - -
Subtraction ∑ Text-Entry 58.2 < .001 .72 1.1 .3 .05
Text-Entry Task
Subtraction Difficulty 25.9 < .001 .53
Same as No-SupportText-Entry Difficulty 173.0 < .001 .88
Subtraction ∑ Text-Entry 28.1 < .001 .55
Acc = accuracy.
Table ANOVA results of the accuracy data; separate for Support and No-Support. Note 
that for the accuracy of the text-entry task we did not find any effects involving 
Support, which is why we collapsed over Support.
3.2 
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Support and the No-Support conditions: in both conditions they make most mistakes 
in the hard-hard condition.
In summary, in the response times of the subtraction task the effect of the problem 
state bottleneck decreased, but did not disappear. In the accuracy data, on the other 
hand, performance in the subtraction task reached no-bottleneck levels with support. 
This indicates that external support can indeed help bypassing the problem state 
bottleneck, but does not bring performance fully back to normal levels. Below we will 
discuss how our model accounts for this. However, we will first describe the mental 
workload results.
Pupil Dilation: Mental Workload
Measuring pupil dilation served two goals: (1) investigating whether the problem state 
bottleneck leads to an increase in mental effort; and (2) seeing if the level of mental 
effort changes in the support condition. We calculated percentage change in pupil 
dilation as compared to the average dilation during the fixation screen before each trial; 
only data of stable fixations were taken into account. For each step in a trial (entering 
a digit or letter) the maximum pupil dilation was taken, which was then averaged per 
condition and participant. The results are shown in Figure 3.4, the ANOVA results 
reported in Table 3.4 (all conditions) and Table 3.5 (collapsed over Support). As we did 
Response Times Accuracy
Source F(1,23) p η
p




Support 8.02 .009 .26 65.7 < .001 .74
Subtraction 484.2 < .001 .95 103.8 < .001 .82
Text-Entry 26.3 < .001 .53 18.78 < .001 .45
Support ∑ Subtraction 27.6 < .001 .55 66.8 < .001 .74
Support ∑ Text-Entry 4.22 .05 .15 12.7 .002 .36
Subtraction ∑ Text-Entry 29.35 < .001 .56 24.7 < .001 .52
Support ∑ Sub. ∑ Text-Entry 5.05 .03 .18 21.4 < .001 .48
Text-Entry Task
Support 2.85 .10 .11 3.20 .09 .12
Subtraction 105.5 < .001 .82 25.7 < .001 .53
Text-Entry 1.17 .29 .05 149.4 < .001 .87
Support ∑ Subtraction 32.7 < .001 .59 < 1 – –
Support ∑ Text-Entry 3.96 .06 .15 3.87 .06 .14
Subtraction ∑ Text-Entry 19.7 < .001 .46 27.1 < .001 .54
Support ∑ Sub. ∑ Text-Entry 9.29 .006 .29 < 1 – –
Subtraction = Subtraction Difficulty, Text-Entry = Text-Entry Difficulty.
Table Overall ANOVA results, on the left for response times, on the right for accuracy. 3.3 
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not find a difference in pupil dilation between the support and the no-support condition 
for either task (no effects involving Support were significant, Table 3.4), we collapsed 
over Support for both tasks.
The top row of Figure 3.4 shows pupil dilation in the subtraction task. While it seems 
as if the interaction effect between Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty is 
somewhat smaller with external support, this effect did not reach significance. Overall, 
the two-way interaction between Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty was 
significant (see Table 3.5), as were the main effects of Subtraction Difficulty and 
Text-Entry Difficulty. Thus, pupil dilation increased with task difficulty, and increased 
even more when both tasks were hard. This replicates the effects that were found in 
the response time and accuracy data.
The bottom row of Figure 3.4 shows pupil dilation during the text-entry task. The 
overall interaction effect between Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty 
was even more pronounced for the text-entry task than for subtraction: highest pupil 
dilation levels were observed in the hard-hard condition (Figure 3.4). However, again we 
did not find a significant difference between the support and the no-support condition. 
In addition to the two-way interaction effect, the main effect of Text-Entry Difficulty 
was also significant. Thus, in the text-entry task pupil dilation increased considerably 
when text-entry was hard, but not when subtraction was hard. However, when both 

























































































































































Figure Pupil dilation results. Easy/Hard means Easy Subtraction – Hard 
Text-Entry, etc. Error bars are standard errors.
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In summary, we found strong interaction effects between Subtraction Difficulty 
and Text-Entry Difficulty. These indicate that the performance decrease caused by the 
problem state bottleneck is also reflected in an increase in mental workload. When 
external support was provided, this increase in mental workload did not disappear for 
either task.
Pupil Dilation




Support 1.86 .19 .07
Subtraction 15.73 < .001 .41
Text-Entry 25.13 < .001 .52
Support ∑ Subtraction 1.24 .28 .05
Support ∑ Text-Entry < 1 – –
Subtraction ∑ Text-Entry 7.25 .01 .24
Support ∑ Sub. ∑ Text-Entry 1.47 .24 .06
Text-Entry Task
Support 2.98 .10 .11
Subtraction 3.51 .08 .13
Text-Entry 56.14 < .001 .71
Support ∑ Subtraction 1.05 .32 .04
Support ∑ Text-Entry < 1 – –
Subtraction ∑ Text-Entry 24.05 < .001 .51
Support ∑ Sub. ∑ Text-Entry 2.16 .15 .09
Subtraction = Subtraction Difficulty, Text-Entry = Text-Entry Difficulty.
Table Overall ANOVA results for the pupil dilation data.3.4 
Pupil Dilation




Subtraction Difficulty 15.79 < .001 .41
Text-Entry Difficulty 24.76 < .001 .52
Subtraction ∑ Text-Entry 7.33 .01 .24
Text-Entry Task
Subtraction Difficulty 3.56 .07 .13
Text-Entry Difficulty 55.86 < .001 .71
Subtraction ∑ Text-Entry 24.32 < .001 .51
Table Overall ANOVA results for the pupil dilation data.3.5 
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Cognitive Model
To account for the observed data, we adapted our computational model of the problem 
state bottleneck (Borst, Taatgen, Stocco, & Van Rijn, 2010; Borst, Taatgen, & Van Rijn, 
2010). This model was developed in the ACT-R cognitive architecture (e.g., Anderson, 
2007), and uses threaded cognition theory to account for the multitasking aspects of 
the task (Salvucci & Taatgen, 2008, 2011). Using a cognitive architecture ensures that 
the components of the model have been validated earlier, which makes it meaningful 
to take for instance the memory, visual, and motor components of the task into account 
(e.g., Cooper, 2007; Newell, 1990). We do not describe the complete model here, but 
refer the interested reader instead to Borst, Taatgen, & Van Rijn (2010).
For the current paper, the problem state component is our main interest. The 
assumption of the model is that the problem state resource can only maintain one 
chunk of information at a time. Thus, as long as at most one of the tasks is hard, the 
model can do the task without a problem – because then at most one problem state 
is required – but when both tasks are hard the model can only maintain one problem 
state, which results in interference. The model assumes that in the hard-hard condition, 
on each step in a trial the problem state resource is swapped out. That is, problem state 
information of the now current task is restored to the problem state resource, while 
problem state information of the previous task is moved to declarative memory. Thus, 
when the model switches to the other task, it first retrieves the necessary problem state 
information from declarative memory, restores this to the problem state resource, and 
only then performs the task. This takes time (a memory retrieval and 200 ms problem 
state restoration costs; Anderson, 2005), which results in increased response times in 
the hard-hard condition. Furthermore, incorrect problem states are sometimes retrieved 
from memory, resulting in lower accuracy scores in the hard-hard condition.
The grey bars in the left panels of Figure 3.2 and 3.3 show the fit of this model to the 
original task1. As can be observed, the model accounts well for the interaction effects 
in both response times and accuracy data, and also matches quite well to the absolute 
response times and accuracy data of the task (R2- and RMSD-values are reported in Table 
3.6). For instance, while we did not add this explicitly to the model, response times 
are lower in the hard text-entry condition than in the easy text-entry condition. This is 
caused by the fact that in the easy condition the model has to read which letter it has 
to enter before it can search for a button and click on it, while in the hard condition 
the model (and participants) already knows what word it is entering. This saves visual 
perception time, and thus results in lower response times in the hard text-entry condition.
We extended the model to also perform the subtraction task in the support condition. 
There were two basic options: either the model always uses the support indicator on 
the screen, which would result in equal response times in the hard subtraction – easy 
text-entry and the hard-hard condition, or it only uses the indicator when it cannot 
use its problem state, in the hard-hard condition. The latter option seems to be the 
most rational one: using the problem state to remember whether a carry is in progress 
1
We fit the model to the data in the no-support condition by estimating retrieval times and retrieval errors from declarative 
memory, and mouse- and eye movements. The model code is available from http://www.jelmerborst.nl/models/.
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takes less time than having to look at the indicator on each step of a trial (cf. the lower 
response times in the hard text-entry condition in the previous paragraph). Thus in 
total it will take less time to do the task when the support indicator is only used in the 
hard-hard condition. When we implemented this strategy in the model, that is, using 
the problem state resource in the hard-easy condition, but the support indicator in the 
hard-hard condition, this led to a good model-data fit (see Figure 3.2 and 3.3; please note 
that we did not make any additional changes to the model, all parameters were kept 
at the same values as for the no-support condition). On the one hand, implementing 
this strategy resulted in a small interaction effect in response times in the support 
condition (in the hard-hard condition the support indicator has to be processed, this 
takes more time than doing the task mentally in the hard-easy condition). On the other 
hand, it also results in a complete absence of the interaction effect in the accuracy 
data (as the model does not make mistakes anymore because of retrieving incorrect 
problem states). Thus, it seems that participants use the externally presented support 
only when it helps them to do the task faster than a mental strategy would allow.
It should be noted that the model always uses its problem state resource to process 
carries in the subtraction task, also in the hard-hard condition with support. Thus, when 
it has to process a carry, it will use its problem state to represent the intermediate 
solution (e.g., when solving ‘6 - 4’ with a carry, it will use the problem state to represent 
‘5 - 4’). This is why the model predicts no changes to the interaction effects for the text-
entry task when external support is presented: It always has to retrieve the text-entry 
problem state from declarative memory and restore it to the problem state resource 
before it can start the text-entry task. However, the data show a small decrease of the 
interaction effects in the support condition in the text-entry task. A simple explanation 
could be that participants do not need to overwrite their text-entry problem state when 
using the support indicator for the subtraction task. This should lead to a complete 
absence of the interaction effect though, both in response times and accuracy. While 
we see a decrease, the interaction effect is still present. As we have no strong hypothesis 
about what happens, we decided against making post-hoc changes to the model to fit 
this.
Measurement R2 RMSD 
RT
Subtraction No-Support 1.0 181 ms
Subtraction Support 1.0 171 ms
Text-Entry No-Support 0.88 88 ms
Text-Entry Support 0.72 124 ms
Acc
Subtraction No-Support 0.99 .68 %
Subtraction Support 1.0 .38 %
Text-Entry No-Support 1.0 .53 %
Text-Entry Support 1.0 2.8 %
RT = Response Times, Acc = accuracy, RMSD = root mean squared 
deviation.
Table Model fit.3.6 
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Summarizing, the model accounts well for the main effects in the data. While we 
might have expected to find no interaction effects at all in the support condition for the 
subtraction task, the model shows that rational behavior does lead to an interaction in 
the support condition, albeit a smaller one than in the no-support condition. Thus, it 
seems that it is possible to use problem state information in the environment, but that 
people only do so when an environment-based strategy is faster than a mental strategy.
General Discussion
In this article we investigated a major bottleneck in human multitasking: the problem 
state (Borst, Taatgen, & Van Rijn, 2010). It was previously shown that this bottleneck 
can have considerable influence on performance, both in the lab and in more real-world 
tasks (Salvucci & Bogunovich, 2010). We therefore looked at how we can design tasks in 
such a way that the problem state bottleneck can be bypassed. In a dual-task experiment, 
it was shown that if problem state information is presented on the screen, the negative 
effects of the problem state bottleneck diminish. Accuracy levels came back to non-
bottleneck levels, while response times improved, but did not reach non-bottleneck levels. 
The computational model showed that this is rational behavior: Participants performed 
the task as fast as possible, which in the single problem state case meant that they did 
it mentally, while they used the external support when a problem state was required 
for both tasks. These results seem to indicate that the problem state bottleneck can be 
avoided by presenting information in the environment, but that users will only use this 
information when it leads to faster and less error-prone behavior. Furthermore, the 
model showed that participants still use their problem state resource for subtraction in 
the support condition, because otherwise the interaction effects in the text-entry task 
should have disappeared.
It is not surprising that presenting external support improves performance on a 
task; the beneficial effects of offloading mental representations to the environment 
have been described before (e.g., Hollan, Hutchins, & Kirsh, 2000; Kirsh, 1995; Wickens, 
1992). However, the current experiment shows that presenting information in the 
environment only helps in certain cases. Using the model, it is possible to predict 
exactly when external support is helpful, and when not. In general, we can conclude 
that it only helps to present external support when users need more than one problem 
state to carry out a task. While in other cases it might still be used as a memory aid, 
there are limits on presenting information in the environment. The current research 
indicates that it is often not necessary to present external information, and that it will 
not even be used when a mental strategy is faster. Moreover, while the current very 
simple interface already shows that the costs of visually processing external support 
have an influence on the task, this is much more important with a real-life interface. 
When multiple sources of external support are present (as is often the case in real-life 
systems), this will increase the costs of actually using it, making it important to only 
present external support when it improves performance.
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As we just described, the current research shows that external support is only helpful 
when multiple problem states are required for performing a task. However, on the other 
hand it indicates that already with two concurrent problem states it can be profitable to 
present information externally. This runs counter to classical ideas that we only have to 
offload internal representations if we cross a threshold of about 5 items. For instance, 
based on the classical idea of a working memory capacity of 7 ± 2 items (Miller, 1956), 
Wickens states that “The 7 ± 2 limit is a critically important one in system design.” 
(1992, p. 222). Based on the current research we would argue for a much lower limit of 
only one item. However, this is also dependent on the costs of processing the external 
support: naturally, it is only helpful to present support when the gains are higher than 
the costs.
Besides behavioral measurements, we also recorded pupil dilation during the 
experiment. Pupil dilation is assumed to reflect mental effort in a task (e.g., Beatty, 
1982; Steinhauer & Hakerem, 1992). Where we previously reported interaction effects 
in response times and accuracy, we now show that the problem state bottleneck also 
leads to an over-additive increase in mental effort: we observed higher dilation in the 
hard-hard condition than would be expected based on the separate hard conditions. 
This is not simply a reflection of increased response times: in the easy subtraction – hard 
text-entry condition we see for example faster response times (Figure 3.2), but higher 
pupil dilation than in the easy-easy condition (Figure 3.4). Interestingly, we did not find 
a significant difference in mental workload between the support and the no-support 
condition. This could indicate that while participants offload problem state processing 
to the screen, it still leads to an increase in mental effort (at least as indicated by pupil 
dilation). However, as there seems to be a slight difference between the conditions 
(Figure 3.4), additional experiments are necessary to make this clear.
Given that an objective measure of mental workload, pupil dilation, does not show 
a difference between the support and no-support conditions, it is likely that also a 
subjective measure of workload (i.e. questionnaires) would not yield a difference. 
However, we see in the behavioral data that performance does improve significantly 
when external support is provided. This indicates that asking users if a certain task 
environment is a useful improvement is not sufficient, but that detailed measures like 
response times and low-level errors have to be taken into account when designing 
user interfaces. Using these measures, cognitive models can then help in identifying 
bottlenecks in behavior, and how these can be bypassed(see also Gray, 2008, on the 
use of cognitive architectures in human factors). As shown, a model can for instance 
be used to predict when external support will be useful to the users of the task, and 
when the visual processing costs are too high for it to be useful.
We conclude that it is possible to bypass the behavioral effects of the problem state 
bottleneck by presenting external support. However, when giving external support, it 
should be taken into account that it is only useful when users need more than one 
problem state to perform a task, and when the processing costs of the support are not 
higher than the behavioral gains.
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Chapter
4
The Neural Correlates of 
Problem States: 
Regions-of-Interest Analysis
In which we investigate the neural correlates of 
problem states by testing a priori fMRI predictions of 
our cognitive model with a regions-of-interest analysis.
This chapter was previously published as:
Borst, J.P., Taatgen, N.A., Stocco, A. & Van Rijn, H. (2010). The 
Neural Correlates of Problem States: Testing fMRI Predictions of a 







































Background: It has been shown that people can only maintain one problem 
state, or intermediate mental representation, at a time. When more than 
one problem state is required, for example in multitasking, performance 
decreases considerably. This effect has been explained in terms of a problem 
state bottleneck.
Methodology: In the current study we use the complimentary methodologies 
of computational cognitive modeling and neuroimaging to investigate the 
neural correlates of this problem state bottleneck. In particular, an existing 
computational cognitive model was used to generate a priori fMRI predictions 
for a multitasking experiment in which the problem state bottleneck plays a 
major role. Hemodynamic responses were predicted for five brain regions, 
corresponding to five cognitive resources in the model. Most importantly, 
we predicted the intraparietal sulcus to show a strong effect of problem 
state manipulations. 
Conclusions: Some of the predictions were confirmed by a subsequent fMRI 
experiment, while others were not matched by the data. The experiment 
supported the hypothesis that the problem state bottleneck is a plausible 




One of the challenges for research on multitasking is to explain why some tasks can 
be performed together without a problem (e.g., talking and walking), while other tasks 
clearly interfere with each other (e.g., talking and reading). According to so-called 
multiple-resource theories, interference occurs when multiple tasks require the same 
cognitive or peripheral resources (e.g., Navon & Gopher, 1979; Salvucci & Taatgen, 2008; 
Wickens, 2002). An obvious example is our visual system: we can only look at one 
thing at a time. There is empirical evidence that the same principle might hold for 
cognitive resources: for instance indicating that we can only retrieve one fact at a time 
from declarative memory (e.g., Anderson & Lebiere, 1998). The impact of a concurrent 
request to a particular resource depends on the time scale of multitasking: whether 
it is truly concurrent multitasking (e.g., driving and calling), or whether the task can 
be characterized as ‘sequential multitasking’ (e.g., writing a paper and answering the 
phone; Salvucci, Taatgen, et al., 2009).
A resource that causes considerable interference in both concurrent and sequential 
multitasking is the problem state resource. This resource is used for maintaining 
intermediate task representations. For instance, when mentally solving the algebra 
problem 3x - 10 = 2 it is used to store 3x = 12 (e.g., Anderson, 2005). In a series of 
experiments we have shown that the problem state resource acts as a bottleneck in 
sequential multitasking (Borst, Taatgen, & Van Rijn, 2010). When multiple tasks needed 
to store intermediate results, interference was observed. However, when only one of 
the tasks required access to intermediate results no interference was found. To account 
for these experimental results we developed a computational cognitive model that 
showed that a ‘problem state bottleneck’ could explain the behavioral data.
The goal of this paper is to explore the neural underpinnings of the problem state 
bottleneck and to further validate our cognitive model. To these ends, the model was used 
to generate a priori predictions of hemodynamic activation patterns in five predefined 
brain areas for a triple-task. Subsequently, an fMRI experiment was conducted, and the 
model predictions were compared to the data. Some of the predictions were confirmed 
while others did not match with the data. In general the results corroborate the model 
and provide further evidence (see e.g., Anderson, 2005) that the intraparietal sulcus 
is a probably location for the problem state resource. In the remainder of this paper 
we will first introduce the theory related to the problem state bottleneck, followed 
by a description of the experiment, the model, and the fMRI predictions. Finally, we 
will discuss the correspondence between the predictions and the fMRI data, and the 
implications for the problem state bottleneck hypothesis.
The Problem State Bottleneck
The problem state resource is the part of working memory responsible for storing 
intermediate representations in a task. For instance, the problem state can be used to 
store an intermediate state of an algebra problem, as mentioned above. An everyday 
example is asking for driving directions, during which one needs the problem state 
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resource to store at which street one should turn to arrive at the destination. Note that 
if the same information is present in the world, that is, if one works out the algebra 
problem on paper or follows road signs to the destination, it is not necessary to maintain 
a problem state. An important functional characteristic of the problem state resource 
is that its contents are directly accessible for the task at hand. This in contrast to other 
elements in working memory, which are only available at a time cost (e.g., McElree, 
2001).
The concept of a central problem state resource originates from a series of neuro-
imaging experiments by Anderson and colleagues, who found that the Blood-Oxygen 
Level-Dependent (BOLD) signal in the posterior parietal cortex correlates with the 
number of transformations of mental representations (e.g., Anderson, 2005; Anderson, 
Albert, et al., 2005; Anderson et al., 2003; Sohn et al., 2005).
Previously, we have conducted a number of experiments investigating the nature 
of this resource (Borst & Taatgen, 2007; Borst, Taatgen, & Van Rijn, 2010). These 
experiments showed that people can only maintain one problem state at a time. 
When a problem state was required for more than one task, performance decreased 
considerably, indicating a processing bottleneck. To account for these results we 
constructed a cognitive model based on the threaded cognition theory (Salvucci & 
Taatgen, 2008) and the cognitive architecture ACT-R (Anderson, 2007). The model 
fit well to the data (see the next section), further corroborating the hypothesis of a 
problem state bottleneck as a plausible explanation of multitasking interference. The 
next section will discuss how the model was used to generate fMRI predictions for the 
current study.
A Priori Model Predictions
To validate cognitive models, it is common practice to compare model data to behavioral 
data. For instance, if response times and accuracy scores correspond well between 
model and data, it is assumed that a model gives a plausible explanation of the data. 
However, many cognitive models have a complexity that cannot be accounted for by 




using only behavioral measurements (e.g., Myung, 2000; Roberts & Pashler, 2000). 
One solution is to use predictions: first use a cognitive model to predict the outcome of 
an experiment, and only conduct the experiment afterwards (see for examples Salvucci 
& Macuga, 2002; Taatgen & Anderson, 2008; Taatgen et al., 2007). Nevertheless, 
there are so many degrees of freedom in developing a model that models are often 
under-constrained by behavioral data. To increase the constraints on models that 
are developed in the cognitive architecture ACT-R, a methodology was developed for 
mapping model activity on brain activity (for a concise explanation, see Anderson et 
al., 2008). This way, models are not only constrained by behavioral data, but also by 
neuroimaging data. The next sections will describe how this methodology was used to 
generate a priori neuroimaging predictions from our model. We will first describe the 
experimental setup and the model itself, followed by the actual predictions.
The	triple	task
The task for which we generate BOLD-predictions is a triple task in which participants 
have to perform a subtraction task, a text-entry task, and a listening comprehension 
task (similar to Experiment 3 in Borst, Taatgen, & Van Rijn, 2010). The subtraction 
and text-entry tasks both have an easy version for which maintaining a problem state is 
not required to perform the task, and a hard version for which maintaining a problem 
state is required to perform the task correctly. In half of the trials, participants also 
had to listen to a short story on which they were quizzed after the trial. To measure 
baseline performance on the listening task, we included an ‘Only Listening’ condition 
in which participants only had to do the listening task. Thus, the experiment has a 
2 ∑ 2 ∑ 2 + 1 design (Subtraction Difficulty (easy/hard) ∑ Text-Entry Difficulty (easy/hard) 
∑ Listening (yes/no) + Only Listening).
Figure 4.1 shows the graphical interface of the experiment. The subtraction 
and text-entry tasks were presented at the same time on two different panels of the 
interface; participants had to alternate between these tasks. After entering a digit in 
the subtraction task, the subtraction panel was disabled, forcing the participant to 
subsequently enter a letter. After entering a letter, the text-entry panel was disabled 
and the subtraction panel became available again. In half of the trials, the listening 
task had to be performed at the same time as the other two tasks. Thus, this paradigm 
allows us to study both concurrent (listening and subtraction/text-entry), and sequential 
multitasking (alternating between subtraction and text-entry).
The interface for the subtraction task is shown in the left panel of Figure 4.1. In 
the subtraction task participants had to solve multi-column subtraction problems in 
standard right-to-left order. However, at each point in time, only one column was 
visible. Although the problems were presented column by column, the participants 
were trained to perceive the separate columns in a trial as one 10-column subtraction 
problem (in the practice phase participants started out with a normal 10-column layout, 
only later they switched to solving the problems column by column). Participants had 
to enter the digits by clicking on the on-screen keypad with the mouse. In the easy, 
no problem state version, the upper digit was always larger or equal to the lower one; 
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these problems could be solved without ‘borrowing’. In contrast, the hard version 
required participants to borrow six times out of 10 possible columns. The assumption, 
supported by the results of Borst, Taatgen, and Van Rijn (2010), is that participants 
have to use their problem state resource to keep track of whether a ‘borrowing’ is in 
progress.
The interface for the text-entry task is shown on the right in Figure 4.1. Participants 
had to enter 10-letter strings by clicking on the on-screen keypad. In the easy version 
these strings were presented one letter at a time and participants had to click the 
corresponding button on the keypad. In the hard version, a 10-letter word was presented 
once at the start of a trial. Once a participant clicked on the first letter, the word 
disappeared and the remaining letters had to be entered one at a time, without feedback. 
Thus, after the initial presentation of the string in the hard condition, participants 
could neither see what word they were entering, nor what they had already entered. 
Results by Borst, Taatgen, and Van Rijn (2010) provide evidence that participants use 
their problem state resource to keep track of the process.
The listening comprehension task had to be performed during half of the trials. 
This task consisted of listening to a short story about which a multiple-choice question 
would be asked at the end of the trial. After answering the question, participants received 
accuracy feedback. According to existing models of language processing in ACT-R, this 
task does not require maintenance of problem states, but draws on different cognitive 
resources (Lewis & Vasishth, 2005; Lewis et al., 2006). Furthermore, the listening task 
did not affect the problem state-related outcomes of Experiment 3 in Borst, Taatgen, 
and Van Rijn (2010), also indicating an absence of problem state usage. This, in turn, 
indicates that problem state interference does not depend on the number of tasks, but 
on the particular cognitive resources used by the tasks. In the ‘only listening’ condition 
a fixation cross was shown instead of the subtraction and text-entry tasks.
Because participants had to alternate between the subtraction and text-entry tasks 
after every letter and digit, they had to maintain intermediate state information for the 
other task (when it was hard) while giving a response on the current task. Based on 
the threaded cognition theory (Salvucci & Taatgen, 2008), we predicted that it is not 
possible to maintain more than one problem state at a time, and therefore expected to 
find interference when participants have to use a problem state for both tasks. As the 
listening task was assumed not to use the problem state resource, it was expected that 
problem state interference was independent of the listening task.
The results of the behavioral experiment of Borst, Taatgen, and Van Rijn (2010) were 
as follows. Response times were considerably higher and accuracy lower in the hard 
subtraction – hard text-entry condition than in the other conditions. In fact, we found an 
interaction effect of Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty both in response 
times and accuracy. The listening task had little behavioral effect; it was limited to a 
small increase in response times in the subtraction task when the listening task was 
added. Because the subtraction and text-entry tasks were performed sequentially, it 
is unlikely that the observed interaction was caused by condition-specific differences 
between the easy and hard conditions: only problem states had to be maintained while 
doing the other task (see for a much more elaborate discussion of these results Borst, 
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Taatgen, & Van Rijn, 2010, in particular Experiment 2). Thus, in line with the problem 
state bottleneck hypothesis, the strongest interference occurred in the hard subtraction 
– hard text-entry condition, indicating that participants could not maintain two problem 
states at the same time. 
The	cognitive	model
To account for these results, a model was developed in the cognitive architecture ACT-R, 
using the threaded cognition theory to handle multitasking. First we will introduce 
ACT-R and threaded cognition, followed by a description of the model itself.
The cognitive architecture ACT-R (Anderson, 2007) describes human cognition as 
a set of independent modules – cognitive resources – that interact through a central 
production system. For instance, it uses visual and aural modules for perception and a 
motor module to interact with the world. Besides these peripheral modules ACT-R also 
has a number of central cognitive modules: the procedural module that implements 
the central production system, the declarative memory module, the goal module, and 
the problem state module. All modules operate in parallel, but each module in itself 
can only proceed serially (Byrne & Anderson, 2001). Thus, the visual module can only 
perceive one object at a time and the memory module can only retrieve one fact at a 
time.
Threaded cognition (Salvucci & Taatgen, 2008, 2011; Salvucci, Taatgen, et al., 2009) 
extends ACT-R by allowing multiple tasks – called threads – to be active at the same time. 
However, because the cognitive resources are serial in nature, the key assumption of 
threaded cognition is that although several tasks can be active at the same time, a 
particular resource can only be used by a single task at a time, and thus acts as a 
bottleneck when required by multiple tasks concurrently.
Of particular importance for the tasks at hand is ACT-R’s problem state module. 
Although this module can hold a problem state that is accessible at no time cost, 
changing or restoring a problem state has been estimated to take a relatively long time 
(a value of 200 ms has provided a good fit in previous ACT-R models, and has been 
left unchanged in our models; e.g., Anderson, Qin, Stenger, & Carter, 2004; Taatgen et 
al., 2009). Because the problem state module can only hold one chunk of information, 
the module’s contents have to be swapped when multiple problem states are required. 
When a problem state is replaced, the previous problem state remains available in long-
term memory, and it can be recalled when required. However, as both retrieving an old 
problem state from declarative memory and updating the problem state takes time, 
using multiple problem states causes considerable interference. An additional effect of 
swapping problem states is that because older problem states need to be retrieved from 
memory, it is possible to retrieve an incorrect problem state from memory, resulting 
in behavioral errors.
The model for the triple task consists of three independent threads, one for the 
subtraction task, one for the text-entry task, and one for the listening task. The 
subtraction and text-entry threads use the visual module to perceive the stimuli and 
the manual module to operate the mouse. In the easy condition of the subtraction task, 
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the model perceives the digits, retrieves a fact from memory (e.g., 5 - 2 = 3) and clicks 
on the corresponding button. The procedure is the same in the hard condition, up to 
the point when borrowing becomes necessary. When the model retrieves a fact from 
memory and notices that the outcome is negative (e.g., 3 - 6 = -3), the model will add 10 
to the upper term, retrieve a new fact (13 - 6 = 7), and store in its problem state that a 
‘borrowing’ is in progress. The model will then check the problem state every time the 
subtraction task is resumed. If a ‘borrowing’ is in progress, the model first subtracts 1 
from the upper term before the initial retrieval is made.
In the easy version of the text-entry task, the model perceives the letter and clicks 
on the corresponding button. In the hard version, the model has to know the target 
word and the current position within that word. This information is stored in the 
problem state resource (e.g. “university, 4th letter”). At each step, the model uses 
this information to determine the next letter. To simulate the spelling processes, we 
implemented an additional declarative retrieval that links the current position to the 
next letter. Although this is a very simplified implementation of the spelling process, 
it was not necessary to model this aspect of the task in more details since no effects 
of spelling difficulty are to be expected on the problem state. After the model has 
determined the next letter, it clicks the appropriate button and updates the problem 
state to reflect that it is one position further in the word.
The listening task was modeled as a third thread. This thread aurally perceives 
words, retrieves lexical information related to the auditory input from memory, and 
builds syntactic trees. The same approach was used by Salvucci and Taatgen (2008) 
to model the classical reading and dictation study of Spelke, Hirst, and Neisser (1976) 
and by Van Rij, Van Rijn, and Hendriks (2010) and Hendriks, Van Rijn, and Valkenier 
(2007) to account for developmental patterns in children’s ability to process pronouns. 
For each incoming word in the auditory module, four processing steps are taken, and 
two facts are retrieved from memory. This results in about 320 ms processing time 
per word, fast enough to keep up with the average speaking rate of 359 ms/word in 
the presented texts (note that the model is capable of listening to speech faster than 
320 ms/word, because the auditory module can already start perceiving a word while 
other cognitive modules are processing the previous word). The process of answering 
the multiple-choice questions was not modeled, because modeling the comprehension 
of a question would have required linguistic processing capabilities at a level of 
complexity that is beyond the scope of the model. However, the model visually parses 
the questions when they appear on the screen.
The model explains the interference effect in the following way. In the hard – hard 
condition a problem state is needed for both the subtraction and the text-entry task. 
This means that the contents of the problem state resource have to be replaced on each 
step in a trial, increasing response times considerably. Because this is only necessary 
in the hard – hard condition, the model predicts an over-additive effect of task difficulty 
on response times. The number of errors will also increase with task difficulty, because 
older and incorrect problem states are sometimes retrieved. As the model does not use 
the problem state resource for the listening task, no influence of the listening task on 
problem state interference is predicted.
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Figure 4.2 shows how the model uses cognitive resources over the course of a 
trial (that is, entering 10 digits and 10 letters). The four panels show four different 
trial types, ranging from easy subtraction – easy text-entry at the top to hard – hard at 
the bottom (all without the listening task). Boxes indicate that a cognitive resource is 
in use. A first observation is that the length of the model traces increases with task 
difficulty: response times increase when the tasks get more difficult. Second, the use of 
the problem state resource and declarative memory also increases with task difficulty, 
with an over-additive increase in the hard – hard condition because of the problem 
state bottleneck. Finally, the use of the manual and visual resources is more or less 
constant over the different trial types, but gets more spread out in the more difficult 
conditions. That is, participants have to make the same number of responses in each 


















Easy Subtraction – Easy Text-Entry
Easy Subtraction – Hard Text-Entry
Hard Subtraction – Easy Text-Entry
Hard Subtraction – Hard Text-Entry
Time
Figure Cognitive resource usage of the model for four trial types. Time goes from left to right; boxes indicate activity 
of a cognitive resource. Note that only trials are depicted without the listening task.
4.2
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The model fit well to the behavioral data from Borst, Taatgen, and Van Rijn (2010): 
it fit both the interaction effects in the response times (average R2 of .99) and in the 
accuracy data (average R2 of .95; for details see Borst, Taatgen, & Van Rijn). The same 
model was used previously to account for the data of two other experiments (Borst, 
Taatgen, & Van Rijn, 2010), corroborating the model’s explanation of the data. In the 
next section we will describe how we used the same model to generate fMRI predictions 
for the current experiment.
The	fMRI	predictions
As mentioned above, the cognitive architecture ACT-R can predict fMRI data, or to be 
more precise, the BOLD response (e.g., Anderson, 2007; Anderson et al., 2008). The 
modules of ACT-R have been mapped onto specific regions in the brain (see Table 4.1), 
and are assumed to predict activation in that region. The most important modules and 
associated brain regions for the current model are listed in Table 4.1.
ACT-R’s modules are not constantly in use during the execution of a model, but 
operate for short periods of time (in the order of hundreds of ms). The assumption 
is that when a module is active the BOLD response increases in the associated brain 
region. The BOLD response of a certain event is modeled by a gamma function, as is 








where t is the age of the event, m determines the magnitude of the BOLD curve, s the 
time scale, and a the shape. If D(t) is a 0-1 demand function that indicates whether a 
module is active at time t, the BOLD activation at time t can be calculated by convolving 
D(t) with the gamma function:
B(t) = D(t) H(t) = D( )H(t )d
0
t
Because the predictions were made before the experiment was run, the gamma function 
parameters were not fit to data but were set to default ACT-R values (s = .75, a = 6). The 
scaling parameter (m) was left at 1 (note that therefore only the shape of the predictions 










Aural Sec. auditory cortex (BA 21/22/42) 5 ∑ 5 ∑ 5 -45, -22, 9 -48, -21, 7
Manual Precentral gyrus (BA 3) 5 ∑ 5 ∑ 4 -42, -20, 50 -42, -23, 54
Visual Fusiform gyrus (BA 37) 5 ∑ 5 ∑ 4 -41, -61, -9 -43, -60, -16
Problem State Intraparietal sulcus (BA 7/39/40) 5 ∑ 5 ∑ 4 -24, -63, 40 -24, -67, 44
Declarative Memory Inferior frontal sulcus (BA 45/46) 5 ∑ 5 ∑ 4 -42, 23, 24 -43, 24, 25
Voxels are 3 ∑ 3 ∑ 3 mm. MNI = Montreal Neurological Institute. BA = Brodmann Area.
Table ACT-R modules and associated brain regions.4.1 
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It should be noted that we do not assume that modules in ACT-R cause activation 
in only these regions, nor that activation in these regions is only due to the associated 
ACT-R modules. However, these regions have been the best indicators of activation in 
the ACT-R modules over an extended series of studies (see also http://act-r.psy.cmu.
edu/mri and Anderson, 2007).
The predictions were made using the model described above, adapted for the 
fMRI-suitable interface of the current experiment. While the experiment is in essence 
the same as Experiment 3 in Borst, Taatgen, and Van Rijn (2010), some changes were 
made to the interface to make it suitable for the fMRI scanner. First, in the current 
experiment, participants were told before each trial what the conditions of the different 
tasks would be to reduce noise in the fMRI measurements. This was most relevant in 
the difficult subtraction condition, as in the experiments in Borst, Taatgen, and Van 
Rijn participants only discovered during a trial that a subtraction required ‘borrowing’. 
Second, all responses had to be made using the mouse (instead of the keyboard). 
Finally the interface was made more compact to reduce eye- and head movements.
































































































































































Figure Model predictions and BOLD results for the problem state module. Please note that the black line is hidden 
behind the green line in the upper left graph.
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We discuss predictions for the five most interesting modules of the current model: 
the problem state module, the declarative memory module, the manual module, the 
visual module, and the aural module (Figures 4.3–4.7; note that these predictions are 
based on module demand traces similar to those shown in Figure 4.2). On the left side 
of each figure the location and the MNI coordinates of the particular module are shown. 
The three graphs in the center of each figure show the model predictions; the three 
graphs on the right the fMRI data (which will be discussed in the ‘Results’ section). 
The four line graphs show the BOLD response over a complete trial (i.e., entering 10 
digits and 10 letters, and in the case of the listening task answering the multiple-choice 
question). The x-axis of these graphs represents time in the form of scans (1 scan = 
2 seconds); the y-axis percent BOLD change (as compared to the average of the first 
two scans in a trial). The two line graphs at the top show the four conditions when 
the listening task was present, together with the ‘only listening’ condition. The two 
line graphs in the middle show the four conditions without the listening task. Finally, 
the two bar graphs show the area under the curve of the BOLD graphs, indicating 


























































































































































Figure Model predictions and BOLD results for the declarative memory module. Please note that the black line is 
hidden behind the green line in the upper left graph.
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the total time a module is active and thus the total activation in a brain area during 
a trial (as it is sensitive to both the magnitude and the duration of the response, see 
Anderson, 2005; Stocco & Anderson, 2008). We will now discuss the most important 
predictions; lower-level predictions for each module will be discussed in the results 
section alongside the experimental results.
The experiment and the model were developed to investigate the problem state 
bottleneck. The most important prediction is therefore related to the problem state 
resource and its associated brain area, the intraparietal sulcus. The model claims that 
the problem state has to be swapped at every step in a trial in the hard – hard condition. 
In the other conditions, the problem state is either not used at all (the easy – easy 
condition), or used only for one of the tasks (easy – hard and hard – easy). Therefore, 
the model predicts no BOLD activity in the easy – easy condition, intermediate levels 
in the easy – hard and hard – easy conditions, and the most activity in the hard – hard 
condition (Figure 4.3; cf. Figure 4.2). In fact, as the area under the curve reflects the 
total time that a module is active, an over-additive interaction effect is predicted in the 























































































































































Figure Model predictions and BOLD results for the manual module.4.5
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intraparietal sulcus. Because the declarative memory module is used to retrieve the old 
problem state on each step in a trial in the hard – hard condition, a similar interaction 
effect is predicted for the declarative memory module (Figure 4.4).
For the manual module (Figure 4.5), opposite patterns are predicted, with highest 
BOLD peaks occurring in the easier conditions. This may seem odd, because participants 
have to make the same number of responses in each condition. However, because 
response times are longer in the more difficult conditions, the BOLD response has 
more time to decay between each response (see also Figure 4.2). Therefore, the curves 
are lower but broader in the more difficult conditions, and higher and narrower in 
the easier conditions: the area under the curve is equal in all conditions. A similar 
pattern is predicted for the visual module (Figure 4.6). However, more visual activity 
is predicted for the hard subtraction condition than for the easy subtraction condition, 
because the model has to look multiple times at the digits to process the ‘borrowings’. 
With respect to the aural module (Figure 4.7), the model obviously predicts no activity in 
the non-listening conditions, and sustained levels of activity in the listening conditions.































































































































































Figure Model predictions and BOLD results for the visual module.4.6
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To summarize, the model does not predict a general increase in BOLD response 
with task difficulty; instead, it predicts lower but more persistent activation levels for 
the more difficult conditions in the visual and manual modules, and higher and more 
persistent activation levels for the more difficult conditions in the problem state and 
declarative memory modules. In the next section the fMRI experiment is described 
that was carried out to test those predictions.
Methods
Experimental Procedures
The design of the experiment is described in ‘A Priori Predictions – The Triple Task’ 
and Footnote 3. The participants performed the experiment in three sessions. The first 
session was a practice session, in which the participants were familiarized with the 
task, and trained for about 30 minutes. The next day the first of two fMRI sessions of 




































































































































































Figure Model predictions and BOLD results for the aural module.4.7
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about 90 minutes took place, followed by the second fMRI session a few days later (on 
average 3.3 days after the first session, range 1-9 days). The two fMRI sessions were 
identical.
Participants
Thirteen students of Carnegie Mellon University participated in the experiment. Three 
of them had to be excluded: one for falling asleep in the MRI scanner, one for ignoring 
the listening task, and one for fMRI recording problems, which leaves 10 complete 
datasets (3 women, average age 21.9, range 19-28, right-handed). All participants had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and normal hearing. Written informed consent 
as approved by the Institutional Review Boards at Carnegie Mellon University and the 
University of Pittsburgh was obtained before the experiment. Participants received 
US$ 100 compensation for performing the practice session and the two experimental 
sessions.
Stimuli
The stimuli for the subtraction task were generated anew for each participant. The 
subtraction problems in the hard version always featured six ‘borrowings’, and resulted 
in 10-digit answers. The 10 letter words for the hard version of the text-entry task were 
handpicked from a list of high-frequency English words (CELEX database) to ensure 
that similarities between words were kept at a minimum. These stimuli were also used 
in the easy text-entry task, except that the letters within the words were scrambled 
(under the constraint that a letter never appeared twice in a row). Thus, participants 
were presented pseudo-random sequences of letters that they had to enter one-by-one 
in the easy condition. By scrambling the words, we controlled for letter-based effects, 
while preventing the use of strategies to predict the next letter.
The audio recordings and questions for the listening task were taken from four 
English listening comprehension exams (university entrance-level in the Netherlands, 
VWO Engels 2004-2007, Cito Arnhem). The story length ranged between 26 and 72 
seconds (M = 52.6, SD = 9.7). The multiple-choice questions, which participants only 
saw after hearing the text, had three options. These questions could be answered without 
making inferences, but did require attention for the complete duration of the story.
During the practice session, the experiment was presented full screen on a 17" 
monitor. The width of the interface measured 20 cm; the overall height 9 cm (see 
also Figure 4.1). Participants were sitting at a normal viewing distance, about 75 cm 
from the screen. The stories were presented via speakers, of which participants could 
control the volume using the keyboard. During the experimental sessions, the 
experiment was projected on a screen in the MRI scanner, allowing the participants 
to view the experiment via a set of mirrors attached to the head coil. The interface was 
operated through a normal computer mouse using the right hand. The listening task 
was presented via fMRI-compatible headphones, reducing scanner noise to allow the 
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participants to hear the stories. Participants could change the volume of the stories 
using the mouse wheel.
Procedure
Each trial started with the presentation of a fixation cross, followed by two colored circles 
indicating the difficulty levels of the tasks (on the left for the subtraction task, on the 
right for the text-entry task; a green circle for easy, a red circle for hard, two open 
circles for the ‘only listening’ condition). If the listening task was present, a short beep 
sounded when the circles were displayed. The circles stayed on the screen for 5 seconds, 
followed by a fixation cross for 1 second. Afterwards, the subtraction and text-entry 
tasks appeared and, in case of the listening task, the story started. Participants always 
begun with the subtraction task, and then alternated between the two tasks. After 
completing both tasks, a feedback screen was shown for 3 seconds, indicating how 
many letters or digits were entered correctly. After the feedback screen and after the 
story was finished, the multiple-choice question was displayed. When the participants 
clicked on an answer, a feedback screen was shown for 4 seconds. The experiment was 
slow event-related, with trials separated by long breaks whose duration was sampled 
from a uniform distribution between 13 and 17 seconds. The onset of the circles as well 
as the onset of the tasks was synchronized with the beginning of a volume acquisition.
The practice session consisted of 13 single task trials, followed by a block of 9 
multitask trials: all combinations of subtraction and text-entry in combination with 
the listening task (4 trials: easy-easy, hard-easy, easy-hard, and hard-hard), without the 
listening task (4 trials), and one ‘only listening’ trial. Both experimental sessions 
consisted of 5 multitask trial blocks and of one practice block at the start of a session, to 
re-familiarize participants with the task (this was performed during the acquisition of 
structural images, allowing the participants to get habituated to the environment and 
to adapt the listening-volume before the experimental trials). Trials were randomized 
within a block; stimuli were randomized over the two experimental sessions. The 
complete experiment (two sessions) consisted of 90 experimental trials. After each 
block participants could take a short break.
fMRI Procedures and Preprocessing 
The fMRI data were collected with a Siemens 3T Allegra Scanner using a standard 
radio frequency head coil. Each functional volume existed of 34 axial slices (3.2 mm 
thickness, 64 ∑ 64 matrix, 3.125 ∑ 3.125 mm per voxel), acquired using echo-planar 
imaging (2000 ms TR, 30 ms TE, 79° flip angle, 200 mm field of view, 0 slice gap, 
with AC-PC on the 11th slice from the bottom). Functional acquisition was event-related; 
scanning onset was synchronized with stimulus onset as described above. Anatomical 
images were acquired using a T1-weighted spin-echo pulse sequence at the same 
location as the functional images but with a finer resolution (3.2 mm thickness, 200 
mm field of view, 256 ∑ 256 matrix, 0.78125 ∑ 0.78125 mm in-plane resolution).
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The data were analyzed using SPM5 (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, 
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). This included realigning the functional images, 
coregistering them with the structural images, normalizing the images to the MNI 
(Montreal Neurological Institute) ICBM 152 template, and smoothing them with an 
8 mm FWHM Gaussian kernel. The MarsBaR toolbox (Brett, Anton, Valabregue, & 
Poline, 2002) was used to extract the time course information in predefined regions.
Results
We will first discuss the behavioral results, followed by the fMRI region-of-interest 
results. An exploratory fMRI analysis was also performed, which confirmed the existence 
of peaks of activations in the standard ACT-R regions-of-interest (see Appendix 1 and 
Tables 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8 for more details). All reported F- and p-values are from repeated 
measure analyses of variance (ANOVAs), all error bars depict standard errors, effects 
were judged significant when a .05 significance level was reached, and accuracy data 
were transformed using an arcsine transformation before performing ANOVAs.
Response Times Accuracy
Source F(1,9) p η
p
2 F(1,9) p η
p
2
Listening 10.69 .010 .54 10.37 .010 .54
Subtraction 32.43 < .001 .78 8.72 .016 .49
Text-Entry 5.67 .041 .39 32.17 < .001 .78
Listening ∑ Subtraction < 1 – – 1.60 .24 .15
Listening ∑ Text-Entry < 1 – – < 1 – –
Subtraction ∑ Text-Entry 12.08 .007 .57 10.35 .01 .53
Listening ∑ Sub. ∑ Text-Entry < 1 – – < 1 – –
Subtraction = Subtraction Difficulty, Text-Entry = Text-Entry Difficulty.
Table ANOVA results of the text-entry task.4.2 
Response Times Accuracy
Source F(1,9) p η
p
2 F(1,9) p η
p
2
Listening 1.58 .24 .15 < 1 – –
Subtraction 83.82 < .001 .90 80.96 < .001 .90
Text-Entry 5.40 .045 .38 4.34 .067 .33
Listening ∑ Subtraction < 1 – – 1.44 .26 .14
Listening ∑ Text-Entry < 1 – – 2.81 .13 .24
Subtraction ∑ Text-Entry 2.70 .13 .23 14.05 .005 .61
Listening ∑ Sub. ∑ Text-Entry 1.47 .26 .14 < 1 – –
Subtraction = Subtraction Difficulty, Text-Entry = Text-Entry Difficulty.
Table ANOVA results of the subtraction task.4.3 
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Behavioral Results
Outliers in response times were eliminated by means of a two-step procedure. First, 
response times faster than 250 ms and slower than 10,000 ms were removed. Then, 
data exceeding 3 standard deviations from the mean per condition per participant were 
excluded. Overall, 2.4% of the data was discarded. Table 4.2 (text-entry) and Table 4.3 
(subtraction) summarize the results.
Results
Figure 4.8, upper panels, shows the response times on the text-entry task, on the left 
without and on the right in combination with the listening task. A response time on 
the text-entry task was defined as the time between entering a digit in the subtraction 
task and entering a letter in the text-entry task. The first responses of each trial were 
removed (per task), as they might contain ‘start-up’ effects. An ANOVA showed that 
all three main effects were significant (see Table 4.2), indicating that response times 
decreased with Text-Entry Difficulty, but increased with Subtraction Difficulty and 
Listening. The interaction between Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty also 
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Figure Response times on the subtraction and text-entry tasks. Error bars 
represent standard errors.
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reached significance, which is due to the increased response times in the hard-hard 
condition, as was predicted. The three-way interaction did not reach significance.
The lower panels of Figure 4.8 show the response times on the subtraction task. 
This is the time between clicking a button in the text-entry task and entering a digit 
in the subtraction task. Again, the first response of each trial was removed. Only the 
main effects of Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty reached significance 
(see Table 4.3), showing an increase in response times for both effects. The interaction 
of Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty did not reach significance, nor did 
any effects involving the listening task.
Figure 4.9 shows the accuracy on the subtraction and text-entry tasks (the ANOVA 
results are listed in Table 4.2 and 4.3). The two top panels show the accuracy on 
the text-entry task. All three main effects reached significance, all three indicating 
a decrease in accuracy. As predicted, when both the subtraction and the text-entry 
task were hard, accuracy decreased even more, which is shown by the significant 
interaction between Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty. The other effects 
did not reach significance. The lower panels of Figure 4.9 show the accuracy on the 
subtraction task. The main effect of Subtraction Difficulty was significant, as was the 
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interaction between Subtraction Difficulty 
and Text-Entry Difficulty. The other tests 
did not reach significance.
Figure 4.10 shows the accuracy on 
the listening task. One of the stories was 
removed because participants’ accuracy 
was at chance level. Only the main 
effect of Subtraction Difficulty reached 
significance (F(1,9) = 18.09, p = .002, η
p
2  = 
.67), caused by a decrease in accuracy when 
subtraction was hard. The other effects 
were not significant (Text-Entry Difficulty: 
F < 1; Subtraction Difficulty ∑ Text-Entry 
Difficulty: F(1,9) = 1.29, p = .28, η
p
2  = .13).
Discussion
The results were as expected: the interaction 
effect between Subtraction Difficulty and 
Text-Entry Difficulty was significant for the response times of the text-entry task and 
for the accuracy scores of both tasks. Thus, when a problem state was required for both 
tasks (the hard-hard condition), response times increased and accuracy decreased, as 
was predicted by the model. The fact that this interaction did not reach significance 
(F(1,9) = 2.7, p = .13, η
p
2  = .23) for the response times of the subtraction task is probably 
due to the lower number of participants than in previous experiments, in which the effect 
was always significant (Borst, Taatgen, & Van Rijn, 2010). Furthermore, compared to 
previous experiments, response times were slightly higher. This difference is probably 
due to performing the experiment in the scanner and using the mouse.
The pattern of response times of the text-entry task was slightly different than in 
the previous experiment (Experiment 3 of Borst, Taatgen, & Van Rijn, 2010): response 
times were lower in the hard version of the text-entry task than in the easy version. 
The explanation is that participants have to do two different actions to determine the 
next letter to type in the text-entry task: in the easy version they have to look at the 
letter that they need to type, and in the hard version they have to mentally determine 
the next letter to type given the word and position. In earlier experiments these two 
actions happened to take approximately the same amount of time, but in the current 
experiment the action for the easy version of the task turned out to be slower, probably 
due to the slightly different interface that we used in this experiment. We have observed 
similar effects before, for instance in Experiment 2 of Borst, Taatgen, and Van Rijn. To 
ensure that the fMRI experiment is comparable to our earlier studies, we ran the same 
experiment outside the scanner. This yielded similar results as reported previously (Borst, 
Taatgen, & Van Rijn, 2010), including the decrease of response times for the hard text-
entry task, indicating that the observed differences are not due to the minor changes in 
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Figure Accuracy on the listening task. Error bars 
represent standard errors.
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is probably caused by the low number of participants, and the slightly different pattern 
of results by performing the task lying in the scanner and operating the mouse in 
this setup. This suggests that the experiment still taps the same underlying cognitive 
constructs and that it is therefore comparable to our previous studies. For details see 
Appendix 2, Figures 4.11 and 4.12, and Tables 4.9 and 4.10.
The model did not predict the effect of the listening task on the text-entry task, neither 
the small increase in response time nor the small decrease in accuracy. As this is not 
the focus of the current paper, we did not pursue this issue further. The effect of the 
subtraction task on the listening task accuracy, Figure 4.10, is explained by the model: 
When the subtraction task is hard, there is a high demand for declarative memory, 
causing the model to not process all words of the listening task (for which declarative 
memory is also required). This could then lead to more mistakes in answering the 
questions (see Borst, Taatgen, & Van Rijn, 2010, for a more extensive discussion of 
this issue).
fMRI Results: Regions-of-Interest
To analyze the effects in the predefined regions, we first transformed the Talairach-
Tournoux coordinates used in previous ACT-R/fMRI papers (e.g., Anderson, 2007) 
to the MNI coordinates reported in Table 4.1 using a non-linear mapping (Lacadie, 
Fulbright, Rajeevan, Constable, & Papademetris, 2008). The smoothed functional 
images were proportionally and grand mean scaled (with a grand mean of 100) using 
SPM. The BOLD response was then calculated as percent signal change as compared 
to the first two scans of a trial. Trials belonging to the same participant, brain area, and 
condition were averaged together. Because the area under the curve reflects the total 
activity of a brain area (see Anderson, 2005; Stocco & Anderson, 2008), we entered 
this value into an ANOVA. We only took the area between the start of a trial and the 
behavioral feedback screens into account, because the tails of the BOLD curves contain 
the multiple-choice questions. These could obscure the results and were not included 
in the ACT-R model (except for the passive act of reading the words on the screen). 
Table 4.4 contains the results; Table 4.5 shows which scans were taken into account for 
the different conditions.
Results
The most important prediction of the model was an over-additive interaction effect in 
the intraparietal sulcus, reflecting the problem state bottleneck. Figure 4.3 shows the 
results in the intraparietal sulcus: most activation is indeed observed for the hard- hard 
condition. The ANOVA of the area under the curve shows that the interaction between 
Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty is significant in combination with 
the listening task, but not without it (see Table 4.4). Furthermore, the main effects 
of Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty are significant with and without 
the Listening task. The model prediction that there is no activation for the easy-easy 
condition did not come true, but the prediction that the problem state resource is not 
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used for the listening task – except for answering the multiple-choice question – is 
reflected by the data.
Figure 4.4 shows the results of the prefrontal cortex, associated with the retrieval 
module. For this region the model also predicted an over-additive interaction effect 
of Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty, which was not found in the data. 
The model also predicted main effects of both Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry 
Difficulty and these effects were indeed found (Text-Entry Difficulty was only significant 
without the listening task, Subtraction Difficulty both with and without listening).
Problem State Module – Intraparietal Sulcus
With Listening Without Listening
Source F(1,9) p η
p
2 F(1,9) p η
p
2
Subtraction 60.20 < .001 .87 20.89 .001 .70
Text-Entry 6.49 .031 .42 10.39 .010 .54
Subtraction ∑ Text-Entry 5.15 .049 .36 < 1 – –
Declarative Memory Module – Prefrontal Cortex
With Listening Without Listening
Source F(1,9) p η
p
2 F(1,9) p η
p
2
Subtraction 11.73 .008 .57 7.53 .023 .46
Text-Entry < 1 – – 9.81 .012 .52
Subtraction ∑ Text-Entry 2.03 .19 .18 < 1 – –
Manual Module – Motor Cortex
With Listening Without Listening
Source F(1,9) p η
p
2 F(1,9) p η
p
2
Subtraction < 1 – – 3.51 .09 .28
Text-Entry 1.85 .207 .17 < 1 – –
Subtraction ∑ Text-Entry < 1 – – < 1 -– –
Visual Module – Fusiform Gyrus
With Listening Without Listening
Source F(1,9) p η
p
2 F(1,9) p η
p
2
Subtraction 11.52 .008 .56 11.12 .009 .55
Text-Entry 3.00 .117 .25 4.06 .075 .31
Subtraction ∑ Text-Entry 2.42 .154 .21 1.35 .276 .13
Aural Module – Secondary Auditory Cortex
With Listening Without Listening
Source F(1,9) p η
p
2 F(1,9) p η
p
2
Subtraction < 1 – – 3.32 .102 .27
Text-Entry 2.00 .191 .18 1.39 .269 .13
Subtraction ∑ Text-Entry < 1 – – < 1 – –
Table ANOVA results of the area under the curve of the regions-of-interest.4.4 
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In contrast to the problem state and 
declarative memory modules, we expected a 
higher BOLD response peak for the easier 
conditions in the manual and visual areas. 
Indeed, in the motor cortex – associated 
with the manual module – the BOLD curve 
reached its highest activation levels in the 
easy-easy condition (Figure 4.5). The more 
difficult the condition, the lower and broader 
the activation curves. The model predicted no 
effects on the total activity; this was confirmed 
by the data.
At first sight, the match between model 
and empirical data for the fusiform gyrus 
(Figure 4.6), associated with the visual module, seems less convincing. However, a 
more careful analysis shows that the same patterns are observed in both model 
and data. The model predicted an effect of Subtraction Difficulty on activation in the 
fusiform gyrus, as the digits have to be visually attended to multiple times in the hard 
condition to solve the ‘borrowings’. This is confirmed by the ANOVA that compared 
the area under the curve between the easy and difficult conditions. While the model 
also predicted a small decrease of visual activation in the hard text-entry conditions 
(because in the hard condition the word only had to be read at the first step of a trial, 
while in the easy condition a letter had to be processed at each step of a trial), this was 
not found in the data. Finally, the model predicted a peak of activation around scan 40 
caused by reading the multiple-choice questions; this was reflected in the data.
Figure 4.7 illustrates the results for the auditory cortex. As expected, when the 
listening task was not present, the BOLD response was absent. When the listening 
task was present, on the other hand, a clear BOLD response was found. The model 
predicted this effect, and additionally predicted a small effect of condition. The cause 
of this effect is that to process each word that the model hears, it has to retrieve 
multiple facts from declarative memory. In the more difficult subtraction and text-
entry conditions, these tasks also make heavy demands on declarative memory. When 
declarative memory is busy, the model can sometimes not process a word right away, 
which results in missing some words in the auditory stream. Thus, the more difficult 
the subtraction and text-entry conditions, the higher the demands on declarative 
memory, the more words are missed, and the lower the predicted BOLD response for 
the secondary auditory cortex (as this region reflects processing auditory information, 
not passive listening). A similar effect seems to be present in the data, but did not 
reach significance.
Discussion
The atypical prediction that the more difficult conditions would show lower but broader 
activation curves in the visual and manual regions, and higher and broader curves 
Subtraction Text-Entry Listening Scans
Easy Easy No 23
Easy Hard No 23
Hard Easy No 31
Hard Hard No 33
Easy Easy Yes 23
Easy Hard Yes 24
Hard Easy Yes 32
Hard Hard Yes 34
Table Number of scans that was taken into 
account for the analyses of the area 
under the curve, per condition.
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in the problem state and declarative memory conditions, was confirmed by the data. 
Furthermore, the over-additive interaction effect in the problem state region was present 
in the fMRI data (in combination with the listening task), supporting the theory that 
the problem state bottleneck is localized in the intraparietal sulcus. This interaction 
effect was not found in the declarative memory region (see the General Discussion 
for an extensive discussion of this issue). In the aural region the predictions were 
confirmed in general: a BOLD response in the listening conditions, mediated by the 
conditions of the subtraction and text-entry tasks. However, these effects did not reach 
significance.
General Discussion
The current study was performed to investigate the neural correlates of problem states 
and the problem state bottleneck, and to validate our theory using neuroimaging data. 
First, we generated a priori fMRI predictions for five brain areas using our model, which 
were subsequently tested in an experiment. This resulted in two main predictions: 
(1) an over-additive interaction effect in the problem state region (the intraparietal 
sulcus) and in the declarative memory region (a part of the prefrontal cortex), and (2) 
lower and broader BOLD curves for the more difficult conditions in the manual and 
visual regions, and higher and broader BOLD curves for the more difficult conditions 
in the problem state and declarative memory regions. The first prediction came true 
for the problem state region, but not for the declarative memory region, while the 
counter-intuitive second prediction was confirmed by the experiment.
In general, the model’s fMRI predictions for this complex task were accurate. The 
paper focuses mainly on the overall BOLD response in the regions (area under the 
curve). The figures also report the time course of the BOLD response over a trial 
together with the corresponding model predictions. Here the fit between the scan-by-
scan data points and the model is more modest, which can be explained by the fact 
that we made a priori predictions, and did not try to fit the curves post-hoc. A number 
of factors might be called into question. First, ACT-R uses only a simple gamma 
function, identical for every module, to predict the BOLD response in each region. 
However, the biological hemodynamic response function is more complex than that, and 
varies in different parts of the brain (e.g., Handwerker, Ollinger, & D’Esposito, 2004). 
Choosing different functions and fitting their parameters for each region separately 
would probably result in a better model-data match. Second, due to the duration of 
our experimental paradigm, only a relatively small number of observations for each 
condition was available for each participant. This small number of observations might 
not be able to cancel the scan-to-scan variations of noise in the MRI signal, thus making 
the true shape of the observed BOLD curves difficult to estimate. Third, the model 
might be underestimating some trial-by-trial variability in the subjects’ responses. In 
particularly long trials, the BOLD response in a region might cumulate over the interval 
between trials and carry over to the scans chosen as a baseline for the successive trial. 
The fact that certain BOLD curves (especially in Figures 4.4 and 4.5) do not return 
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to baseline suggests that this kind of contamination was indeed occurring, possibly 
corrupting the true shape of the BOLD curves.
It should be noted that, while all these factors can affect the shape of the BOLD 
response, none of them should significantly impact our predictions on the relative 
magnitudes of the areas under the curve. Therefore we choose to focus on the predictive 
power of the model and its principal predictions. In combination with the behavioral 
evidence that we gathered before (Borst, Taatgen, & Van Rijn, 2010), the observed global 
effects on the BOLD response suggest that the hypothesized existence of a problem 
state bottleneck can explain the interference effects in the data.
The most important prediction of the model was an over-additive interaction 
effect in the problem state region. While this effect was indeed present in the data in 
combination with the listening task, it did not reach significance in the trials without 
the listening task. The main reason for this is that while the model predicted no 
activity in the problem state region for the easy-easy condition, the experimental data 
does show increased activity in this condition. One possible explanation is that the 
observed activity was caused by visually processing the stimuli, as the same parietal 
region is known to be involved in visual-spatial processing (e.g., Culham & Kanwisher, 
2001). Not only would this lead to an effect in the easy-easy condition, but also obscure 
the effects in the other conditions. In combination with non-linear properties of the 
BOLD response (e.g., Bandettini & Ungerleider, 2001; Dale & Buckner, 1997; Vazquez 
& Noll, 1998), this could explain why we did not observe the interaction effect here, 
especially taken into account the relatively low number of participants. Another 
possibility is that participants use their problem state resources in the easy-easy condition 
to represent information, even if this is not required by the task. This would lead to 
neural activity in the easy-easy condition, again canceling the interaction effect. The 
additional load of the listening task could have prevented the use of problem state 
resource (see, for similar effects, Taatgen et al., 2009), which could explain why we did 
find the interaction effect in the context of the listening task. However, as the model 
has successfully accounted for data of three experiments (Borst, Taatgen, & Van Rijn, 
2010), we do believe that the basic mechanisms of the model are sound, and decided 
against post-hoc changes to the model.
The prefrontal region corresponding to the declarative memory module exhibits 
the predicted main effects of subtraction difficulty and text-entry difficulty (except for 
Text-Entry Difficulty when the listening task was present). This supports the hypothesis 
that this predefined region indeed represents an area involved in the processing of 
declarative memory elements (such as subtraction facts). However, we did not find 
the predicted interaction effect. The interaction effect was supposed to be caused by 
encoding of problem states (on top of retrieving subtraction facts). Even though the 
predefined area is known to be active when intentionally encoding facts and even 
when unintentionally encoding facts (e.g., Buckner, Kelley, & Petersen, 1999), the 
experiment did not provide evidence that it is actually used to encode suspended 
problem states. Therefore, either this region’s contribution to the processing problem 
states was too weak to impact the BOLD signal, or the retrieval of suspended problem 
states is controlled by a different region.
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With respect to the first option (i.e., the contribution to the signal being too weak) 
one must note that the predictions made by our model were based on the assumption 
that both retrieving a previous problem state from declarative memory and swapping 
it into the problem state module require some measurable cost in terms of time. 
When the model was fit to the behavioral data of Borst, Taatgen, and Van Rijn (2010), 
these two costs had to be estimated together, with no possibility of disentangling them. 
However, it is conceivable that the retrieval time for a problem state is very short, and 
that most of the time is due to the swapping process. Under such circumstances, the 
model would still predict the over-additive effects of task difficulty for the problem 
state region, but not for the retrieval region. In fact, there are at least two reasons why 
the retrieval time for problem states should be very short. The first reason is recency: 
the problem state that needs to be retrieved has been swapped out of its module only 
a few seconds before, and it is probably still active in memory.  Second, the retrieval of 
appropriate problem states can be easily cued by task-relevant, on-screen information. 
In both cases, there is no reason to expect a significant effect of problem state retrievals 
on the prefrontal region. In fact, the pattern of data in Figure 4.5 (lower half) suggests 
that main factor affecting the response of the retrieval region is the difficulty of the 
subtraction task.   Thus, although the interaction effect in the PFC was an a priori 
prediction of our model, it was not an inevitable prediction and its lack does not 
undermine the plausibility of our framework.
On the basis of previous ACT-R/fMRI research, the model predicted that the problem 
state resource – and thus the effect of the bottleneck – is located in the intraparietal 
sulcus. This notion is supported by the current results: the predicted interaction effect 
caused by the problem state bottleneck was found in this region. This region is part 
of the fronto-parietal network that is consistently found in neuro-imaging studies of 
working memory. While the intraparietal sulcus is mostly implicated in spatial working 
memory and spatial attention tasks, it is also known to be responsible for object 
and verbal working memory (among other regions, e.g., LaBar, Gitelman, Parrish, & 
Mesulam, 1999; Wager & Smith, 2003). In our study, the problem states did not contain 
spatial information, and therefore confirms a more general role of the intraparietal 
sulcus for working memory. 
In the hard subtraction task the problem state resource contained numerical 
information, that is, information whether a ‘borrowing’ is in process. It is not 
surprising that this leads to increased activation in the intraparietal sulcus, as the 
horizontal part of the intraparietal sulcus is one of the three circuits for numerical 
processing as identified by Dehaene, Piazza, Pinel, and Cohen (2003). In the hard 
text-entry task, the problem state is used to maintain verbal information. Brodmann 
Area 40, a region bordering on the intraparietal sulcus, is known to be involved in 
verbal working memory, specifically in maintaining verbal working memory (e.g., Smith, 
Jonides, Marshuetz, & Koeppe, 1998), and it is thus also not surprising that this region 
is involved in maintaining the problem state for the text-entry task. While slightly 
different regions are implicated for storage of different kinds of information, this 
study suggests that maintaining more than one problem state of any kind at a time 
results in significant interference.
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The current results also seem to suggest that the problem state is modality-specific. 
The subtraction and text-entry task elicit activation in the intraparietal sulcus even 
when they are easy (while a problem state is not required), and interfere with each 
other in the hard – hard condition. The listening task, on the other hand, hardly causes 
activation in the intraparietal sulcus (as shown by the ‘only listening’ condition), nor 
does it cause multitasking interference. As the listening task is the only non-visual 
task, this could imply that the intraparietal sulcus is only involved in maintaining 
visual problem states (cf. Anderson, Qin, Jung, & Carter, 2007).
In the current mapping scheme of ACT-R processes to brain regions, the problem 
state predicts activation as a function of problem state transformations, but not in 
reaction to storing problem states. This may seem odd, as storing problem states 
should also have metabolic costs. In practice, however, the two processes of storing 
and manipulating are difficult to separate, (as storing always follows a problem state 
manipulation) and previous research (see e.g., Anderson, 2007) has led to estimated 
costs for transformations only, assuming that representations persist at no additional 
metabolic cost. Therefore, we decided to keep our model as parsimonious as possible 
and not to introduce ad-hoc estimates of the storing costs for problem states.
Our model is based on threaded cognition (Salvucci & Taatgen, 2008, 2011; Salvucci, 
Taatgen, et al., 2009), a theory of multitasking that assumes multiple central and 
peripheral processing bottlenecks. This in contrast to for instance the EPIC theory 
(Meyer & Kieras, 1997a), which assumes only peripheral bottlenecks, and the central 
bottleneck theory (e.g., Pashler, 1994), which assumes only a single central bottleneck. 
While brain evidence for a central bottleneck in the frontal lobes has been reported 
before (e.g., Dux, Ivanoff, Asplund, & Marois, 2006), the current fMRI results give 
evidence for an additional central bottleneck located in the intraparietal sulcus, 
corroborating multiple-bottleneck theories.
In conclusion, this study lends additional support to the notion of the problem 
state bottleneck. This bottleneck can cause considerable interference not only in 
concurrent multitasking – as most bottlenecks – but also in sequential multitasking: 
When multiple alternating tasks need to store intermediate results, the problem 
state bottleneck will cause significant interference. Take for instance the prototypical 
example of taking a phone call while working on a paper: if you had a sentence in mind 
before taking the call, you will almost certainly have forgotten about it after the call.
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Appendix 1: Exploratory fMRI Analysis
An exploratory analysis was performed to identify regions that responded significantly 
to our experimental manipulations. The results of this analysis are reported here. All 
analyses were performed using the general linear model implemented in SPM5. The 
colored circles indicating task condition (see the Method – Procedure section, first 
paragraph), the ‘real’ trial, and the feedback presentations were modeled for each 
condition separately. Realignment parameters were included as covariates and a 
high-pass filter with a 128 sec cutoff was applied. For each voxel, the hemodynamic 
response function (HRF) and its time and dispersion derivatives were fitted. Contrast 
images for each condition were made for the individual participants, and entered into 
second level random-effect group analyses. The statistical results were thresholded 
using a false-discovery-rate (FDR) correction for multiple comparisons of 0.05 and 
more than 40 contiguous voxels. The results are summarized in Table 4.6 (Listening 
> Non-Listening), Table 4.7 (Hard Text-Entry > Easy Text-Entry), and Table 4.8 (Hard 
Subtraction > Easy Subtraction). We also tested the interaction of Subtraction Difficulty 
and Text-Entry Difficulty, however, no brain areas survived the significance test.
Results
Table 4.6 lists the areas with greater activation when all three tasks had to be performed 
as compared to when only the subtraction and text-entry tasks had to be performed, 
reflecting activity related to the listening task. As expected, activation was found in 
bilateral temporal areas and in the left inferior frontal gyrus (cf. Just, Keller, & Cynkar, 
2008). According to for instance Friederici (Friederici, 2002), the temporal regions 
perform identification processes, while the left frontal area integrates the words and 
sentences into a coherent whole. The temporal region overlaps with the area associated 
with ACT-R’s aural module (see also Figure 4.9).
In Table 4.7 areas are listed where more activation was found when the text-
entry task was hard as compared to when it was easy, thus when a problem state 
was required as compared to when it was not. The first area exists of large parts of 
the bilateral superior and inferior parietal lobules, including the intraparietal sulcus. 
This region includes the predefined problem state region, and was therefore expected 
to show an effect. The region is associated with attention and the integration of 
information (e.g., Culham & Kanwisher, 2001), and it is therefore not surprising that 
it is stronger activated by the increase in task-coordination that is necessary to perform 
the hard text-entry task. A second large activated network was found in the medial 
frontal cortex: the left Supplementary Motor Area (SMA), the left superior medial 
gyrus, extending into the left and right precentral gyri (the region extends into the 
left inferior frontal gyrus, which we will discuss below). This network is presumably 
active in response to the increase of cognitive control that is necessary for the hard 
text-entry task in combination with the subtraction task (e.g., Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, 
Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004). Furthermore, the middle and inferior frontal gyri 
were active bilaterally. These regions are very close to ACT-R’s declarative memory 
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R Superior Temporal Gyrus 1575 19.03 63, -12, 0
L Superior/Middle Temporal Gyrus 2055 15.5 -57, -18, 3
L Inferior Frontal Gyrus 78 6.24 -54, 24, 12
Voxels are 3 ∑ 3 ∑ 3 mm. MNI = Montreal Neurological Institute.
Table Exploratory analysis results. Areas with greater activation for 
Subtraction, Text-Entry, and Listening than Subtraction and Text-
Entry alone (p < .05, FDR corrected, >40 contiguous voxels).
4.6 






L SMA / L Superior Medial Gyrus / 
L Inferior Frontal Gyrus
1287 9.16 -3, 6, 60
R Middle Frontal Gyrus 318 8.18 42, 36, 33
L & R Superior /  
Inferior Parietal Lobules
1115 7.49 -9, -69, 51
L Middle Frontal Gyrus 233 5.94 -42, 45, 21
R Insula Lobe 123 5.28 30, 27, 0
Voxels are 3 ∑ 3 ∑ 3 mm. MNI = Montreal Neurological Institute. SMA = 
Supplementary Motor Area.
Table Exploratory analysis results. Areas with greater activation for 
Hard Text-Entry than Easy Text-Entry (p < .05, FDR corrected, >40 
contiguous voxels).
4.7 






R Superior Frontal Gyrus 113 7.61 27, 12, 57
R Supra Marginal Gyrus / R 
Inferior Parietal Lobule
485 7.58 48, -39, 45
R Middle Frontal Gyrus 215 6.69 45, 42, 24
L Middle / Inferior Frontal Gyrus 301 6.53 -48, 36, 24
L Inferior Parietal Lobule 317 6.48 -36, -48, 39
L SMA 90 5.50 3, 21, 45
Voxels are 3 ∑ 3 ∑ 3 mm. MNI = Montreal Neurological Institute. SMA = 
Supplementary Motor Area.
Table Exploratory analysis results. Areas with greater activation for Hard 
Subtraction than Easy Subtraction (p < .05, FDR corrected, >40 
contiguous voxels).
4.8 
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area, reflecting an increase in memory retrievals necessary for interpreting words and 
spelling information.
A very similar set of regions was found when we compared the hard subtraction task 
to the easy condition: a bilateral parietal network, a control network around the medial 
frontal cortex, and a memory network in the middle and inferior frontal gyri (Table 
4.8). An increase of cognitive control and information processing requirements is even 
clearer for the subtraction task than for the text-entry task: more difficult subtraction 
facts have to be retrieved and ‘borrowings’ have to be processed.
Appendix 2: Behavioral Results outside the Scanner
Here we report the results of the experiment that we ran outside the fMRI scanner. 
This experiment was performed to test whether differences between the behavioral 
results of the current fMRI experiment and the previous experiment (Experiment 3, 
Borst, Taatgen, & Van Rijn, 2010) are due to performing the experiment in the scanner 
and the low number of participants, or to the slightly different interface.
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Subtraction / Text Entry Subtraction / Text Entry
Figure Response times outside the scanner. Error bars represent standard errors.4.11
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Results
Participants
Twenty students of Carnegie Mellon University participated in the experiment (11 women, 
average age 20.6, range 18–23). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision and normal hearing. Informed consent as approved by the Institutional Review 
Boards at Carnegie Mellon University and the University of Pittsburgh was obtained 
before the experiment. Participants received US$ 10 for performing the experiment.
Results
Outliers in reaction times were eliminated by means of a two step procedure. First, 
response times faster than 250 ms and slower than 10,000 ms were removed. Then, 
data exceeding 3 standard deviations from the mean per condition per participant were 
excluded. Overall, 2.0% of the data was discarded. Figure 4.11 (response times) and 
Figure 4.12 (accuracy) show the results; Table 4.9 (text-entry) and Table 4.10 (subtraction) 
list the results of the analyses. All reported F- and p-values are from repeated measure 
analyses of variance (ANOVAs), all error bars depict standard errors, effects were 
Response Times Accuracy
Source F(1,19) p η
p
2 F(1,19) p η
p
2
Listening 1.50 .236 .07 < 1 – –
Subtraction 69.49 < .001 .79 15.62 < .001 .45
Text-Entry < 1 – – 38.63 < .001 .67
Listening ∑ Subtraction 1.62 .219 .08 2.00 .173 .10
Listening ∑ Text-Entry 1.37 .256 .07 < 1 – –
Subtraction ∑ Text-Entry 19.85 < .001 .51 16.03 < .001 .46
Listening ∑ Sub. ∑ Text-Entry 2.57 .126 .12 3.06 .096 .14
Subtraction = Subtraction Difficulty, Text-Entry = Text-Entry Difficulty.
Table ANOVA results of the Text-Entry Task outside the scanner.4.9 
Response Times Accuracy
Source F(1,19) p η
p
2 F(1,19) p η
p
2
Listening < 1 – – < 1 – –
Subtraction 139.23 < .001 .88 52.86 < .001 .74
Text-Entry 31.99 < .001 .63 6.10 .023 .24
Listening ∑ Subtraction < 1 – – < 1 – –
Listening ∑ Text-Entry < 1 – – 1.93 .181 .09
Subtraction ∑ Text-Entry 22.09 < .001 .54 4.19 .055 .18
Listening ∑ Sub. ∑ Text-Entry < 1 – – 1.26 .276 .06
Subtraction = Subtraction Difficulty, Text-Entry = Text-Entry Difficulty.
Table ANOVA results of the subtraction task.4.10 
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judged significant when a .05 significance level was reached, and accuracy data were 
transformed using an arcsine transformation before performing ANOVAs.
Figure 4.11, upper panels, shows the response times on the text-entry task, on the 
left without and on the right in combination with the listening task. A response time on 
the text-entry task was defined as the time between entering a digit in the subtraction 
task and entering a letter in the text-entry task. The first responses of each trial were 
removed (per task), as they might contain ‘start-up’ effects. An ANOVA showed that 
the main effect of Subtraction Difficulty was significant (see Table 4.9), indicating 
that response times increased with Subtraction Difficulty. The interaction between 
Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty also reached significance, which is due 
to the increased response times in the hard-hard condition, as was predicted. All other 
effects were not significant.
The lower panels of Figure 4.11 show the response times on the subtraction task. 
This is the time between clicking a button in the text-entry task and entering a digit in 
the subtraction task. Again, first responses of a trial were removed. The main effects 
of Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty reached significance (see Table 4.10), 
showing an increase in response times for both effects. Response times increased 
even more when both tasks were hard, as shown by the significant interaction effect 
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Subtraction / Text Entry Subtraction / Text Entry
Figure Response times outside the scanner. Error bars represent standard errors.4.12
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of Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty. All other effects did not reach 
significance.
The two top panels of Figure 4.12 show the accuracy on the text-entry task. The 
main effects of Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty reached significance, 
as did the interaction effect between Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty: 
Accuracy decreased with the two main effects, and even more when both tasks were 
hard. The other effects did not reach significance. 
The lower panels of Figure 4.12 show the accuracy on the subtraction task. The main 
effect of Subtraction Difficulty was significant; the interaction between Subtraction 
Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty showed a trend towards significance. The other 
tests did not reach significance. 
Discussion
This experiment was performed to test why two results of the fMRI experiment were 
slightly different from previous experiments: First, the interaction effect in the response 
times of the subtraction task was absent in the fMRI experiment, and second, the 
pattern of response times of the text-entry task was different. The current experiment, 
with the same interface as the fMRI experiment, did find a significant interaction 
effect in the response times of the subtraction task, and shows a ‘normal’ pattern in 
the response times of the text-entry task. This suggests that the small differences in the 
behavioral data of the fMRI experiment are due to the changed environment and the 
low number of participants, not to the new interface.
Chapter
5
The Neural Correlates 
of Problem States: 
Model-Based fMRI Analysis
In which we apply a novel model-based fMRI analysis 
method to locate the neural correlates of the problem state 
resource, declarative memory, and other resources.
This chapter was previously published as:
Borst, J.P., Taatgen, N.A., & Van Rijn, H. (2011). Using a Symbolic Process 
Model as input for Model-Based fMRI Analysis: Locating the Neural 






































In this paper, a model-based analysis method for fMRI is used with a 
high-level symbolic process model. Participants performed a triple-task 
in which intermediate task information needs to be updated frequently. 
Previous work has shown that the associated resource – the problem state 
resource – acts as a bottleneck in multitasking. The model-based method 
was used to locate the neural correlates of “problem state replacements”. 
To analyze the fMRI data, we fit the computational process model to the 
behavioral data and regressed the model’s activity against the fMRI data. 
The brain region responsible for the temporary representation of problem 
states, the inferior parietal lobule, and the brain region responsible for 
long-term storage of problem states, the inferior frontal gyrus were thus 
identified. These results show that model-based fMRI analyses can be 




If one wants to find the neural correlates of a theorized cognitive process using the 
classical fMRI analysis method of cognitive subtraction (e.g., Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000; 
Logothetis, 2008), the first step is to translate the theory into suitable experimental 
conditions. Then, an experimental condition placing demands on the process of 
interest is compared to a control condition. The control condition is the same as the 
experimental condition except for the absence of the process under investigation. 
Brain areas that are more active in the experimental condition than in the control 
condition are assumed to be involved in the cognitive process of interest (e.g., Friston, 
Ashburner, Kiebel, Nichols, & Penny, 2007). However, it would be better to localize 
cognitive functions in a more direct way. Especially for more complex tasks, the 
translation of theory into experimental conditions is non-trivial. In complex tasks, 
central cognitive processes are often used in all experimental conditions (although 
with a different frequency or temporal pattern), which makes it difficult to find a good 
control condition that does not include the process of interest. A way to address this 
problem and to localize brain functions in a more direct way is to use model-based 
fMRI analysis (e.g., Gläscher & O’Doherty, 2010; O’Doherty et al., 2007).
In model-based fMRI analysis, information coming from a computational model 
that simulates the process of interest is correlated against fMRI data, showing which 
brain areas show activation patterns that are consistent with the process of interest. 
This method has proven to be very successful in locating brain areas involved in 
reinforcement learning (e.g., Daw, O’Doherty, Dayan, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006; 
Hampton, Bossaerts, & O’Doherty, 2006; Haruno & Kawato, 2006; Kim, Shimojo, & 
O’Doherty, 2006; Wunderlich, Rangel, & O’Doherty, 2009). Parameters of mathematical 
reinforcement models were correlated against brain data, showing which brain areas 
are involved in the reinforcement learning process. In this article we will use the 
model-based method with a higher-level symbolic cognitive model. Such a higher-level 
model not only simulates a particular process, but the whole task including, for 
example, visual and motor processes. Instead of correlating model parameters, we will 
correlate the presence and absence of activity of cognitive resources against brain data, 
showing where the cognitive resources are best represented in the brain. This way, 
we will investigate whether predictions derived from a high-level process model can 
be used for model-based fMRI, and whether this combination allows for more direct 
exploratory fMRI analyses.
The Problem State Resource
We will use model-based fMRI to analyze data of a relatively complex experimental 
paradigm, which was developed to investigate the neural correlates of the “problem 
state resource” (Borst, Taatgen, Stocco, et al., 2010). The problem state resource is 
defined as the part of working memory that is available at no time cost (Anderson, 
2005), as opposed to other elements in working memory that take time to retrieve and 
use (e.g., McElree, 2001). It is normally used to represent intermediate information 
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in a task, and can at most contain one chunk of information (Borst, Taatgen, & Van 
Rijn, 2010). Thus, the concept of a problem state resource is comparable to the focus of 
attention in working memory theories that pose an extremely limited focus of attention 
(e.g., Garavan, 1998; McElree, 2001). The concept of a central problem state resource 
originates from a series of neuroimaging experiments by Anderson and colleagues, 
who found that activity in the posterior parietal cortex correlates with the number of 
transformations of mental representations (Anderson, 2005; Anderson, Albert, et al., 
2005; Anderson et al., 2003; Sohn et al., 2005).
Although Anderson and colleagues assumed on functional grounds that the 
problem state resource contains at most one chunk of information, we have recently 
provided empirical evidence for this assumption. In a series of experiments, we 
showed that the problem state resource is a source of interference when required by 
multiple tasks at the same time (Borst & Taatgen, 2007; Borst, Taatgen, & Van Rijn, 
2010). A computational cognitive model was developed to account for the observed 
multitasking interference. The basic assumption of the model is that when multiple 
tasks require a problem state, the contents of the problem state resource have to be 
replaced on each switch between tasks. That is, on every alternation the problem state 
of the previous task is stored in declarative memory, while the problem state of the 
current task is recalled from declarative memory and restored to the problem state 
resource. The model incorporating these time-consuming and error-prone problem 
state replacements provided a good match with the interference effects in the data. The 
current experiment was performed to find the neural correlates of the resources that 
are used by the model, which are, apart from the problem state resource, associated 
with vision, manual action, and declarative memory.
Materials and Methods
Behavioral Experiment
To locate the neural correlates of the model’s resources, we used a triple-task design in 
which participants alternated between solving subtraction problems and entering text, 
while performing a listening comprehension task simultaneously (Figure 5.1 shows a 
screenshot of the experiment). Both the subtraction task and the text-entry task had 
two versions: an easy version that did not require maintenance of a problem state and 
a hard version that did.
In the subtraction task participants had to solve 10-column subtraction problems. 
Although participants were shown only one column at a time to minimize eye and 
head movements, participants were trained to perceive these columns as part of a full 
10-column subtraction problem. In the easy version the upper term was always larger 
or equal to the lower term: no carrying was required. However, in the hard version 
participants had to carry in 6 out of the 10 columns; thus, participants had to remember 
whether a carry was in progress while performing the text-entry task.
In the text-entry task participants had to enter 10-letter strings. In the easy version a 
single letter was shown, which the participants had to enter. After solving one column of 
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the subtraction problem, a new letter was shown, etc. In the hard version, a complete 
10-letter word was shown once at the start of a trial, but as soon as the participant 
entered the first letter, the word disappeared and had to be entered letter by letter 
without feedback. Thus, in the hard version of the text-entry task participants had to 
remember what word they were entering.
Because participants had to alternate between the tasks after every number and 
letter, they had to keep track of whether a carry was in progress and what word they 
were entering (and the position within the word) in the hard versions of the tasks while 
giving a response on the other task. Supported by results from previous experiments 
(Borst, Taatgen, & Van Rijn, 2010), we assumed that participants used their problem 
state resource to keep track of the absence or presence of a carry and the words, but 
did not use this resource in the easy conditions. In half of the trials participants also 
had to perform a listening comprehension task. As the listening task is not the focus of 
the current article, we collapsed over this task if not mentioned otherwise. A detailed 
description of the Methods and discussion of the setup can be found in Borst, Taatgen, 
Stocco, et al. (2010).
fMRI Procedures and Analysis
The fMRI data were collected with a Siemens 3T Allegra Scanner using a standard 
radio frequency head coil. Each functional volume existed of 34 axial slices (3.2 mm 
thickness, 64 ∑ 64 matrix, 3.125 ∑ 3.125 mm per voxel), acquired using echo-planar 
imaging (2000 ms TR, 30 ms TE, 79° flip angle, 200 mm field of view, 0 slice gap, 
with AC-PC on the 11th slice from the bottom). Functional acquisition was event-related; 
scanning onset was synchronized with stimulus onset. Anatomical images were 
acquired using a T1-weighted spin-echo pulse sequence at the same location as the 
functional images but with a finer resolution (3.2 mm thickness, 200 mm field of view, 
256 ∑ 256 matrix, 0.78125 ∑ 0.78125 mm in-plane resolution).
The data were analyzed using SPM5 (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, 
London). This included realigning the functional images, coregistering them with 
the structural images, normalizing the images to the MNI (Montreal Neurological 
Figure Screenshot of the experiment.5.1
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Institute) ICBM 152 template, and smoothing them with an 8 mm FWHM Gaussian 
kernel.
Participants
Thirteen students of Carnegie Mellon University participated in the experiment. The 
data of three participants were excluded (one participant fell asleep in the MRI 
scanner, one ignored the listening task, and with one fMRI recording problems were 
encountered) leaving 10 complete data sets (3 women, average age 21.9, range 19–28, 
right-handed). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and normal 
hearing. Informed consent as approved by the Institutional Review Boards at Carnegie 
Mellon University and the University of Pittsburgh was obtained before the experiment. 
Participants received US$ 100 compensation.
Results
Behavioral Results
All reported F- and p-values are from repeated measure analyses of variance (ANOVAs), 
effects were judged significant when a .05 significance level was reached, and accuracy 
data were transformed using an arcsine transformation before performing ANOVAs. 
Outliers in response times were eliminated by means of a two-step procedure. First, 
response times faster than 250 ms and slower than 10,000 ms were removed. Then, 
data exceeding 3 standard deviations from the mean per condition per participant were 
excluded. Overall, 2.4% of the data was discarded. First responses on both tasks were 
removed per trial.
As the listening task is not the focus of the current paper, we collapsed over levels 
of difficulty for this task if not mentioned otherwise.1 Response time on the text-entry 
task was defined as the time between entering a digit in the subtraction task and 
entering a letter in the text-entry task, while a response time on the subtraction task 
was defined as the time between entering a letter in the text-entry task and entering 
a digit in the subtraction task. Figure 5.2(a) shows the response times on the text-
entry task (left) and the subtraction task (right); Table 5.1 contains the results of the 
ANOVAs. The interaction between Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty was 
significant in the text-entry task, as were both main effects. Interestingly, response 
times decreased when the text-entry task was hard but increased when the subtraction 
task was hard. We have come across this effect before (e.g., Experiment 2 in Borst, 
Taatgen, & Van Rijn, 2010). It can be explained by assuming that in the hard condition 
participants know what word they are entering and thus do not need any additional 
visual input, but in the easy condition participants first have to look at the screen to see 
which letter they have to enter next. Our computational model (Borst, Taatgen, & Van 
Rijn, 2010) fitted these results. In the subtraction task the interaction effect failed to 
1
Please note that the listening task has hardly any influence on the subtraction and text-entry results (Borst, Taatgen, Stocco, 
et al., 2010; Borst, Taatgen, & Van Rijn, 2010).
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reach significance, but both main effects did: a small increase of response times when 
text entry was hard, and a large increase when the subtraction task was hard.
Figure 5.2(b) shows the accuracies, in which the interaction effects between 
Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty reached significance for both tasks. The 
main effects of the tasks were also significant: Subtraction Difficulty for the subtraction 
task and Text-Entry Difficulty for the text entry task.
Based on similar effects on response times and accuracy we previously argued that 
the results of this type of experiment support the idea of a problem state bottleneck 
(Borst, Taatgen, & Van Rijn, 2010). In the easy tasks, no intermediate results need 
to be stored in the problem state resource. If a task is hard, accurate performance 
on a task requires storing intermediate results. Although participants had to alternate 
between tasks, the combination of one hard and one easy task is not problematic, since 
the problem state resource is not overwritten during the easy task. If, however, both 
tasks are hard, both tasks require the use of the problem state resource. Therefore, on 
each step in the task in the hard–hard condition the problem state resource has to be 
swapped out: on each step an old problem state is retrieved from declarative memory 
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Figure Behavioral results. RT = response time, E/E = easy–easy, E/H = easy–hard, 
etc., error bars indicate standard error.
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task. This results in the typically observed over-additive interaction effects.2 To test 
whether this effect can indeed explain the observed data, we developed a computational 
cognitive model, which we will discuss in the next section.
Cognitive Model
To account for the data, we used a high-level symbolic cognitive model (Borst, Taatgen, 
& Van Rijn, 2010), developed in the cognitive architecture ACT-R (e.g., Anderson, 
2007). Most important for the task at hand are the problem state resource and resources 
associated with vision, manual actions, and declarative memory. The model uses the 
visual resource to perceive the stimuli; this resource is assumed to do focused processing 
of attended stimuli. The manual resource was used to make responses; it operates the 
“hands” of the model. The declarative memory resource was used to retrieve facts (e.g., 
“5 - 2 = 3”). Facts in ACT-R have a certain activation level, which represents frequency 
and recency of use (e.g., Anderson & Schooler, 1991). This activation level determines 
the probability of retrieving a fact, and the speed with which a fact is retrieved. For 
example, a simple subtraction fact such as “5 - 2” is probably used very often, and has 
therefore a high activation level. In contrast, “17 - 8” will have been used less often in 
the past, and will therefore have a lower activation level and take a little more time to 
retrieve.
The problem state resource is used to maintain intermediate information and is 
therefore of particular interest for the current article. Information in the problem 
state resource can be accessed at no time cost, but it takes 200 ms to replace it (e.g., 
Anderson, 2005). Problem states that are discarded from the problem state resource 
are still available in declarative memory, and can be retrieved and restored later.
2
That the interaction for the response times of the subtraction task in the current experiment failed to reach significance is 
probably a power issue, as previously reported experiments showed significant effects (Borst, Taatgen, & Van Rijn, 2010). 
Moreover, an extensive behavioral pilot experiment with the exact same experimental setup as the current experiment also 
showed both interactions. We report the results of this pilot experiment in the Appendix.
Table ANOVA results of the behavioral data. Interaction is the 




Source F(1,9) p η
p




Subtraction  32.13  <.001  .78  5.20  .049  .37
Text-Entry  5.62  .042  .38  44.27  <.001  .83
Interaction  12.10  .007  .57  6.38  .03  .41
Subtraction Task
Subtraction  83.94  <.001  .90  96.33  <.001  .91
Text-Entry  5.36  .046  .37  4.04  .075  .31
Interaction  2.66  .137  .23  21.16  .001  .70
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Using a cognitive architecture makes it meaningful to model all components relevant 
for a task such as visual, manual, and declarative memory processes (e.g., Cooper, 2007; 
Newell, 1990): the architecture provides the time it takes to move the mouse or retrieve 
a fact from memory, and as such the time courses of when the different resources are 
used. These elements of the architecture have received extensive experimental support 
(e.g., Anderson, 2007 and see http://act-r.psy.cmu.edu/).
To account for multitasking aspects the model uses threaded cognition theory 
(Salvucci & Taatgen, 2008, 2011; Salvucci, Taatgen, et al., 2009). According to threaded 
cognition theory, multiple tasks can be active concurrently, but a cognitive resource 
can only be used by one task at a time. Thus, the problem state resource can only 
maintain information for a single task. However, in the hard–hard condition of the 
present experiment, a problem state is required for both tasks. The problem state then 
has to be replaced on each step of a trial (participants had to alternate between the 
subtraction and text-entry tasks), which takes time (a declarative retrieval and 200 ms 
problem state restoration, see Borst, Taatgen, & Van Rijn, 2010 for details). In contrast, 
in the easy–easy condition the problem state resource is not used at all, while in the 
easy–hard and hard–easy conditions it is only used for one task. Because problem states 
have to be restored and replaced at each step in the hard–hard condition, this leads to 
an over-additive interaction effect on response times. Furthermore, because the model 
sometimes retrieves an incorrect problem state from declarative memory, it also gives 
an explanation for the interaction effect on accuracy.
Previously, the model was fitted to data of Experiment 1 in Borst, Taatgen, and Van 
Rijn (2010, p. 370), and shown to give a good account of the data (R2 for response 
times and accuracy approached 1). Subsequently, the model was used to predict the 
data of Experiment 2 and 3 in the same paper, showing that the model was capable 
of generalizing to different data sets. Experiment 3 in that paper also included the 
listening task; the model fit well to the data of all three tasks in that data set. We use the 
exact same model in the current paper to analyze the fMRI data. Thus, the model takes 
the small influence of the listening task on the timing of the other tasks into account. 
The listening task itself, at least for the purposes of the current model, only requires 
use of the declarative memory resource, and does not use any of the other resources. 
However, we analyzed declarative memory only in the non-listening condition. An 
extensive description of the (lack of) influence of listening can be found in Borst, 
Taatgen, and Van Rijn, 2010.
Model-Based fMRI Analysis – Method
We will now turn to the model-based fMRI analysis data to locate the model’s resources. 
For the classical fMRI analysis method of cognitive subtraction, one typically defines 
stimulus functions that correspond to the experimental conditions (e.g., Friston et al., 
2007). These stimulus functions are entered into a general linear model (GLM), which 
shows brain areas in which activity correlates with the conditions of the experiment. 
Stimulus functions used for classical fMRI analyses are coarse in the sense that they 
assume stable activation during a complete trial – an assumption that often does 
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not hold. During a trial in the current experiment, for example, participants solve a 
10-column subtraction problem and enter a 10-letter word. These processes involve 
multiple fixations, manual actions, memory retrievals, and continuous maintenance 
and updating of problem states, and can thus not be characterized by constant 
activation throughout a trial. To construct more detailed stimulus functions, we fitted 
the cognitive model to the data, and entered the activity of the model’s resources as 
stimulus functions into the general linear model. This method takes into account 
when and how often a resource is used during a trial, instead of assuming constant 
activation.
To approximate the cognitive processes at trial level, we ran the model for each 
participant on the same stimuli as the participant received, in the same order, including 
all non-experimental components, such as fixation and feedback screens. To further 
improve the timing of the model, we lined up the model’s responses with the 
participant’s responses. Figure 5.3 gives a schematic overview of the procedure. The 
first line represents data, with key-presses as dashed lines. The second line shows 
a model simulation of these steps. As the model is regressed directly against brain 
data it is important to have a correct time mapping between model and data (Gläscher 
& O’Doherty, 2010): it does not make sense to compare a fixation in the model to 
a key-press in the data. Therefore, we used a linear transformation to line up the 
key-presses of the model to the key-presses of the participants. Line 3 in Figure 5.3 
shows the result: the transformation causes Step 1 of the model to increase a little 
in length and Step 2 to decrease in length. Not only the key-presses of the model are 
shifted, but also cognitive resource activity within a step is shifted and in- or decreased 
in length (represented by the grey boxes in Figure 5.3). The resulting activity for four 
cognitive resources during four different trials in the experiment is shown as grey 
lines in Figure 5.4.
As the next step, the stimulus functions were convolved with a hemodynamic response 
function. The convolved stimulus functions are displayed in black in Figure 5.4. For 
model-based fMRI analysis it is crucial that the different resources of the model make 
different predictions, because otherwise different resources cannot be distinguished. 
Figure 5.4 shows clearly different patterns between the problem state resource and 
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Figure Demonstration of the linear transformation that was used to line up 
the model data with the participants’ data.
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declarative memory3  on the one hand, and the visual and manual resources on the 
other hand. It is important to note that problem state activity of the model relates to 
changing the contents of the problem state resource, not to passive maintenance of 
information. The problem state resource and declarative memory are used most in the 
hard–hard condition because of repeated problem states replacements, while they are 
used less in the easier conditions. The visual and manual resources show a different 
pattern: they are used for roughly the same amount of time in all conditions, but their 
activity is spread over a larger period of time in the harder conditions, resulting in a 
lower BOLD prediction (the same amount of visual information has to be processed 
and the same amount of key-presses have to be made, but as response times are higher 
more time is available in the more difficult conditions). The problem state resource and 
declarative memory can also be distinguished from each other: declarative memory is 
used often in the hard subtraction – easy text-entry condition (many subtraction facts 
have to be retrieved from memory to process the carries), resulting in high BOLD 
predictions. The problem state resource only shows intermediate BOLD levels in this 
condition (see Figure 5.4). The visual and manual stimulus functions, on the other 
3
The fact that there is hardly any BOLD response predicted in the easy–easy condition of the declarative memory resource is 
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Figure Stimulus functions and convolved stimulus functions for the model-based analysis method, for four 
cognitive resources: the problem state resource, declarative memory, vision, and the manual motor 
resource. Easy–Hard etc. = Easy Subtraction – Hard Text-Entry.
5.4
120 Chapter 5 The Neural Correlates of Problem States: Model-Based fMRI Analysis
hand, are very similar. Table 5.2 shows the inter-correlations between the stimulus 
functions (the prediction column shows the correlations between the predictions). The 
correlation between the visual and the manual resource is .93, which makes it difficult 
to identify separate areas for these resources. 
These stimulus functions were then entered one by one into a GLM to see which 
brain areas correlated with the predicted activity of the resources. Each stimulus function 
was accompanied by its ‘opposite’: a function showing when the resource was not 
active.4 Feedback screens and the screens indicating conditions were also entered into 
the GLM; fixation screens formed the baseline. Contrast images were made for the 
individual participants, and entered into second level random-effect group analyses.
Model-Based fMRI Analysis – Results
Figure 5.5 shows the results for (a) the problem state resource, (b) declarative memory, 
(c) vision, and (d) the manual resource. The column on the left shows the regions 
that were identified by the model-based fMRI analysis. A threshold of p < .01 (FWE-
corrected) and 100 contiguous voxels was applied to the results, with the exception of 
declarative memory, for which a threshold of .05 was used (FWE-corrected; see below 
for an explanation). Crosshairs in Figure 5.5 are located at the most significant voxel, 
except for the manual resource and the visual resource (see below). The xyz-coordinates 
indicate the most significant voxel in MNI-coordinates in the located region. The white 
squares show the existing mapping between ACT-R’s resources and brain regions (e.g., 
Anderson, 2007), which can be used for confirmatory analyses (e.g., Anderson et al., 
2008; Borst, Taatgen, Stocco, et al., 2010).
The area that corresponded best to problem state activity was located in the 
inferior parietal lobule, around the intraparietal sulcus. Declarative memory also 
showed activation in that area, but the best fitting area was located around the inferior 
4
While the ‘non-activity’ of a resource is implicitly modeled by its stimulus function (1 = resource active, 0 = not active), we 
added a non-activity regressor to distinguish it from the fixation screens. Because non-activity often takes place in between 
activity of a resource, due to the convolution with the HRF there is usually some activity present on these scans, unlike on the 
fixation scans. To account for this, we added ‘non-activity’ as a separate regressor.
Correlation between Prediction Data
Problem State – Declarative Memory .69 .65
Problem State – Vision .51 .23
Problem State – Manual .43 .44
Declarative Memory – Vision .22 .35
Declarative Memory – Manual .21 .62
Vision – Manual .93 .38
Table Correlations between the different regions and predictions. 
Please note that correlations with declarative memory were 
calculated on the non-listening data, because that was the 
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Figure Results of the model-based analysis method, for (a) the problem state resource, (b) declarative memory, (c) 
vision, and (d) the manual motor resource. (a), (c), and (d) with a Family Wise Error threshold of p < .01 
and 100 contiguous voxels, (b) with an FWE threshold of p < .05 and 100 contiguous voxels. White squares 
represent predefined mappings between ACT-R’s resources and the brain. Crosshairs are centered at the 
most significant voxel, except for the manual, which is centered on the most significant voxel in the cluster in 
the motor cortex and for the visual, which was moved down 13 mm to enable comparison to the predefined 
region of ACT-R. The middle column shows the stimulus function that was entered into the GLM, averaged 
per condition and trial, the right column the measured BOLD response in the located area.
5.5
122 Chapter 5 The Neural Correlates of Problem States: Model-Based fMRI Analysis
frontal gyrus. The threshold for declarative 
memory was increased to p < .05.5 This was 
necessary due to a more limited data set, as 
we only used the trials in which the listening 
task was not present. If we included the trials 
with the listening task, the best fitting area for 
declarative memory coincided with the aural 
regions, because the model is not able to separate 
auditory processing of the incoming speech and 
the subsequent updating of declarative memory.
Figure 5.5(c) and (d) show the results of 
the visual and manual resources. As discussed 
above, the stimulus functions were very similar 
as moving the mouse in the model is almost 
always accompanied by moving the eyes, and 
this was reinforced by the convolution with the 
HRF. It was therefore not surprising that the 
analyses yielded very similar results. The most 
significant area for both was the occipital visual 
area, but both also showed a fitting area in the 
motor cortex. This area was a little larger for the 
manual resource than for the visual resource, 
and as we know that manual actions are 
represented in the motor cortex, we centered 
the results of the manual resource on that area. 
The crosshairs of the visual area were moved down 13 mm, to enable comparison with 
ACT-R’s predefined region (however, the coordinates indicate the most significant 
voxel).
The middle column of Figure 5.5 shows the stimulus functions that were entered 
into the GLM, averaged per condition per trial. Thus, what is shown here is the 
activity of the model convolved with the BOLD response over the course of entering 
10 numbers in the subtraction task and entering 10 letters in the text-entry task. The 
x-axis represents time in scans (1 scan = 2 seconds). The y-axis shows % BOLD change 
(the height of the curves is not important for the GLM, only the relative magnitude 
of the curves). The right column of Figure 5.5 shows the measured BOLD response 
in the 100 most significant voxels for the located regions. ANOVA results of the area 
under the curve (reflecting total activation in a trial, see e.g., Anderson, 2005; Stocco 
& Anderson, 2008) are reported in Table 5.3. In general, the graphs show that the 
model-based fMRI method is able to identify patterns of activation in the brain that 
are very similar to the predictions of the model. Where for the problem state and 
declarative memory resources the hard–hard condition shows most activation, this is 
5
If we decrease the p-values to .001 the same areas are found for all cognitive resources (except that the number of consecutive 
voxels had to be lowered to 25 for declarative memory).
ANOVA results of the area under 
the curve in the located regions. 
“Interaction” is the interaction 
between Subtraction Difficulty and 
Text-Entry Difficulty.




Subtraction 121.24 < .001 .93
Text-Entry 23.07 < .001 .72
Interaction < 1 - -
Declarative Memory
Subtraction 52.25 < .001 .85
Text-Entry 15.76 .003 .64
Interaction < 1 - -
Vision
Subtraction 43.51 < .001 .83
Text-Entry < 1 - -
Interaction 4.66 .059 .34
Manual
Subtraction 6.81 .028 .43
Text-Entry < 1 - -
Interaction 2.06 .185 .19
Table 5.3 
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not the case for the manual and visual resources6, as predicted by the model. On the 
other hand, the fit is not perfect. For instance, while the model predicted no activity at 
all in the easy–easy condition for the problem state resource, this was not found in the 
located region. This indicates that the model-based analysis is not limited to identifying 
regions with a perfect fit, but locates regions that correlate significantly with the model 
predictions.
Discussion
The model-based method was able to find neural correlates corresponding to the 
cognitive resources of the model. Instead of using the experimental conditions as a 
basis for the analysis, the model-based method allows for assessing directly which 
parts of the brain correlate significantly with model predictions. In this paper we have 
shown that this is possible with a detailed high-level symbolic cognitive model (as 
compared to the more low-level mathematical models that have been used previously; 
e.g., Daw et al., 2006; Gläscher & O’Doherty, 2010; Hampton et al., 2006; Haruno 
& Kawato, 2006; Kim et al., 2006; O’Doherty et al., 2007; Wunderlich et al., 2009). 
Instead of focusing on one process, using a high-level model integrated in a cognitive 
architecture allows for analyzing all cognitive processes that are involved in the task, 
and thus localizing multiple resources in one experiment. Furthermore, because the 
analysis is based on a cognitive model, the fMRI results are grounded in the theoretical 
framework the model was built on, providing a functional explanation of the results 
(Gläscher & O’Doherty, 2010; O’Doherty et al., 2007).
The experiment was set up to test a hypothesis related to the problem state resource. 
Because activity in the model is related to changes of the problem state resource, the 
located region represents these changes, and not storage of problem states per se. 
The analysis showed that the model’s problem state activity corresponded best to a 
region focused in the inferior parietal lobule, but also included parts of the superior 
parietal lobule and the intraparietal sulcus. The intraparietal sulcus has been linked 
previously to ACT-R’s problem state resource (e.g., Anderson, 2005; Anderson, Albert, et 
al., 2005; Anderson et al., 2003; Sohn et al., 2005). While it is most often referred to in 
connection with spatial working memory, it is also known to be involved in object and 
verbal working memory (e.g., LaBar et al., 1999; Smith et al., 1998; Wager & Smith, 
2003), functions that are attributed to the problem state resource.
Use of declarative memory also correlated with activity in the identified problem 
state region, but the best fitting area was the inferior frontal gyrus, slightly anterior to 
the standard ACT-R region for declarative memory (e.g., Anderson, 2007; Anderson 
et al., 2008). This region is known to be involved in memory retrieval (e.g, Cabeza, 
Dolcos, Graham, & Nyberg, 2002; Fletcher & Henson, 2001; Wagner, Maril, Bjork, & 
Schacter, 2001). More interestingly, if we lower the significance threshold, it becomes 
clear that both areas are part of a larger fronto-parietal network, a network that is often 
6
The graph for declarative memory ends earlier than the graphs of the other resources because only trials without the listening 
task are taken into account; these trials are shorter than the trials with the listening task.
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implicated in working memory research (e.g., Collette, Hogge, Salmon, & Van der 
Linden, 2006; Collette & Van der Linden, 2002). While both declarative memory and 
problem state activity are associated with functions of working memory, the current 
analysis implies that retrieving information is done via an area around the inferior 
frontal gyrus, while maintaining and updating working memory is performed in the 
parietal regions.
Model-Based fMRI versus Traditional Analysis Methods
We have shown that model-based fMRI makes it possible to directly locate the neural 
correlates of model resources, and therefore allows for fine-grained exploratory fMRI 
analyses. However, does it perform better than traditional methods? While there is 
no traditional method that allows for direct localization of model components, we 
used two existing methods to localize the over-additive interaction effect that was 
predicted by the model’s problem state resource (see the BOLD prediction in Figure 
5.5(a), middle column), and compared the results of these methods to the results of the 
model-based method. First, we used a classical cognitive subtraction approach to find 
an interaction effect; when that failed we tried a parametric method that is somewhat 
similar to the model-based method.
For the classical cognitive subtraction analysis we defined a stimulus function for 
each condition in the experiment. Subsequently, the four stimulus functions were 
convolved with a hemodynamic response function and entered into a general linear 
model. We then tested for an over-additive interaction effect of Subtraction and 
Text-Entry Difficulty by contrasting the difference between the hard–hard condition 
and the hard–easy condition against the difference between the easy–hard and the easy–
easy condition (i.e. (hard–hard - hard–easy) - (easy–hard - easy–easy); e.g., Friston et al., 
2007). The results are shown in Figure 5.6(a): no voxels crossed the FWE significance 
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Figure Results of traditional fMRI analysis methods, for (a) a classical interaction 
analysis, and (b) a parametric modulation analysis (see the main text for details). 




a region that showed the predicted interaction effect, and could not be used to locate 
the neural correlates of the problem state resource.
We then used a method that is more similar to model-based fMRI: a parametric 
analysis (e.g., Büchel, Wise, Mummery, Poline, & Friston, 1996; M. S. Cohen, 1997). 
For this method we defined one stimulus function for all conditions in the experiment, 
and then specified a parametric model, with 0 for the easy–easy condition, 1 for the 
hard–easy and easy–hard conditions, and 3 for the hard–hard condition. This method 
is comparable to the model-based method, except that the amplitudes of the different 
conditions have to be specified by the researcher, instead of the model providing these 
estimates (note that the model also predicts a detailed pattern within each trial and 
differences between participants, see the next section). The results are shown in Figure 
5.6(b): while the problem state region was found, visual and motor areas also showed 
significant activation, with the most significant voxel being located in the visual cortex. 
Thus, the parametric method yielded less specific results than the model-based method, 
and, moreover, indicated a seemingly incorrect region (compared to previous results, 
e.g., Anderson et al., 2008).
Model-based fMRI thus outperformed these two traditional methods. There are 
obviously other possibilities to analyze the data, but, to our knowledge, none of these 
options can directly show the neural correlates of resources in a model. Additionally, 
model-based fMRI allows for locating multiple resources in one experiment, without 
having to adapt the experimental design for each resource, which is the case for 
traditional methods. In the next section we performed a detailed analysis to investigate 
what enabled the model-based fMRI analysis to locate the model’s resources.
What makes the Model-Based Method Powerful?
To arrive at the reported results, the model-based method uses a computational cognitive 
model to look in a more informed way at fMRI data. The model-based stimulus functions 
not only contain differences between conditions (as in classical fMRI analyses), but also 
differences per participant and trial, and even a detailed temporal pattern within each 
trial (Figure 5.4). To assess what drives the results, we compared a series of models that 
incorporate increasing levels of detail. First, we constructed four different stimulus 
functions for each cognitive resource (Figure 5.7). Please note that we used stimulus 
function 5.7(d) for the model-based analysis described above; (a)-(c) are only used for 
investigating which level of detail drives the results. The first stimulus function, 5.7(a), 
contains differences per condition, but was the same for all trials in a condition and 
all participants. The second stimulus function, 5.7(b), also contained differences per 
participant7, while the third and the fourth stimulus functions in addition contained 
effects of trial8. The fourth stimulus function differed from the third with respect to 
7
Effects of participant are caused by differences in speed between participants: some participants are slower in, for example, the 
easy–easy condition, resulting in a lower BOLD prediction (resource activity is spread more over the trial). However, all trials 
of the same condition of one participant have the same predicted BOLD amplitude.
8
Effects of trial originate in the response times on a particular trial: for instance, for a quick trial with the same number of 
key-presses as a slow trial, a higher BOLD response is predicted for the manual motor resource.
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the temporal detail within a trial: the first three stimulus functions are smooth, while 
the fourth has a very detailed temporal structure9 (i.e., this is the stimulus function 
that was used for the model-based analysis reported earlier in this paper). Figure 5.7 
illustrates the four different stimulus functions (note that here a stimulus function is 
shown for one resource, with different levels of detail; in contrast, Figure 5.4 shows 
four stimulus functions for four different resources). 
These stimulus functions were then entered one by one into linear-mixed-effects 
models (e.g., Baayen et al., 2008) with the stimulus function as a fixed effect and 
participant as a random effect. For each cognitive resource we constructed two LMEs, 
9
This temporal pattern stems from the time course of cognitive resource usage within a trial, as explained in the ‘fMRI – 
Model-Based Method’ section.
































example of trials that are different in 
the four stimulus functions
Figure Example of four different stimulus functions, shown for one session of one participant for the problem 
state resource. These stimulus functions were used to test which properties of the stimulus functions were 
important for the model-based analysis. Stimulus function (a) only contains effects of condition, (b) of 
condition and participant, (c) of condition, participant, and trial, and (d) of condition, participant, trial, and 
of cognitive resource usage within a trial. While it is clear that (d) is different from (a)-(c), the differences 
between (a)-(c) are minor.
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one to fit the stimulus function to the BOLD response in the best fitting voxel, and one 
to fit the average BOLD response in the 100 best fitting voxels. All stimulus functions 
correlated significantly with the data. The results, in the form of the log-likelihood of 
the fit, are listed in Table 5.4 (best fitting voxel) and Table 5.5 (average of the 100 best 
fitting voxels). As can be seen in these tables, for none of the resources was it helpful 
to include the temporal pattern within a trial. For declarative memory and the manual 
resource the model made correct predictions on a trial-by-trial level, for the problem 
state resource and vision on a condition level (for the 100 best fitting voxels; for the 
problem state resource on a participant level for the best fitting voxel). Based on this 
we can conclude that it is useful to include trial-by-trial differences in the model-based 
stimulus functions, but not the temporal pattern within a trial (either because the model 
predictions are not precise enough within a trial, or because the data is too noisy). Thus, 
the strength of the model-based analysis lies in the predicted amplitude levels per trial. 
By providing the analysis with these precise a priori estimates of the amplitudes of the 
BOLD response, the model allows for a better identification of the regions involved in 








Condition -36,743 -14,463 -44,476 -33,163
Participant -36,733 -14,459 -44,480 -33,139
Trial -36,771 -14,444 -44,492 -33,138
Within-Trial -37,029 -14,701 -44,848 -33,676
Log-likelihood of linear-mixed-effects models indicating which 
properties of the stimulus functions are important in the model-
based analysis, for the best fitting voxel per cognitive resource. 
Each stimulus function is more detailed than the previous one, 
e.g., the stimulus function ‘Participant’ also includes effects of 









Condition -28,398 -11,537 -39,221 -29,227
Participant -28,402 -11,534 -39,231 -29,214
Trial -28,426 -11,516 -39,257 -29,209
Within-Trial -28,823 -11,849 -39,736 -29,650
Log-likelihood of linear-mixed-effects models indicating which 
properties of the stimulus functions are important in the model-
based analysis, for the average of the 100 best fitting voxels per 
cognitive resource. Each stimulus function is more detailed than 
the previous one, e.g., the stimulus function ‘Participant’ also 
includes effects of condition. See the main text for details.
5.5 Table
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ACT-R
While the model-based analysis can be used with different kinds of models, the current 
article focuses on a model implemented in the ACT-R architecture. ACT-R only predicts 
when and for how long a cognitive resource is used, and not the intensity with which a 
resource is used. For instance, it is conceivable that an automatized movement takes as 
much time as a novel movement, but less effort. While this can be seen as a shortcoming, 
accounting for intensity would introduce extra free parameters, weakening the current 
predictive power of the model, as we would have to fit them post-hoc. On the other 
hand, if those new parameters were to explain a significant portion of the variance in 
the experimental data, they would increase the generalizability of the model (see e.g., 
Pitt & Myung, 2002). 
If we compare the model-based fMRI method to the standard method of relating 
ACT-R models to neuroimaging data using predefined regions (Anderson, 2007; 
Anderson et al., 2008; see Borst, Taatgen, Stocco, et al., 2010 for a region-of-interest 
analysis of the current task), two things become clear: First, the areas that were located 
with the model-based analysis are very close to the predefined regions normally 
associated with ACT-R, which are shown as white squares in Figure 5.5. Only the 
visual area is different: the located region overlaps with V1, while the predefined ACT-R 
region is located in the fusiform gyrus. Thus, it seems that lower level vision actually 
fits better with the ACT-R predictions than the slightly higher-level visual processing 
of the fusiform gyrus. Second, the strength of the model-based method lies in its 
exploratory nature. Using this method, we can not only validate cognitive models, but 
also determine which brain regions are involved in complex tasks.
Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that the technique of model-based fMRI can be used 
in combination with a high-level symbolic process model. The model-based analysis 
method uses the results of a computational cognitive model to look in a more informed 
way at fMRI data: it shows areas in the brain that correlate with activity of the model. 
This method is especially useful for cognitive functions that are hard to discriminate in 
a pure subtraction-based design, for instance working memory storage and updating: 
These processes go hand-in-hand, which makes it difficult to find experimental 
conditions with one process but without the other. However, when a good model is 
available, these processes would yield different stimulus functions, which could in 
turn lead to different regions in the fMRI analysis, or at least different focal points in 
networks of activity. Because the model-based analysis works by refining the stimulus 
function, the method can be used with all modeling techniques that yield information 
that is more detailed than the condition structure of an experiment, which is used as 
the stimulus function in classical fMRI analyses.
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Appendix: Behavioral Results outside the Scanner
Here we report the results of the pilot experiment that we ran outside the fMRI scanner. 
This experiment has exactly the same setup as the experiment that is reported in the 
main text.
Participants
Twenty students of Carnegie Mellon University participated in the experiment (11 women, 
average age 20.6, range 18–23). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision and normal hearing. Informed consent as approved by the Institutional Review 
Boards at Carnegie Mellon University and the University of Pittsburgh was obtained 
before the experiment. Participants received US$ 10 for performing the experiment.
Results
Outliers in reaction times were eliminated by means of a two-step procedure. First, 
response times faster than 250 ms and slower than 10,000 ms were removed. Then, 
data exceeding 3 standard deviations from the mean per condition per participant were 
excluded. Overall, 2.0% of the data was discarded. Accuracy data were transformed 
using an arcsine transformation before performing ANOVAs.
Figure 5.8(a) shows the response times on the text-entry task (left) and the subtraction 
task (right); Table 5.6 contains the results of the ANOVAs. The interaction between 
Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty was significant in both tasks. Furthermore, 
Subtraction Difficulty had a significant effect on the response times of the text entry 
Table ANOVA results of the pilot data. “Interaction” is the interaction 
between Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty.
5.6 
Response Times Accuracy
Source F(1,19) p η
p




Subtraction 69.47 < .001 .79 16.64 < .001 .47
Text-Entry < 1 - - 50.72 < .001 .73
Interaction 19.84 < .001 .51 17.92 < .001 .49
Subtraction Task
Subtraction 139.4 < .001 .88 62.98 < .001 .77
Text-Entry 32.18 < .001 .63 4.29 .052 .18
Interaction 22.73 < .001 .54 2.85 .108 .13
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task, while both Subtraction Difficulty and Text Entry Difficulty had a significant effect 
on the response times of the subtraction task.
 Figure 5.8(b) shows the accuracies, in which the interaction effect between 
Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty reached significance for the text entry 
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Figure Behavioral results in the pilot experiment. RT = response time, E/E = 




An Integrated Theory of 
Intermediate Representations 
in Multitasking
In which we present our final theory of how intermediate 
representations are processed in the mind, and how 












































































In this article we propose an integrated theory of how intermediate 
representations – e.g., ‘3x = 24’ when solving ‘3x – 6 = 18’ – are processed 
in human multitasking. The theory, working memory in multitasking 
(WMM), suggests that working memory limitations are an important 
cause of multitasking interference. WMM states that (a) at most a single 
intermediate representation can be stored without decay in the so-called 
problem state resource, (b) representations that are not currently in the 
problem state resource are temporarily stored in a declarative memory 
store that is subject to decay, and (c) the concurrent use of multiple 
representations for different tasks therefore leads to interference. We will 
review previously published studies and present three new experiments to 
support the three major aspects of the theory: a single-sized problem state 
resource, involvement of a declarative memory store that is subject to decay, 
and the strategic use of intermediate representations and the environment. 
In addition, we will present computational models that show that the 




Anyone who has observed a car drifting out of its lane because the driver tries to 
enter a new destination in the navigation device is familiar with the negative effects 
that multitasking can have on performance. As early as 1931, Telford investigated 
interference due to human multitasking. He introduced the psychological refractory 
period (PRP) paradigm, and showed that people are slower to respond to the second 
of two tasks when these tasks have to be performed concurrently. In addition to 
concurrent multitasking, theorists have recently started looking at the detrimental 
effects that sequential multitasking (interleaving tasks) can have (e.g., Altmann & Gray, 
2008; González & Mark, 2004; Monk et al., 2008; Monsell, 2003). However, both in 
concurrent and sequential multitasking, most studies have focused on relatively simple 
tasks that do not require maintaining information. In real-world tasks, which often 
involve multitasking, maintaining and using intermediate information is typically an 
important part of the task. In the current article we will therefore focus on the use of 
intermediate information in multitasking. We will show that the use of intermediate 
representations – for example 3x = 14 when solving 3x - 5 = 9 – is an important cause of 
multitasking interference, both in concurrent and sequential multitasking. To account 
for this kind of interference we will propose a computational theory, Working Memory 
in Multitasking, which yields quantitative predictions of multitasking interference due 
to the use, storage, and retrieval of intermediate representations.
Background
Since Telford (1931), many theories have been put forward to explain interference 
effects in multitasking (see for overviews, Meyer & Kieras, 1997a; Salvucci & Taatgen, 
2008). Theories on multitasking can be divided into three general groups: bottleneck 
theories, resource theories, and cognitive control theories. Bottleneck theories assume 
fixed bottlenecks in human cognition that can only process one task at a time, causing 
interference when used by multiple tasks concurrently (e.g., Broadbent, 1958; Keele, 1973; 
Pashler, 1994; Welford, 1952). Theorists have identified several different bottlenecks, 
ranging from perceptual bottlenecks (e.g., Broadbent, 1958), to response-selection 
bottlenecks (e.g., Pashler, 1984; 1994), to motor bottlenecks (e.g., Keele, 1973). To unify 
these different bottleneck accounts, resource theories were introduced. These theories 
assume that attention can be flexibly employed, and that multitasking interference 
occurs when cognitive resources are required by multiple tasks at the same time, but 
not when tasks require different resources (e.g., Kahneman, 1973; Navon & Gopher, 
1979; Wickens, 1984, 2002). A third research tradition focuses on executive processing 
and cognitive control to explain multitasking interference (e.g., Baddeley, 1986; Cooper 
& Shallice, 2000; Meyer & Kieras, 1997a, 1997b; Norman & Shallice, 1986). In these 
theories, multitasking interference arises because of scheduling problems between tasks. 
That is, while tasks could in principle be carried out concurrently, executive control 
mechanisms enforce a certain task order, leading to interference. Using a cognitively 
bounded rational analysis, Howes, Lewis, and Vera (2009) have recently shown that 
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any theory of the classical PRP effect (Schumacher et al., 1999; Telford, 1931) should 
contain cognitive control mechanisms, a motor bottleneck, and a response-selection 
bottleneck.
The recently proposed threaded cognition theory of multitasking indeed incorporates 
these elements (Salvucci & Taatgen, 2008, 2011; Salvucci, Taatgen, et al., 2009). 
Threaded cognition is a general theory of human multitasking that was proposed to 
integrate all findings to date. It assumes multiple different bottlenecks, and states 
that while multiple tasks can be performed concurrently, every resource in human 
cognition can only process one task at a time and therefore acts as a bottleneck when 
required by multiple tasks concurrently. Depending on the requirements of the tasks 
at hand, these bottlenecks lead to different patterns of interference. For instance, when 
two tasks need to retrieve a fact from declarative memory at the same time, threaded 
cognition predicts that one of the tasks will have to wait for the other task, resulting 
in multitasking interference. While all resources are singular in nature, the resources 
themselves act in parallel (cf. Byrne & Anderson, 2001). This implies that no multitasking 
interference will occur as long as tasks have different resource requirements (i.e. 
perfect time sharing, Anderson, Taatgen, et al., 2005; Hazeltine, Teague, & Ivry, 2002; 
Schumacher et al., 2001).
In was shown that threaded cognition can account for interference caused by two 
peripheral bottlenecks (vision, motor) and two cognitive bottlenecks (procedural and 
declarative memory; Salvucci & Taatgen, 2008; cf. Howes et al., 2009). In addition, 
based on its integration in the cognitive architecture ACT-R (e.g., Anderson, 2007), one 
more source of multitasking interference was predicted: the so-called problem state 
resource1. The problem state resource is used to store intermediate representations that 
are necessary for performing a task. For example, when calculating ‘2 + 3 ∑ 4’ mentally, 
one might use the intermediate representation ‘2 + 12’. According to the ACT-R theory, 
only a single intermediate representation can be maintained at a time, which should 
therefore lead to interference when multiple representations are required concurrently. 
Recently, we provided support for this prediction with a series of experiments (Borst, 
Taatgen, & Van Rijn, 2010). In a dual-task paradigm, subjects either needed zero, one, 
or two intermediate representations to perform the tasks. We showed that performance 
decreased considerably when subjects needed two intermediate representations at 
the same time, as compared to when subjects needed zero or one representations. To 
account for these results we developed a cognitive computational model. This model 
showed that both the increase in response times and the decrease in accuracy could be 
explained by a so-called problem state bottleneck.
Current Article
In the current article we will present an integrated theory of how intermediate 
representations are used in multitasking: the Working Memory in Multitasking 
theory (WMM). While we have previously shown that the use of multiple intermediate 
1
 The imaginal buffer in ACT-R terminology.
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representations at the same time leads to multitasking interference, we did not 
investigate how the problem state bottleneck interacts with other elements of human 
cognition. We will now show that the interplay of the problem state resource, a 
declarative memory store, and the environment can explain a much wider range of 
human multitasking phenomena. In the remainder of this article we will first explain 
the WMM theory in detail. We will then provide supporting data for three major aspects 
of the theory in the following three sections of the paper. Finally, we will discuss the 
wider implications of the WMM theory.
Working Memory in Multitasking: An Integrated Theory 
of Intermediate Representations in Multitasking
In this section we will describe the WMM theory,2 which accounts for the use of 
intermediate representations in multitasking and the interference that can result 
from using them. WMM was implemented in the cognitive architecture ACT-R (e.g., 
Anderson, 2007; Anderson, Bothell, et al., 2004), to enable quantitative predictions 
of response times, errors, and neuroimaging data (see Cooper, 2007; Meyer & Kieras, 
1997a; Newell, 1973; 1990 for discussions on the advantages of cognitive architectures). 
Using a cognitive architecture also has the advantage that interactions between 
central cognitive processes and perception automatically result from the modeling 
effort, which is crucial for modeling interactions between (often complex) tasks in 
multitasking (e.g., Kieras & Meyer, 1997; Van Maanen et al., 2009). We will now first 
discuss the main components of the WMM theory, followed by how it accounts for 
multitasking interference.
Main Components: 
The Problem State Resource and Declarative Memory
Figure 6.1 shows the main components of the WMM theory: the problem state 
resource and declarative memory. These elements are based on the corresponding 
elements in ACT-R (e.g., Anderson, 2007). The problem state resource is used to 
maintain intermediate representations in a task and can maintain a single intermediate 
representation at a time. It is assumed that a representation in the problem state 
resource can be used instantly, without incurring a time cost. However, it was estimated 
that it takes about 200 ms to store a representation in the problem state resource (e.g., 
Anderson, 2005). When a representation is stored in the problem state resource, its 
previous contents are automatically encoded in declarative memory. Representations 
in the problem state resource can originate from three sources: a representation can 
be perceived, it can be retrieved from declarative memory, or it can be the outcome of 
a cognitive process.
2
 The code of models described in this article can be downloaded from http://www.jelmerborst.nl/models.
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The concept of the problem state resource stems from a series of neuroimaging 
experiments by Anderson and colleagues, who found that activity in the posterior 
parietal cortex correlates with the number of transformations of mental representations 
(Anderson, 2005; Anderson, Albert, et al., 2005; Anderson et al., 2003; Sohn et al., 
2005). A region in the posterior parietal cortex (Montreal Neurological Institute, MNI, 
coordinates: -24, -67, 44; roughly indicated in Figure 6.1) is hypothesized to reflect 
changes to the problem state resource, while a region in the prefrontal cortex (-43, 
24, 25) is supposed to reflect retrieving information from declarative memory (e.g., 
Anderson, 2007; Anderson et al., 2008; Borst, Taatgen, Stocco, et al., 2010).
The second major component of the WMM theory is the involvement of a declarative 
memory store. To this end, we used ACT-R’s declarative memory store, which simulates 
short and long term storage of facts. In contrast to the problem state resource, it 
contains multiple memory items. Each item has a certain activation level, representing 
the strength of the item in memory. Activation of an item reflects its frequency and 
recency of use, and decays with a power function (Anderson & Schooler, 1991). An 
item that has been used more frequently in the past will have a higher activation level, 
as will an item that has been used more recently. The base-level activation B
i
 of an item 






 indicate moments in time when the item has been (re-)created or used. 
The ACT-R literature has reached consensus on a value of .5 for d, the decay parameter. 
Thus, for each memory trace k of an item, the activation is calculated (based on how 
long ago k was and the decay value: (t tk )
d ); those activation values are summed to 
calculate the final activation value of an item.
Retrieving information from declarative memory is not always successful: it can 
either fail altogether (because activation is below the predefined retrieval threshold) or 
a similar but incorrect element can be retrieved (e.g., ‘15 – 7 = 8’ when trying to retrieve 
a fact containing ‘15 – 8’). This is implemented in the ACT-R theory as a process of 
partial matching: items can be retrieved when they do not match a retrieval request 
completely, in which case their activation receives a mismatch penalty (see for details 
of partial matching, Anderson et al., 1996; Lebiere, 1999; Taatgen & van Rijn, 2011).
When retrieval of an item from declarative memory is attempted, activation of 




 is the base level activation of an item calculated with Equation 1, MP
i
 the 
mismatch penalty the item receives, and ε noise drawn from a logistic distribution. 
Because the item with the highest activation is retrieved, noise will sometimes result in 
the retrieval of an incorrect (but similar) item. The probability of retrieving an incorrect 
3
 ACT-R’s complete activation equation also incorporates spreading activation (see e.g., Anderson, 2007). As spreading activation 
does not play a role in the current article we simplified the equation.




Ai = Bi MPi +
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item depends on the activation difference between items: the closer the activation levels 
of two items, the higher the chance that an incorrect item will be retrieved.
Retrieving an item from declarative memory takes time. The duration of a retrieval 
depends on the activation level A
i
 of the item:
  (6.3)
in which F is a latency scale factor (normally set between .1 and 2, Anderson et al., 
1998). Thus, the higher the activation level of an item, the faster it will be retrieved 
from memory.
Summarizing, the main components of the WMM theory are a single-sized problem 
state resource and the use of a declarative memory store with memory items that are 
subject to decay.
Multitasking Interference
The WMM theory was developed to account for multitasking interference. Figure 6.2 
illustrates the origin of multitasking interference in the theory. A dual-task situation 
is depicted, in which two tasks are alternated (this can be quick or slow alternation, 
depending on the duration of the ‘General Task Actions’). Panel A shows a situation 
in which neither Task 1 nor Task 2 needs an intermediate representation, for example 
drinking coffee while casually listening to music. Only general, non-problem state related 









• Retrieval takes time
•  Decay
• Prefrontal cortex
When a new representation is stored in the 
problem state resource, the previous representation is 
automatically moved to declarative memory.
• Single element
• Directly accessible for use, 
 no time cost
•  Storage takes 200 ms
• No decay
• Posterior parietal cortex
Figure The main components of the WMM theory: the problem state resource and declarative memory. As indicated by 
the dashed lines, representations in the problem state resource can originate from general cognitive processes, 
declarative memory, or perception. Only elements and connections that we will discuss explicitly in this article 
are shown in the figure.
6.1
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Figure Multitasking interference in the WMM theory.6.2
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actions are performed for both tasks. There is thus no intermediate representation 
related multitasking interference in this situation.
Panel B shows a situation in which only Task 1 needs an intermediate representation. 
For instance, writing an article and taking a sip of coffee. At the start of Task 1, a 
representation – say, a reference that has to be included in the current paragraph – is 
stored in the problem state resource, which takes 200 ms. This representation can 
then be used by the ‘General Task 1 actions’: writing a paragraph. When the switch to 
Task 2 occurs, the problem state resource is not overwritten, because Task 2, drinking 
coffee, does not need an intermediate representation. After the next task switch, Task 1 
can therefore still use its representation, and continue writing where it left off. Again, 
as in Panel A, there is no multitasking interference due to the use of intermediate 
representations.
Panel C of Figure 6.2 depicts the situation in which multitasking interference occurs: 
both tasks need an intermediate representation. For example, being interrupted by 
a phone call while writing an article. Also in this situation a representation for Task 
1 is stored in the problem state resource at the start of the dual-task. However, Task 
2 now also needs to use the problem state resource, and therefore stores its own 
intermediate representation – the topic of the call – after the switch from Task 1. By 
doing so, the representation of Task 1 is automatically encoded in declarative memory, 
where its activation starts to decay. After Task 2 finished its General Task 2 actions and 
the call is terminated, Task 1 recommences. However, before it can start, it first has to 
restore its intermediate representation from declarative memory – the reference that 
was relevant for the current paragraph.
This process is shown in detail in Figure 6.3. First, Task 1 notices that the problem 
state resource has the wrong contents, and it starts retrieving its own representation 
from declarative memory. This retrieval takes a certain amount of time, depending on 
how long ago the intermediate representation was encoded in declarative memory: the 













































Figure Swapping intermediate representations via declarative memory.6.3
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longer ago it was encoded, the longer it will 
take to retrieve it (calculated with Equations 
6.1–6.3). When the representation is 
recalled, the command to restore it to the 
problem state resource is issued, and it 
is restored. Only then can Task 1 start its 
normal actions.
Thus, starting Task 1 after Task 2 in 
situation C takes 2 ∑ 50 ms (procedural 
memory firing time; e.g., Anderson, 2007) 
+ 200 ms (default value of storing an item 
in the problem state resource) + the retrieval 
time of the intermediate representation 
from declarative memory  = at least 300 
ms longer, as compared to situations A 
and B. The exact length of the interference 
depends on the duration of Task 2: the 
longer Task 2, the more the representation 
of Task 1 will have decayed in declarative 
memory, the longer it will take to retrieve 
it. This is depicted in Figure 6.4: panel 
A shows the decay of the intermediate 
representation in declarative memory while 
the intervening task is performed (in this 
case Task 2), while panel B shows the effect 
on the time cost of recommencing the first 
task. The basic costs represent the 300 ms of 
procedural memory usage and restoring the 
problem state resource. The other costs are 
influenced by the latency factor F (Equation 
6.2), which was set to .3 for all models in 
this article.
The duration of the intervening task 
does not only increase the time cost of 
restarting the first task, it also increases the probability of not being able to retrieve the 
intermediate representation of Task 1 at all, because its activation dropped below the 
retrieval threshold due to decay. This would either lead to errors because of guessing, 
or, when possible, to reconstructing the representation from the environment, which 
has its own associated costs. Even if the model retrieves a representation from memory, 
a less active intermediate representation will also make it more likely that a similar but 
incorrect representation is retrieved (see the text on partial matching and noise above).
Summarizing, the WMM theory predicts that as long as at most one intermediate 
representation is required no interference will occur. However, as soon as more than one 
representation is needed, it predicts interference both in response times and errors due 
Duration Intervening Task (s)
Duration Intervening Task (s)

































Figure Time cost of restoring an intermediate 
representation to the problem state resource 
after an intervening task. A) shows decay 
of the representation in memory while the 
intervening task is performed, B) shows the 
time cost depending on the duration of the 
intervening task and different values of the 
latency factor F.
6.4
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to a single-sized problem state resource. Moreover, the interference costs increase with 
the duration of the intervening task, because representations in declarative memory 
are subject to decay.
Strategic use of the Problem State Resource and the Environment
The WMM theory explains how mentally maintaining intermediate representations 
can lead to multitasking interference. However, Figure 6.1 shows that an intermediate 
representation can also originate in perception, opening up the possibility to use the 
environment as an external memory, and thereby avoiding the limits of the problem 
state resource. For example, when solving a multicolumn subtraction problem on 
paper it is not uncommon to indicate whether a carry is in progress, which decreases 
the problem state resource requirements. Even when one relies on memory, and stores 
the carry in the problem state resource, there are two possible strategies to continue 
after losing the representation due to an interruption: recalling whether a carry was in 
progress from declarative memory, or reconstructing it by recalculating the previous 
column. While reconstruction is the safer option, it is also likely to take more time 
than recall from memory.
We assume that these are strategic processes: when reconstructing or perceiving 
a representation from the environment takes less time than a cognitive ‘in-the-head’ 
strategy (using the problem state resource as it is, or retrieving it from memory), 
humans will use the environment, otherwise they will use a cognitive strategy. This is 
in accordance with the Soft Constraints Hypothesis, which proposes that our strategy 
choices aim at minimizing temporal costs instead of, for example, mental effort (Gray 
& Fu, 2004; Gray, Sims, Fu, & Schoelles, 2006). To support this, Gray et al. showed 
in four experiments that subjects always used the fastest local strategy, instead of 
minimizing mental effort or total time-on-task. Even when minimizing local time led 
to suboptimal behavior (using fast but imperfect knowledge in-the-head vs. slower but 
perfect knowledge in-the-world) or to more memory effort (memorizing multiple facts 
instead of perceptually revisiting a display), subjects opted for the fastest method (that 
is, the fastest local method, as this often relied on imperfect knowledge in-the-head it 
could lead to mistakes and longer total time-on-task). The assumption of the WMM 
theory is that the Soft Constraints Hypothesis also holds for processing intermediate 
representations, and therefore that people always choose the fastest way of performing 
a task, whether that is using the problem state resource, declarative memory, or the 
environment.
Overview of the Article
In the remainder of this article we will provide support for the following three aspects 
of the WMM theory:
• the single-sized problem state resource, leading to multitasking interference 
when more than one representation is required for a task;
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• the involvement of a declarative memory store with decay, leading to more 
interference with longer task interruptions;
• the strategic nature of using the problem state resource, declarative memory, 
and the environment. 
We will discuss support for these aspects of the theory in the next three sections of this 
article.
The Single Element Size of the Problem State Resource
In this section we will review an experiment that supports the assumption that the 
problem state resource can contain at most one representation at a time. The experiment 
shows that using the problem state resource for two tasks at the same time leads to 
interference. In addition to the behavioral data we will also present model fits, to 
show that the WMM theory can account for the patterns in the behavioral data. The 
experiment has been published before as Experiment 1 in Borst, Taatgen, and Van Rijn 
(2010).
To test whether the problem state resource can at most contain a single intermediate 
representation, a dual-task experiment was designed in which subjects had to alternate 
between solving multi-column subtraction problems and entering text. Both tasks had 
two versions: an easy version in which no intermediate representations were required 
and a hard version in which subjects needed intermediate representations to perform 
the task. The experiment had a 2 ∑ 2 factorial within-subjects design: Subtraction 
Difficulty (easy/hard) ∑ Text-Entry Difficulty (easy/hard).
Experimental Design
Figure 6.5 shows a screenshot of the experiment. On the left side of the screen subjects 
had to solve 10-column subtraction problems in standard right-to-left order. In the easy 
version of the subtraction task the lower term was always smaller or equal to the upper 
term in each column, meaning that subjects never had to carry between columns. In 
the hard version (depicted in Figure 6.5) subjects had to carry in 6 out of 10 columns. 
The assumption is that subjects used their problem state resource to keep track of 
whether a carry was in progress.
On the right side of the screen subjects had to enter 10 letter strings using the 
mouse. In the easy, no problem state version these strings were presented letter by 
letter (an ‘I’ is presented in Figure 6.5). Subjects had to click on the corresponding 
button, after which the next letter appeared. In the hard version subjects had to enter 
10-letter words without feedback. That is, at the start of a trial a complete 10-letter word 
was presented, but as soon as they clicked on the first letter, the word disappeared (i.e. 
subjects could neither see what word they were entering, nor what they had already 
entered). It was assumed that subjects used their problem state resource to maintain 
the word and the position in the word (e.g., ‘information, 4th letter’).
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The interesting part of the experiment is that subjects had to alternate between 
the two tasks after every digit and letter. Thus, they had to maintain the intermediate 
representations – the carries and words – while giving a response on the other task. 
According to the WMM theory, this should result in interference in the hard subtraction 
– hard text-entry condition, because then the problem state resource has to be swapped 
out on each step in a trial as it can only contain a single element (situation C in Figure 
6.2). In all other conditions at most one intermediate representation is required to do 
the tasks, which, according to the theory, does not result in interference (easy – easy: 
Figure 6.2A, easy – hard and hard – easy: Figure 6.2B). See Borst, Taatgen, and Van 
Rijn (2010) for further details of the methods.
Results
Figure 6.6 shows the results of the experiment (black bars). The top two panels show 
the response times, the bottom panels accuracy. As predicted by the WMM theory, both 
in the text-entry task (left) and in the subtraction task (right) there is a clear increase 
in response times in the hard-hard condition as compared to all other conditions. In 
the response times of the subtraction task there is also a clear effect of subtraction 
difficulty: response times increase when subtraction becomes hard. However, in the 
hard-hard condition response times are even higher. These results were confirmed by 
Figure Screenshot of Experiment 1. Adapted with permission from Borst, Taatgen, and Van Rijn (2010). 
Copyright 2010 by the American Psychological Association.
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significant interaction effects between Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty 
for both tasks.
In the accuracy data (Figure 6.6, lower panels, black bars) similar effects were 
observed. Accuracy decreased with task difficulty of the tasks itself, but even more 
in the  hard-hard conditions. For instance, in the subtraction task subjects hardly made 
any mistakes as long as subtraction was easy. When subtraction was hard the amount 
of mistakes increased, but it increased even more when text-entry was hard as well. 
The same effects can be seen in the text-entry data. Statistically, the interaction 
effect between Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty was significant for the 
subtraction task, and it showed a trend towards significance for the text-entry task.
Model
To see whether a single-sized problem state resource could have caused the effects in 









































































































































































Subtraction / Text-Entry Subtraction / Text-Entry
Figure Results of Experiment 1. Error bars represent standard errors. RMSD 
= root-mean-square deviation; RT = response time. Adapted with 
permission from Borst, Taatgen, and Van Rijn (2010). Copyright 2010 
by the American Psychological Association.
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6.6 show the results. Based on general characteristics of ACT-R, response times and 
accuracy data in the easy-easy, hard-easy, and easy-hard conditions were estimated (see 
for details, Borst, Taatgen, & Van Rijn, 2010). The WMM theory adds the interference 
effects in the hard-hard condition: increased response times and decreased accuracy. 
The increased response times are accounted for by swapping the contents of the 
problem state resource on each step of a trial, as explained above (Figure 6.2C). The 
model produces the decrease in accuracy by sometimes retrieving an older, incorrect 
representation from memory when swapping the problem state resource.
Discussion
The experiment was performed to test whether the problem state resource can contain 
a single or multiple intermediate representations. As predicted, the data show that 
when more than one representation is needed concurrently, performance decreases 
considerably. The model fit shows that the WMM theory can account both for the 
effects on response times and on accuracy.
One thing to note is that, instead of using a mental strategy, it is possible to 
reconstruct the intermediate representation of the subtraction task by reprocessing the 
previous column (see Figure 6.5). If subjects had used this strategy in all conditions, 
we would not have found a difference between the hard subtraction – easy text-entry and 
the hard subtraction – hard text-entry conditions. However, it is conceivable that subjects 
reconstructed the intermediate representation in the hard-hard condition, but not in 
the hard-easy condition. This would have resulted in the same effects on response 
times: response times would have been higher in the hard-hard condition because of 
the costs of reconstructing the representation. We controlled for this in Experiment 3 
in Borst, Taatgen, and Van Rijn (2010) and in several other experiments (e.g., Borst, 
Taatgen, Stocco, et al., 2010) by masking previous columns. These experiments yielded 
comparable results as the current experiment. This is in accordance with the prediction 
of the WMM theory that reconstruction via the environment only takes place when it 
takes less time than recalling a representation from memory, as the model predicts 
that reconstruction would take longer than the observed interference effect of 400 
ms (see for more on the strategic use of the problem state resource the section ‘The 
Strategic Nature of using the Problem State Resource and the Environment’ below). 
Furthermore, reconstruction would not have explained the effects in the accuracy data: 
there is no reason why accuracy would be lower in the hard-hard condition in that case.
The presence of interference in the hard-hard condition indicates that the difficulty 
of one task affects both tasks. The simplest explanation for this interference is a 
resource that is shared by both tasks. As the tasks are never performed concurrently, 
this is probably a resource that is used while doing the other task. The obvious candidate 
for that is the resource that maintains intermediate information required by the 
tasks, the problem state resource in the WMM theory. According to the theory, the 
interference effects in the data are caused by swapping out a single-sized problem 
state resource. However, there are at least two alternative explanations to explain the 
data of this experiment: memory load (e.g., Logan, 1979; Woodman et al., 2001) and a 
146 Chapter 6 An Integrated Theory of Intermediate Representations in Multitasking
phonological loop bottleneck. To test these possibilities, Borst, Taatgen, and Van Rijn 
(2010) conducted two additional experiments. These experiment clearly showed that 
these alternatives did not hold, and they concluded that a single-sized problem state 
resource was the most likely explanation of the results.
Summary
In this section we set out to support the assumption of the WMM theory that the 
problem state resource can only maintain a single representation at a time. The 
experiment that we reviewed showed that when subjects had to maintain more than 
one representation at a time, considerable interference occurred. These results are in 
line with the WMM theory, and imply a single-sized problem state resource.
The WMM model showed a nice fit to the results: it predicted interference effects 
both in response times and accuracy data, which were indeed observed. Fitting the 
model to the data showed that it could also account for the size of the effects. This is 
not surprising, given that there are two parameters that determine the size of the time 
cost. Figure 6.4 shows that this time cost is determined by the basic costs and the 
declarative memory latency factor F, which scales the time of retrieving a representation 
from declarative memory. To fit the model to the data we set the latency factor F to .3 
for both experiments.
In the next section we will look at the assumption of the WMM theory that there are 
two separate memory stores involved in processing intermediate representations: the 
problem state resource and a declarative memory store.
Two Memory Stores for Intermediate Representations
In the previous section, we reviewed an experiment that supports a single-sized problem 
state resource. According to the WMM theory, this single-sized problem state resource 
is a separate resource from declarative memory. Where declarative memory is assumed 
to consist of multiple elements that take time to retrieve and are subject to decay, the 
problem state resource can only contain a single element, which is directly accessible 
and not susceptible to decay. In this section we will discuss support for this assumption. 
We will first review fMRI data that shows that problem state activity is best represented 
in a different brain area than declarative memory activity, supporting the view of two 
separate memory stores. We will then turn to two new experiments, that show that (1) 
the WMM theory explains interference effects of interruptions, and (2) a declarative 
memory resource with decay is needed to account for these effects, in addition to a 
single-sized problem state resource.
Neuroimaging Evidence for Two Separate Memory Stores
To investigate the neural correlates of the WMM theory we conducted two fMRI 
experiments. Based on ACT-R’s predefined resource-brain mapping (e.g., Anderson, 
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2007; Anderson et al., 2008), we first conducted confirmatory region-of-interest 
analyses. These analyses showed that the WMM theory could make plausible a priori 
fMRI predictions (Borst, Taatgen, Stocco, et al., 2010; Borst, Taatgen, Van Rijn, Stocco, 
& Fincham, 2009). These predictions were based on the assumption that declarative 
memory and the problem state resource are separate entities, and that they are reflected 
by activity in different brain areas (e.g, Anderson et al., 2007). To test this assumption, 
we subsequently applied a novel exploratory fMRI analysis method to the data (Borst, 
Taatgen, & Van Rijn, 2011). This method, termed model-based fMRI, confirmed that the 
problem state resource and declarative memory are best represented by two different 
brain areas (posterior parietal and prefrontal cortex, respectively). We will now discuss 
this experiment and analysis in more detail.
Design
To investigate the neural correlates of the WMM theory, we conducted the 
subtraction – text-entry experiment in an fMRI scanner. That is, the interface was 
adapted to minimize eye- and head-movements, and all responses now had to be given 
with a mouse, but the basic task remained unchanged. Thus, subjects had to constantly 
alternate between solving 10-column subtraction problems (of which only one column 
was shown at a time in this experiment) and entering 10-letter strings. Both tasks again 
had an easy, no intermediate representation condition, and a hard condition with 
intermediate representations (see for details, Borst, Taatgen, Stocco, et al., 2010).
Analysis
The behavioral data showed similar effects as the data reviewed above, further 
corroborating the single-sized problem state resource hypothesis (Borst et al., 2011). 
To analyze the fMRI data, we applied a novel fMRI analysis technique, which has 
previously been used to investigate the neural mechanisms of reinforcement learning 
(e.g., Gläscher & O’Doherty, 2010; O’Doherty et al., 2007). Instead of regressing the 
conditions of the experiment against the experimental data, as is traditionally done 
in fMRI research (e.g., Friston et al., 2007), we regressed the activity of the model’s 
resources directly against the fMRI data.
To that end we first fitted the WMM model to the behavioral data: We performed 
model simulations of each individual subject, using the same stimuli, in the same 
order, as the subject received. In addition, we lined up the key-presses of the model to 
the key-presses in the data, resulting in a perfect model-behavioral data fit. We then 
convolved the activity of the model’s resources with a hemodynamic response function 
(describing the sluggish brain response that is measured with an fMRI scanner; e.g., 
Friston et al., 2007), and entered the resulting signal into General Linear Models 
(GLM). This results in regressing the model’s resource activity directly against the 
brain activity in all voxels of the brain, and shows which voxels correlate significantly 
with the predicted activity of the model’s resources. Thus, it shows where in the brain 
the resources of a model are most likely represented.
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Results
Figure 6.7 shows the model activity and the predicted hemodynamic response for the 
problem state resource and declarative memory over the course of four trials (note 
that this is just an example, the exact signal was different for each trial depending 
on the stimuli in a trial; a trial constitutes solving a complete subtraction problem 
and entering a 10-letter string). The grey line shows the activity of the resources. The 
problem state resource is not used in the easy-easy condition, used for one of the tasks 
in the easy-hard and hard-easy conditions, and used most in the hard-hard condition: 
not only is it used for both tasks, but its contents are also swapped on each step of a 
trial. Declarative memory shows a very similar pattern. First, declarative memory is 
hardly used in the easy-easy condition (as the subtraction task only requires simple, 
and thus fast, retrievals, e.g., ‘5 – 2 = 3’). Second, we see increased levels in the hard 
subtraction – easy text-entry condition, because in that condition additional retrievals 
are necessary for processing the carries (e.g., ‘5 – 8 = -3’, but also ‘15 – 8 = 7’). Third, 
declarative memory is used for the spelling processes of the words in the text-entry 
task (Borst, Taatgen, Stocco, et al., 2010; Borst, Taatgen, & Van Rijn, 2010), resulting in 
increased levels in the easy subtraction – hard text-entry condition. Finally, it is used most 
in the hard-hard condition, on the one hand for the tasks themselves, and on the other 
hand for retrieving a representation to reconstruct the contents of the problem state 
resource on each step of a trial. The black line in Figure 6.7 shows the convolution of 
the resource activity with the hemodynamic response function, yielding a very detailed 
prediction of brain activity (such a prediction was made for all subjects over all trials 
in the experiment). This signal was subsequently regressed against the brain data: 
showing which areas of the brain correlate significantly with these predicted signals. 
As the predictions for the problem state resource and declarative memory were very 
similar, it was relatively unlikely to find different brain areas for these resources.
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Figure Model activity and associated hemodynamic response functions that were used for the fMRI analysis. 
Note that declarative memory usage in the easy-easy condition is so fast that it hardly causes a predicted 
hemodynamic response.
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Figure 6.8 shows the results. The best fitting area for the problem state resource 
was located in the inferior parietal lobule, around the intraparietal sulcus (Borst et 
al., 2011). This area has not only been linked to ACT-R’s problem state resource in 
the past (e.g., Anderson, 2005; Anderson, Albert, et al., 2005; Anderson et al., 2003; 
Sohn et al., 2005), but has also been found in other studies on working memory (e.g., 
LaBar et al., 1999; Smith et al., 1998; Wager & Smith, 2003). Declarative memory 
correlated best with a region in the prefrontal cortex, around the inferior frontal gyrus. 
This area is known to be involved in retrievals from memory (e.g., Cabeza et al., 2002; 
Fletcher & Henson, 2001; Wagner et al., 2001). Furthermore, when we lowered the 
significance threshold, it became apparent that both areas are part of a larger fronto-
parietal network, a network that is often implicated in working memory research (e.g., 
Collette et al., 2006; Collette & Van der Linden, 2002).
Discussion
While the predicted hemodynamic response functions of the problem state resource 
and declarative memory were quite similar, the current analysis shows that they 
correlate best with different areas in the brain (see for a detailed discussion of the 
power of model-based fMRI, Borst et al., 2011). That we found two significant, spatially 
quite different areas, suggests that the functions of those resources are indeed best 
represented by two separate memory stores as the WMM theory assumes. In this 
scheme, the problem state resource is used for maintaining and updating a single 
intermediate representation for the task at hand, while declarative memory is used for 
storage of information when it is not directly available.
If it is indeed the case that intermediate representations are swapped in and out of 
the problem state resource via declarative memory, we should find a typical declarative 
memory effect on these representations in memory: decay. In the next section we will 
discuss two experiments that test this prediction.
 Declarative MemoryA) B)
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Problem State
Figure Results of the fMRI analysis: the best fitting areas for a) the problem state resource and b) 
declarative memory. The white squares indicate ACT-R’s predefined regions (e.g., Anderson, 
Fincham, Qin, & Stocco, 2008), xyz-coordinates are of the most significant voxel.
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Interruption Experiments: Decay in Declarative Memory
One major assumption of the WMM theory is that intermediate representations are 
swapped in and out of the problem state resource via declarative memory. Because the 
activation of a representation in declarative memory decays while an intervening task 
is performed (Figure 6.2C), this leads to the prediction that the longer an intervening 
task lasts, the higher the costs of restoring an intermediate representation will be (see 
Figure 6.4). To test this prediction, we conducted two ‘interruption experiments’ (e.g., 
Gillie & Broadbent, 1989).
It is well known that interruptions of a task lead to a decrease in performance (e.g., 
Gillie & Broadbent, 1989; McFarlane & Latorella, 2002). Two important factors that 
determine the disruptiveness of interruptions are the duration and the complexity of 
the interrupting task. The longer the interrupting task, the longer it takes to resume 
the primary task (Hodgetts & Jones, 2006; Monk et al., 2008), and the more complex 
the interrupting task, the longer the resumption time (e.g., Gillie & Broadbent, 1989; 
Hodgetts & Jones, 2006; Monk et al., 2008; Zijlstra, Roe, Leonora, & Krediet, 1999). 
This maps well onto the WMM theory, if we assume that an important factor in the 
disruptiveness of interruptions is the loss of intermediate representations of the 
primary task and subsequent decay of these representations in memory. According 
to the WMM theory, intermediate representations of the primary task would only be 
disturbed when the interrupting task is sufficiently complex to need an intermediate 
representation for itself, at least partly explaining the complexity effect. At the same 
time, the longer the interrupting task, the further a representation would have decayed 
in declarative memory, leading to increased resumption times. The latter idea is 
similar to the memory for goals model (Altmann & Trafton, 2002; Salvucci, Monk, et 
al., 2009; Trafton et al., 2003).
The hypothesis that intermediate representations are an important factor in the 
disruptiveness of interruptions leads to an interesting new prediction: the duration 
of an interruption should only influence the resumption time of the primary task 
if both tasks need an intermediate representation. If the primary task does not need an 
intermediate representation, there should be no resumption costs other than costs for 
re-attending the task, and these costs should not increase with the duration of the 
interruption. If the secondary task does not need an intermediate representation, the 
same holds: an intermediate representation of the primary task can now be maintained 
throughout the interruption, enabling the primary task to be continued directly 
after the interruption (cf. Figure 6.2B). Only when both tasks need an intermediate 
representation (Figure 6.2C), there should be an increase of resumption costs with the 
length of the interruption, in addition to the extra costs of restoring the representation 
to the problem state resource itself (basic costs in Figure 6.4).
To test this prediction we conducted two interruption experiments. In these 
experiments we interrupted a primary task with a secondary task. As before, both 
tasks had two conditions: and easy condition that did not require an intermediate 
representation, and a hard condition that did require the use of an intermediate 
representation. In addition, we now varied the length of the interruptions, to test 
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whether the costs of restoring a representation increase with the duration of an 
interruption. If that were the case, it would imply that intermediate representations 
are indeed swapped in and out of the problem state resource via a declarative memory 
store that is subject to decay.
Interruption	Experiment	1:	Text-Entry	and	N-Back
In the first interruption experiment, we used the text-entry task from the previous 
experiments as the primary task, and interrupted it twice every trial with a so-called 
n-back task. Figure 6.9 shows the setup of the experiment: subjects started with the 
text-entry task, which was unpredictably interrupted by the n-back task. After doing a 
varying number of steps in the n-back task, the text-entry task recommenced.
The text-entry task was the same task as described earlier: in the easy condition 
subjects were presented with a letter, they had to click on the corresponding button, 
followed by the next letter, etc. In the hard version, subjects had to enter a 10-letter 
word without feedback.
In the n-back task (Kirchner, 1958), a rapid stream of digits was sequentially presented 
to the subjects (Figure 6.9). Each number was on the screen for 1100 ms, followed by 
a mask (a #-mark) for 233 ms. In the easy, no representation condition, subjects had 
to do a 1-back task: they had to indicate whether the current number was the same or 
































Figure Setup of Interruption Experiment 1, in which the text-entry task is interrupted by an n back task. The figure 
shows the easy text-entry – easy n-back condition, with a 4 second interruption.
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shown, within 1100 ms. No response was required to the first number. As the presented 
mask was very short, this did not require the use of an intermediate representation: 
subjects could simply judge whether the shape was the same or different before and 
after the short mask. In the hard version of the task, subjects had to do a 2-back task: 
they had to judge whether the current number was the same as two numbers back. In 
this condition no response was required on the first two steps in the n-back task. Now 
subjects had to use intermediate representations to perform to the task: they constantly 
had to keep track of what the number two back was. When subjects made a mistake 
on the n-back task, a loud buzzer sounded, reminding the subject to focus on the task.
Each text-entry trial (entering a 10-letter string) was interrupted twice by the n-back 
task. The points of interruption were varied between the 2nd letter and the 9th letter, 
that is, subjects always started, and also ended, with typing at least two letters in the 
text-entry task. There were also at least two letters between the two interruptions. This 
gave 15 different trial-types: the points of interruption were therefore unpredictable 
to the subjects. The length of the interruptions was 3, 6, or 9 n-back steps, thus 4, 8, 
or 12 seconds. There was no relation between the length of the first and the second 
interruption in a trial. The experiment had a 2 ∑ 2 ∑ 3 factorial within-subjects design 
(Text-Entry Difficulty (easy/hard) ∑ N-Back Difficulty (easy/hard) ∑ Interruption Duration 
(4/8/12 sec). Additional methods are reported in Appendix A.
Predictions. Figure 6.10A shows predictions of a WMM model for this task. Resumption 
cost is plotted against interruption duration, which is the duration of the n-back 
task. Resumption cost is the extra cost after an interruption as compared to normal 
responses. We calculated resumption costs by subtracting the average response time of 
responses that did not follow an interruption in a condition from the response time of 
responses immediately following an interruption.
According to the WMM theory – and assuming that intermediate representations 
are the only factor in the disruptiveness of interruptions – as long as the text-entry 
task is easy (the dashed lines in Figure 6.10) and does not need an intermediate 
representation, there is no effect of the interruptions, independent of the difficulty of 
the n-back task. When text-entry is hard and the n-back task is easy, a small resumption 
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Figure Model prediction (A), data (B), and model fit (C), of the resumption costs in Interruption Experiment 1.6.10
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not related to problem state resource updates, but originates from the model already 
knowing which letter it has to enter next in the hard text-entry condition (in contrast to 
the easy text-entry condition, in which the next letter has to be perceived from the screen). 
It can therefore start preparing the next response while still executing the motor action 
of the current response. However, this is not possible during an interruption, leading to 
slightly longer response times directly after an interruption. In the hard-hard condition 
a large cost is predicted that increases with interruption duration. This is due to the 
single-sized problem state resource: because the n-back task also needs intermediate 
representations when it is hard, the intermediate representation of the text-entry task 
has to be restored after the interruption. This cost increases with interruption duration, 
as the representation will have decayed further in declarative memory the longer the 
interruption lasts, and it will therefore take more time to retrieve it again (see Figure 
6.4). 
Results. Accuracy on the n-back task was in all conditions over 90%, indicating that 
subjects focused on the n-back task. Figure 6.10B shows the resumption costs of 
the text-entry task. The first thing to note is that as long as text-entry is easy, there 
are no increasing costs with interruption duration. However, there are resumption 
costs of about 400 ms in all conditions, which the model did not predict. When text-
entry was hard, resumption costs were much higher. Where the model predicted a 
small cost for hard text-entry – easy n-back, the data show a much larger effect than 
predicted, which furthermore increases with interruption duration. When both tasks 
were hard there is an additional increase in resumption costs, which increases slightly 
steeper with interruption duration than when n-back was easy. The ANOVA largely 
confirmed these results: besides main effects of Text-Entry Difficulty, N-Back Difficulty, 
and Interruption Duration, also the two-way interaction effect between Text-Entry 
Difficulty and N-Back Difficulty was significant. The three-way interaction between 
Text-Entry Difficulty, N-Back Difficulty, and Interruption Duration showed a trend 
towards significance. The ANOVA results are reported in full in Table 6.1; detailed 
analysis procedures are reported in Appendix A.
Source F(1,15) p η
p
2
Text-Entry Difficulty 155.96 < .001 .91
N-Back Difficulty 18.92 < .001 .56
Interruption Duration 33.11 < .001 .69
Text-Entry ∑ N-Back 16.24 .001 .52
Text-Entry ∑ Interruption Duration 22.04 < .001 .60
N-Back ∑ Interruption Duration 3.75 .07 .20
Text-Entry ∑ N-Back ∑ Interruption 3.18 .09 .17
Table ANOVA results for resumption cost in Interruption 
Experiment 1.
6.1 
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Discussion. Interruption Experiment 1 was conducted to test the assumption of the 
WMM theory that intermediate representations are processed via a declarative memory 
store that is subject to decay. The WMM theory predicted that longer interruptions 
of a task lead to higher resumption costs, but only when both the primary and the 
interrupting task require an intermediate representation. Indeed, the experiment showed 
that as long as the primary task did not need an intermediate representation, there were 
costs due to the interruption, but these costs did not increase with the interruption 
duration. While this was in accordance with our predictions, it runs counter to one of 
the standard effects described in the literature: increasing cost with interruption length 
(e.g., Hodgetts & Jones, 2006; Monk et al., 2008). When the primary task needed an 
intermediate representation, we found much higher resumption costs, which increased 
with interruption duration. In addition, when both the primary and the secondary task 
required an intermediate representation, these costs were even higher. According to 
the WMM theory, this is due to the single-sized problem state resource, necessitating 
the restoration of the representation after an interruption in the hard-hard condition. 
As these costs increase with interruption duration, this argues in favor of the WMM 
theory’s assumption that intermediate representations are swapped in and out of the 
problem state resource via a declarative memory store with decay.
 However, while the WMM theory predicted a low cost and a flat line in the hard 
text-entry – easy n-back condition, the data show a high resumption cost with a clear 
increase with interruption duration. There are at least three possible explanations 
for this discrepancy between the predictions and the data. One possibility is that 
the easy n-back task required the use of an intermediate representation, leading to 
interference in the hard text-entry – easy n-back condition. However, in that case we 
would not expect a difference between the results of the hard text-entry – easy n-back 
and the hard text-entry – hard n-back conditions, as they both would be effectively 
hard-hard. A second possibility is that the problem state resource sometimes looses 
the stored representation. For instance, Anderson and Qin (2008) proposed that 
representations were lost on average every 20 seconds. While such a time-scale does 
not work for the current model, a similar mechanism might explain the data: a 
representation would sometimes (but not always) be lost during an interruption in the 
hard text-entry – easy n-back condition, leading to resumption costs that lie between the 
model’s prediction and the costs in the hard-hard condition. A third possibility is that 
the text-entry task requires two intermediate representations instead of one: one for the 
word (‘information’) and one for the position in the word (‘4th letter’). This would mean 
that one of these representations decays in the hard text-entry – easy n-back condition 
(as the problem state resource can only be used to maintain one of the representations), 
leading to increased costs with interruption duration, while both representations decay 
in the hard-hard condition, leading to even higher costs.
To see whether this last possibility can explain the data we implemented it as 
a WMM model. When the model is interrupted in the hard text-entry – easy n-back 
condition it stores the word in the problem state resource, while the position in the 
word decays in declarative memory. In the hard-hard condition, neither the word nor 
the position in the word can be stored in the problem state resource, and therefore 
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they both decay in declarative memory. Figure 6.10C shows the results: the model fits 
the patterns in the data, making a dual-representation strategy a possible explanation 
of the data.4 For this model fit we implemented a dual-representation strategy for the 
text-entry task and estimated the general costs of interruptions from the data, which 
were added to the outcome of the model. Thus, we took the average of the resumption 
costs in the easy text-entry conditions, and added this to the model results. This is not 
meant to give an explanation of these costs, but only to ensure that we estimated the 
costs due to intermediate representations correctly.
While a dual-representation strategy seems to be a possible way of explaining the data, 
we cannot distinguish between this explanation and the other possible explanations 
discussed above. To test whether it is a more likely explanation than the other 
explanations, we performed a second interruption experiment, in which we made sure 
that only a single representation was needed for the primary task.
Interruption	Experiment	2:	Subtraction	and	N-Back.	
In the second interruption experiment we tested whether a dual-representation strategy 
is a probable explanation for the data of Interruption Experiment 1. Instead of text-
entry, we now used the subtraction task described earlier as the primary task, again 
interrupted with the n-back task. If the dual-representation strategy for the text-entry 
task explains the data above, then we should find a flat line in the hard subtraction – 
easy n-back condition (cf. Figure 6.10A), as only a single representation is necessary for 
the subtraction task. If one of the other explanations is more likely, we should find a 
pattern similar to the one that was found for the text-entry task.
The only difference between the two experiments is the use of the subtraction task 
as the primary task instead of text-entry. A complete 10-column subtraction problem 
was shown on the screen, but solved columns were masked with #-marks. Interruption 
Experiment 2 thus had a 2 ∑ 2 ∑ 3 factorial within-subjects design (Subtraction Difficulty 
(easy/hard) ∑ N-Back Difficulty (easy/hard) ∑ Interruption Duration (4/8/12 sec). 
Additional methods are reported in Appendix A.
Results. Accuracy on the n-back task was above 85% in all conditions. Figure 6.11A 
shows the resumption costs in the different conditions; Figure 6.11B the model 
fit. Again, no effect of interruption duration on the resumption costs was found as 
long as subtraction was easy. In addition, when subtraction was hard and n-back easy, 
we also did not observe increasing costs with interruption duration, unlike in the 
previous experiment. Only when both tasks required an intermediate representation, 
in the hard-hard condition, we observed increasing costs with interruption duration. 
The ANOVA (Table 6.2) confirmed main effects of Subtraction Difficulty and N-Back 
Difficulty. Furthermore, also the interaction effect between Subtraction Difficulty 
4
 If a dual-representation strategy is indeed the correct way of describing behavior in the text-entry task, the question is whether 
the model fits of Borst, Taatgen, and Van Rijn (2010) and the model-based fMRI results of Borst et al. (2011) still hold. We 
implemented the dual-representation strategy also for these experiments, which yielded similar results as before. We report these 
analyses in Appendix B.
156 Chapter 6 An Integrated Theory of Intermediate Representations in Multitasking
and N-Back Difficulty was significant, but the expected three-way interaction between 
Subtraction Difficulty, Text-Entry Difficulty, and Interruption Duration did not reach 
significance. However, given that our model made specific a priori predictions, the 
overall ANOVA is overly conservative as it tests for any kind of three-way interaction, 
instead of the clear directional effects that the model predicted. We therefore subsequently 
performed simple effects analyses to investigate the model’s prediction that we should 
only observe increasing costs with interruption duration in the hard-hard condition. 
We tested for the separate n-back and subtraction conditions whether there was an 
effect of Interruption Duration. These analyses confirmed that there was no effect of 
Interruption Duration as long as either the subtraction task or the n-back task was easy 
(all Fs < 1). In the hard-hard condition, on the other hand, we found a significant effect 
of Interruption Duration (F(1,32) = 4.17, p = .0495, η
p
2 = .12). Thus, resumption costs 
only increased with interruption duration in the hard-hard condition, which is in line 
with the predictions of the WMM theory.
Discussion. In the interruption experiments we tested the prediction of the WMM theory 
that interruptions should only lead to increasing resumption costs with interruption 
duration when both the primary and the secondary task require an intermediate 
representation. The two experiments confirm this prediction, and the model fits show 
that the WMM theory can account for the datasets.
In Interruption Experiment 2 we only observed increasing costs with interruption 
duration in the hard-hard condition, and no increasing costs in the hard subtraction 
– easy n-back condition. Thus, this experiment suggests that the increasing costs in 
Interruption Experiment 1 in the hard text-entry – easy n-back condition were caused 
by properties of the text-entry task, possibly by a dual-representation strategy. 
Therefore, the two experiments taken together suggest that interruptions only lead to 
increasing costs with interruption duration when both tasks require an intermediate 
representation. This contrasts with earlier findings (e.g., Hodgetts & Jones, 2006; 
Monk et al., 2008), and with the memory for goals theory that proposes that resumption 
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Figure Resumption costs (A), and model fit (B) of Interruption Experiment 2.6.11
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The main objective of conducting the interruption experiments was to investigate 
whether intermediate representations are processed via a declarative memory system 
with decay, as the WMM theory proposes. The experiments showed that when the 
primary task required a representation and was interrupted by a task that also needed 
an intermediate representation, the costs of resumption increased with interruption 
duration. This argues in favor of a declarative memory system with decay: the longer 
ago an intermediate representation was stored in declarative memory, the more its 
activation will have decayed, the longer it takes to retrieve and restore it and to resume 
the primary task. Furthermore, the WMM model matched the size of the effects (Figure 
6.10C and 6.11B), while using the same parameters as in the model fits discussed 
above.
Summary
In the first major section of this paper, we reviewed experimental evidence that shows 
that the problem state resource can only maintain a single intermediate representation 
at a time. In this section, we investigated where intermediate representations are 
maintained when they are removed from the problem state resource. According to 
the WMM theory, they are processed via a separate declarative memory store in which 
items are subject to decay. In the first part of this section, we used a novel model-based 
fMRI analysis technique to show that activity related to the problem state resource 
on the one hand, and activity related to declarative memory processes on the other 
hand, are best represented in two different brain areas, implying two separate memory 
stores. In the second part of this section, we reported two interruption experiments 
that show that representations that are not maintained in the problem state resource 
are subject to decay. Thus, this combination of experiments implies that intermediate 
representations that cannot be maintained in the problem state resource are processed 
via a declarative memory store that is subject to decay, while representations in the 
problem state resource are not subject to decay.
In the next section we will look at the proposed strategic nature of using the 
problem state resource: according to the WMM theory the problem state resource, in 
Source F(1,32) p η
p
2
Subtraction Difficulty 33.83 < .001 .51
N-Back Difficulty 25.38 < .001 .44
Interruption Duration 3.69 .064 .10
Subtraction ∑ N-Back 5.44 .026 .15
Subtraction ∑ Interruption Duration 1.77 .19 .05
N-Back ∑ Interruption Duration 1.83 .19 .05
Subtraction ∑ N-Back ∑ Interruption 2.51 .12 .07
Table ANOVA results for resumption cost in Interruption 
Experiment 2.
6.2 
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combination with declarative memory, will only be used when it is faster than using 
the environment.
The Strategic Nature of using the Problem State 
Resource and the Environment
Using intermediate representations is only necessary when information is not available 
in the environment. For example, when solving a multi-column subtraction problem 
on paper, one would usually indicate on paper whether a carry is in progress, and 
thus use the environment as an external representation (e.g., Hollan et al., 2000; 
Kirsh, 1995; Wickens, 1992). Even when one is interrupted while solving a subtraction 
problem mentally, it is possible to reconstruct the representation using the previous 
columns after the interruption, instead of retrieving a representation from memory 
(as was required in the interruption experiments above). Based on the Soft Constraints 
Hypothesis (Gray & Fu, 2004; Gray et al., 2006), the WMM theory assumes that 
people always use the fastest strategy: whether that is using a representation in the 
problem state resource, retrieving a representation from declarative memory, or using 
the environment. In this section, we will present an experiment that supports this 
assumption.
For this experiment we again used the subtraction and text-entry dual-task described 
above, but added a condition in which on-screen support was provided for the 
subtraction task (see also Buwalda, Borst, Taatgen, & van Rijn, 2011).  Figure 6.12 
shows the interface of this condition. The ‘|’ above the subtraction task indicates that 
currently no carry is in progress, it will turn into a ‘1’ after a column that induced a 
carry. Thus, no intermediate representation is required in this Support condition for 
the subtraction task. The experiment had a factorial 2 ∑ 2 ∑ 2 within-subject design 
(Subtraction Difficulty (easy/hard) ∑ Text-Entry Difficulty (easy/hard) ∑ Support (yes/
no)). Additional methods are reported in Appendix C.
Predictions
For this task, the WMM theory predicts the following. In the no-support condition 
of the subtraction task, intermediate representations cannot be reconstructed from 
the environment, because only a single column is shown at a time. In the support 
condition, on the other hand, the intermediate representation is shown on the 
screen. Thus, the costs of using the environment in the support condition consist of 
perceiving the support indicator. As long as the subtraction task is easy, no differences 
are predicted between the support and the no-support condition, as carries are never 
required. In the hard subtraction – easy text-entry condition, the model also expects 
the same behavior with and without support: Because a mental strategy is faster than 
perceiving the support indicator on the screen, the WMM theory predicts that subjects 
will not use the indicator in the support condition.
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Only in the hard subtraction – hard text-entry condition the WMM theory predicts 
a difference: in the support condition it is faster to use the environment than to use 
a declarative memory-based reconstruction (as used for all tasks above). However, 
using the environment in the hard-hard condition is still slower than using a mental 
representation in the hard subtraction – easy text-entry condition with support (because 
the support-indicator has to be perceived, which takes time). Therefore, in the support 
condition, the model expects slightly higher response times in the  hard-hard condition 
than in the hard subtraction – easy text-entry condition. Thus, while an interaction 
effect between Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty is expected in the no-
support condition, as observed previously, a reduced interaction effect is predicted in 
the support condition.
While the WMM theory predicts interaction effects for response times both with 
and without support, for the accuracy data the model predicts that the interaction 
effect disappears with support. As the model uses the perfect information in the 
environment in the hard-hard condition with support, there is no reason for it to make 
more mistakes in this condition than in the hard subtraction – easy text-entry condition.
Results
Figure 6.13 shows the results of the experiment: the top panels show response times, 
the bottom panels accuracy. The complete ANOVA results are reported in Tables 6.3, 
6.4, and 6.5. As the WMM theory predicted, subjects showed significant interaction 
No Carry Carryor On-Screen Support:
or
Figure The interface of the experiment. The ‘|’ in the subtraction task indicates that 
currently no carry is in progress, a ‘1’ indicates a carry in progress.
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effects between Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty both with and without 
support. Moreover, the interaction effect was smaller in the support condition, as 
shown by a significant three-way interaction effect between Subtraction Difficulty, 
Text-Entry Difficulty, and Support. This is in line with the predictions described above.
The accuracy data of the subtraction task show a similar pattern, except that 
the interaction between Subtraction Difficulty and Text-Entry Difficulty completely 
disappears in the Support condition. This is also in line with the model: while using 
the environment is slightly slower than using a mental strategy, it should not lead to 
more errors.
Model
As can be seen in Figure 6.13 (grey bars), the WMM model accounted well for the data. 
Both the effects on response times and accuracy of the subtraction task were captured. 
The size of the effects was also reflected by the model, which uses the same parameters 
as before.
Discussion
The experiment supports the assumption of the WMM theory that problem state 
resource usage is strategic: subjects always used the fastest option. As long as a mental 
Response Times Accuracy
Source F(1,23) p η
p




Support 8.02 .009 .26 65.7 < .001 .74
Subtraction 484.2 < .001 .95 103.8 < .001 .82
Text-Entry 26.3 < .001 .53 18.78 < .001 .45
Support ∑ Subtraction 27.6 < .001 .55 66.8 < .001 .74
Support ∑ Text-Entry 4.22 .05 .15 12.7 .002 .36
Subtraction ∑ Text-Entry 29.35 < .001 .56 24.7 < .001 .52
Support ∑ Sub. ∑ Text-Entry 5.05 .03 .18 21.4 < .001 .48
Text-Entry Task
Support 2.85 .10 .11 3.20 .09 .12
Subtraction 105.5 < .001 .82 25.7 < .001 .53
Text-Entry 1.17 .29 .05 149.4 < .001 .87
Support ∑ Subtraction 32.7 < .001 .59 < 1 – –
Support ∑ Text-Entry 3.96 .06 .15 3.87 .06 .14
Subtraction ∑ Text-Entry 19.7 < .001 .46 27.1 < .001 .54
Support ∑ Sub. ∑ Text-Entry 9.29 .006 .29 < 1 – –
Subtraction = Subtraction Difficulty, Text-Entry = Text-Entry Difficulty.
Table Overall ANOVA results of the external support experiment, on the left for response 
times, on the right for accuracy. 
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strategy was possible (up to the hard subtraction – easy text-entry condition with support), 
they seemed to prefer a mental strategy instead of using the environment, even when 
support was provided. In the hard-hard condition, when they had to use an intermediate 
representation for both tasks, they switched to environmental support when possible, 
resulting in faster response times with support than without support.
This is in accordance with the Soft Constraints Hypothesis (Gray & Fu, 2004; Gray 
et al., 2006), which states that humans adapt their behavior to minimize temporal 
costs, even if that leads to suboptimal behavior. That is exactly what we observed in the 
experiment, in which it might make more sense to always use the perfect knowledge 
in-the-world as opposed to imperfect knowledge in-the-head. While subjects were free 
to use the indicator in the Support condition – which seems to be the rational option, 
as it is always correct and requires less effort than remembering whether a carry was 
in progress – there was a clear difference between the hard subtraction – easy text-entry 
condition and the hard-hard condition, indicating that they used different strategies in 
these conditions. According to the WMM theory and the Soft Constraints Hypothesis 
this is because participants tried to minimize the temporal costs of the task, and therefore 
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RMSD = .50 %
Figure Results of the support experiment.6.13
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General Discussion
In this article we proposed the Working Memory in Multitasking theory, which describes 
how intermediate representations are processed in human multitasking. The WMM 
theory states that our cognitive system has a single-sized problem state resource 
for maintaining intermediate representations. When more than one representation 
is required for the tasks that make up the ‘multitask’, the representations that are 
currently not used are temporarily stored in a declarative memory store that is 
subject to decay. The use of multiple intermediate representations leads therefore 
to interference, because the representations have to be swapped in and out of the 
problem state resource via declarative memory. The WMM theory furthermore proposes 
that intermediate representations are processed mentally as long as that is faster than 
using the environment, but that otherwise the environment is used.
RT No-Support RT Support
Source F(1,23) p η
p




Subtraction Difficulty 357.9 < .001 .94 531.3 < .001 .96
Text-Entry Difficulty 22.0 < .001 .49 15.0 < .001 .40
Subtraction ∑ Text-Entry 20.0 < .001 .47 14.5 < .001 .39
Text-Entry Task
Subtraction Difficulty 133.6 < .001 .85 46.4 < .001 .67
Text-Entry Difficulty < 1 – – 2.6 .12 .10
Subtraction ∑ Text-Entry 26.5 < .001 .53 8.6 .007 .27
RT = response times.
Table ANOVA results of the response time data; separate for Support and No-Support.6.4 
Acc No-Support Acc Support
Source F(1,23) p η
p




Subtraction Difficulty 80.4 < .001 .77 36.8 < .001 .62
Text-Entry Difficulty 45.0 < .001 .66 < 1 - -
Subtraction ∑ Text-Entry 58.2 < .001 .72 1.1 .3 .05
Text-Entry Task
Subtraction Difficulty 25.9 < .001 .53
Same as No-SupportText-Entry Difficulty 173.0 < .001 .88
Subtraction ∑ Text-Entry 28.1 < .001 .55
Acc =accuracy.
Table ANOVA results of the accuracy data; separate for Support and No-Support. Note 
that for the accuracy of the text-entry task we did not find any effects involving 
Support, which is why we collapsed over Support.
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In the previous three sections we have discussed various data sets that support 
the WMM theory. First, we reviewed an experiment of Borst, Taatgen, and Van Rijn 
(2010) that showed that the problem state resource can maintain at most a single 
representation. We then turned to a novel fMRI analysis technique to support the 
assumption that discarded representations are stored in a separate memory store. In 
addition, with two new interruption experiments we showed that representations in 
this declarative memory store are subject to decay. Finally, we presented an experiment 
in which external support was given to the subjects, to show that intermediate 
representations are always processed in the fastest way possible, whether that is using 
the environment, the problem state resource, or declarative memory.
The main prediction of the WMM theory is that intermediate representations are 
an important factor in interference in human multitasking. This idea stems from 
the combination of the threaded cognition theory (Salvucci & Taatgen, 2008, 2011) 
and the ACT-R theory (e.g., Anderson, 2007). The data sets discussed in this article 
give therefore also indirect support for these theories. The WMM theory, being based 
on threaded cognition, is a multiple bottleneck theory (although we focused on the 
problem state bottleneck in this article). It therefore supports the idea of multiple 
separate bottlenecks, with interference effects depending on the requirements of the 
tasks at hand. According to the WMM theory one of those bottlenecks is the problem 
state resource. As it takes a relatively long time to restore intermediate representations 
to the problem state resource, this bottleneck causes substantial interference, both in 
response times and accuracy.
In the remainder of this article we will discuss the relation between the WMM theory 
and current working memory theories, its consequences for interruption studies, its 
relation to the Memory for Goals theory and the Soft Constraints Hypothesis, and 
finally real-world implications of the WMM theory.
Working Memory
The function of intermediate representations – temporarily maintaining information 
– is traditionally part of the concept of short-term or working memory (e.g., Baddeley, 
1986; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Miller, 1956). However, where theories used to assume 
a limit of 7±2 items (Miller, 1956) or 4±1 items (Cowan, 2000), the WMM theory 
assumes a limit of only one directly accessible item. Other items that are traditionally 
part of working memory are in the WMM/ACT-R framework represented by highly 
activated items in declarative memory (Anderson, 2005; Daily et al., 2001; Lewis 
& Vasishth, 2005; Lovett et al., 2000). The combination of a single-sized problem 
state resource and highly active items in declarative memory gives a more traditional 
working memory capacity of around four to nine items (Anderson et al., 1998). In this 
framework, the representation in the problem state resource can be used immediately, 
while it takes time to retrieve and use the highly activated items in declarative memory.
Recent working memory theories have proposed similar ideas, in which the ‘focus of 
attention’ represents items in working memory that are directly available (e.g., Cowan, 
1995; Garavan, 1998; Jonides et al., 2008; McElree, 2001; Oberauer, 2002, 2009; 
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Oberauer & Bialkova, 2009). For example, Oberauer (2009) proposed a model in 
which “declarative working memory” consists of activated items of long term memory, 
of which only a single item can be in the focus of attention. This idea of one directly 
available item and other highly active items in declarative memory constituting working 
memory is very similar to the concept of working memory in the WMM theory, as 
are other recent working memory theories (e.g., Jonides et al., 2008; McElree, 2001; 
Oberauer, 2002).
Interruptions
We illustrated the WMM theory with two interruption experiments. It is well known 
that interruptions of a task lead to a decrease in performance when recommencing 
this task (e.g., Gillie & Broadbent, 1989; McFarlane & Latorella, 2002). Two important 
factors that determine the severity of an interruption are the complexity and the 
duration of the interrupting task (e.g., Gillie & Broadbent, 1989; Hodgetts & Jones, 
2006; Monk et al., 2008; Zijlstra et al., 1999). According to the WMM theory, these 
effects are partly caused by intermediate representations. As explained in detail above, 
whether the tasks need intermediate representations determines whether there is 
representation-related interference (complexity effect), while decay in declarative 
memory of intermediate representations causes the duration effect.
Interestingly, this leads to the prediction that the duration effect only plays a role 
when both tasks need an intermediate representation, as opposed to what is normally 
assumed (and in contrast to the Memory for Goals theory, e.g., Altmann & Trafton, 
2002, see below). The presented experiments confirmed this prediction: as long as the 
primary task did not need an intermediate representation there was no effect of the 
duration of the interruption. Moreover, when the primary task required a representation, 
there was only an effect of interruption duration if the interrupting task also needed an 
intermediate representation.
While the WMM theory accounts for increasing costs with interruption duration, 
note that it does not (neither does it mean to) explain the basic interruption costs that 
we observed in all conditions (Figure 6.10 and 6.11). According to the WMM theory 
they cannot be ascribed to the processing of intermediate representations, but are 
caused by a different mechanism.
Memory for Goals
 The Memory for Goals theory (Altmann & Trafton, 2002; Trafton et al., 2003) has been 
used to explain resumption costs in interruption tasks such as the ones presented in 
this article. It assumes that every task has an associated goal in declarative memory, and 
that when a task is interrupted, this goal starts to decay. When a task is recommenced 
after an interruption, the associated goal has to be retrieved from memory, which 
takes more time the longer the interruption was due to decay in memory (cf. Figure 
6.4). Thus, Memory for Goals theory explains interruption costs by the time it takes to 
retrieve a goal from declarative memory.
165General Discussion
Salvucci, Monk, et al. (2009) rephrased Memory for Goals in problem state terms: 
“which they [Altmann & Trafton, 2002] referred to as the goal […] we call the problem 
state” (p. 799). Thus, they assume that every task has an associated intermediate 
representation in the problem state resource (instead of a goal), which has to be 
retrieved from declarative memory after an interruption. As support they presented a 
model fit of an interruption experiment by Monk et al. (2008). However, while Salvucci, 
Monk, et al. assumed that every task has an associated intermediate representation 
(which was true for the tasks they simulated), the WMM theory proposes that not all 
tasks need an intermediate representation. According to the WMM theory, only tasks 
with associated intermediate representations will lead to increasing resumption costs 
with interruption duration, thereby explaining the flat lines in the easy conditions in 
the interruption experiments described above.
Strategic Behavior and the Soft Constraints Hypothesis
The WMM theory assumes that humans always use the fastest strategy, whether that 
is using information in-the-head or using information in-the-world. This assumption 
is based on the Soft Constraints Hypothesis, which proposes that behavior is adapted 
to a task by minimizing temporal costs (Gray & Fu, 2004; Gray et al., 2006). The 
support experiment presented in this article yields additional behavioral evidence for 
this hypothesis: while it might have been expected that subjects always use external 
support when it is available, this did not seem to be the case. An open question is how 
subjects decided which strategy to use: how did they learn that it was faster to use 
information in-the-head than to use the information presented in the environment?
To discover the best strategy, Gray et al.’s (2006) Ideal Performer Model used 
reinforcement learning (e.g., Sutton & Barto, 1998). However, they “make no claim 
that the process followed by the [reinforcement learning] algorithm mimics any process 
followed by human cognition” (Gray et al., 2006, p. 465). Recently, Janssen and Gray 
(in press) investigated whether reinforcement learning could also provide a cognitively 
plausible explanation of the data. They concluded that reinforcement learning could be 
used to simulate the human data, especially if it used ‘time’ as the reward parameter. 
This is in line with other efforts to use reinforcement learning to explain human 
behavior (see, e.g., Daw & Frank, 2009, for a special issue on reinforcement learning 
and higher-level cognition). As the subjects in our experiment received sufficient 
practice, it is possible that reinforcement learning can also be used to explain the 
strategic choices in our dataset.
Real World Implications
In this article we have presented several behavioral experiments that highlight the 
interference effects of the WMM theory. While these interference effects are relatively 
large, one could wonder if the processing of intermediate representations also plays 
a role in everyday life. First evidence that this is the case comes from an experiment 
in which subjects had to keep a (very basic) simulated car in the middle of the road 
166 Chapter 6 An Integrated Theory of Intermediate Representations in Multitasking
while entering addresses into a navigation device (Borst & Taatgen, 2007). Both tasks 
had two conditions: either they needed an intermediate representation or not. When 
both tasks required an intermediate representation, performance was slower than in 
all other conditions.
More recently, Salvucci and Bogunovich (2010) let subjects perform a customer-
support task in which the use of intermediate representations was manipulated. 
Subjects in their experiment had to reply to emails inquiring about the price of a certain 
product. These prices had to be looked up on a simulated internet. During certain 
parts of this task, subjects had to maintain an intermediate representation (white bars 
in Figure 6.14). While replying to the emails and looking up the information on the 
internet, subjects additionally had to perform a chat task: Sometimes a chat window 
was highlighted, indicating that a new message had arrived to which the subjects had 
to respond. Subjects were free to choose when they switched to the chat task. Figure 
6.14 shows the results: they switched almost exclusively to the chat task when no 
intermediate representation had to be maintained (the grey bars). This indicates 
that the subjects were aware that there is a cost associated with using intermediate 
representations, and thus that multitasking interference due to the use of intermediate 
representations has an impact on real-world tasks.
Conclusion
In this article we proposed the Working Memory in Multitasking theory. This theory 
states that intermediate representations are an important factor in multitasking 
interference. As support for the WMM theory we have reviewed experiments from the 
literature, and in addition tested predictions of the theory in three new experiments, 
showing that it accounts for data ranging from concurrent tasks to interruption studies, 















































No intermediate representation for the mail task
Action in the email task
Intermediate representation 
for the mail task
Intermediate representation 
for the mail task
Figure Results of the Salvucci and Bogunovich (2010) experiment. Adapted from Figure 3 (Salvucci & Bogunovich, 
2010).
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Appendix A:  
Additional Methods of Interruption Experiment 1 and 2
In this appendix we describe the subjects, stimuli, procedure, and statistical procedure 
of Interruption Experiments 1 and 2. 
Interruption Experiment 1: Text-Entry and N-Back
In this experiment subjects had to perform a text-entry task, which was twice every 
trial interrupted by an n-back task. The design of the task is discussed in the main text.
Subjects
16 students of the University of Groningen participated in the experiment for course 
credit (12 female, age range 18–22, mean age 19.2). All subjects had normal or 
corrected-to-normal visual acuity. Informed consent as approved by the Ethical 
Committee Psychology of the University of Groningen was obtained before testing.
Stimuli	and	Apparatus	
The 10 letter words for the hard version of the text-entry task were handpicked from 
a list of high-frequency Dutch words (CELEX database; Baayen et al., 1993) to ensure 
that similarities between words were kept at a minimum. These stimuli were also 
used in the easy text-entry task, except that the letters within the words were scrambled 
(under the constraint that a letter never appeared twice in a row). Thus, subjects were 
presented pseudo-random sequences of letters that they had to enter one-by-one in the 
easy condition. By scrambling the words, we controlled for letter-based effects, while 
preventing the use of strategies to predict the next letter.
The n-back stimuli were generated during the experiment. Subjects had to respond 
‘same’ in 50% of the cases (thus, in the easy, 1-back version, the digit was the same as 
the previous digit, in the 2-back version the same as the digit 2 back), and ‘different’ in 
the other 50% of the cases. Additionally, no more than three digits in a row could be the 
same. Subjects had to press ‘x’ or ‘z’ on the keyboard to indicate ‘same’ or ‘different’. 
Whether ‘x’ or ‘z’ indicated ‘same’ or ‘different’ was counter-balanced over subjects.
Procedure
Each trial in the experiment started with presenting the conditions of the text-entry 
task and the n-back task on the screen, for example: N-Back: easy, Text-Entry: hard. 
This was presented for three seconds, after which the text-entry task was shown on the 
screen. After entering between 2 and 6 letters the first n-back interruption was started. 
No warning was given, but instead of the next text-entry letter the n-back task was shown 
(Figure 6.9). The subject had to do 3, 6, or 9 n-back steps (balanced over the text-entry 
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and n-back conditions). Then the text-entry interface was shown again. After another 2 
to 6 letters the second n-back interruption started, after which the subject could finish 
the text-entry task. When the subject had entered the complete 10-letter word, feedback 
was presented, indicating the number of correct letters in the text-entry task. The text-
entry feedback was presented for 3 seconds, followed by a fixation screen for 4 seconds. 
Afterwards the next trial started. Feedback was continuously presented for the n-back 
task: every time an incorrect or no response was given, a buzzer was sounded.
The experiment consisted of a practice block and two experimental blocks. The 
practice block started with three trials of only the easy text-entry task, followed by three 
trials of the hard text-entry task, seven 6-step trials of the easy n-back task, and seven 
7-step trials of the hard n-back task. Then the real task was practiced in four trials. The 
seven n-back trials (per condition) increased in speed in four steps: in the first trial the 
digit was presented for 1700 ms followed by a 733 ms mask, in the second and third 
trial they were presented for 1500/533 ms, in the fourth and fifth trials for 1300/383 
ms, and in the sixth and seventh trials for 1100 ms with a 233 ms mask (as in the real 
experiment).
The two experimental blocks were the same, each consisted of 36 trials: 2 (easy/
hard text-entry) ∑ 2 (easy/hard n-back) ∑ 3 (3/6/9 steps first interruption) ∑ 3 (3/6/9 
steps second interruption). The order of these conditions was randomized within a 
block. The interruption points in each trial were also randomized: the first interruption 
came after the 2nd up to the 6th letter, the second interruption between the 4th and the 
8th letter. The distance between the interruptions was a minimum of 2 letters, resulting 
in 15 different combinations. The complete experiment consisted of 72 experimental 
trials, and lasted for about 90 minutes. Between the blocks subjects could take a short 
break.
Statistical	Procedure
We only analyzed the data from the experimental phase of the experiment. A response 
time in the text-entry task was defined as the time between two responses, or, directly 
after an interruption, as the time between the reappearance of the text-entry task and 
the response. First responses of each trial were removed. Outliers were removed from 
the data (RTs < 250 ms or > 10,000 ms), after which we removed data exceeding three 
standard deviations from the mean per condition per subject (in total 0.92% of the 
data was removed). All F- and p-values are obtained from repeated measure ANOVAs; 
all error bars depict standard errors. Analyses on response times are only for correct 
responses.
Interruption Experiment 2: Subtraction and N-Back
In this experiment subjects had to perform a subtraction task, which was twice every 
trial interrupted by an n-back task. The design is similar to the design of Interruption 
Experiment 1, except when noted otherwise.
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Subjects
39 students of the University of Groningen participated in the experiment for course 
credit. Three subjects had to be excluded because of not being able to do the hard 
subtraction task (< 65% columns correct or slower than 3,500 ms per response), two 
subjects for not doing the hard n-back task (< 80% correct), and one subject had to 
be excluded because of health problems, leaving 33 complete data sets (23 female, age 
range 18-27, mean age 20.7). All subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal visual 
acuity. Informed consent as approved by the Ethical Committee Psychology of the 
University of Groningen was obtained before testing.
Design
Instead of text-entry, solving 10-column subtraction problems was the primary task in 
the second interruption experiment. Responses had to be made using the numeric 
keypad of the keyboard. The n-back task was again used as the interrupting task, but 
now with letters instead of digits.
Stimuli	and	Apparatus
The stimuli for the subtraction task were generated anew for each subject. The 
subtraction problems in the hard version always featured five carries, and resulted in 
10-digit answers. The n-back stimuli were again generated on the fly, using the same 
constraints as in Interruption Experiment 1.
Statistical	Procedure
We only analyzed the data from the experimental phase of the experiment. A response 
time in the subtraction task was defined as the time between two responses, or, directly 
after an interruption, as the time between the reappearance of the subtraction task and 
the response. First responses of each trial were removed. Outliers were removed from 
the data (RTs < 250 ms or > 15,000 ms), after which we removed data exceeding three 
standard deviations from the mean per condition per subject (in total 2.74% of the 
data was removed). All F- and p-values are obtained from repeated measure ANOVAs; 
all error bars depict standard errors. Analyses on response times are only for correct 
responses.
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Appendix B:  
Effects of a Dual-Representation 
Strategy on Previous Results
In this appendix we report the effects of a dual-representation strategy for the text-entry 
task on previously published results. According to the results of Interruption 
Experiment 1 (see the main text), it is likely that two intermediate representations are 
used for the text-entry task, instead of one. Thus, when a word has to be entered in the 
hard text-entry task, one representation is used for storing the word (‘information’) and 
one for the position in the word (‘6th letter’). Such a model implementation resulted in 
a good fit for Interruption Experiment 1. However, if a dual-representation strategy is 
indeed the correct way of explaining the results of the text-entry task, the question is 
whether previously published model fits still hold. To investigate this we implemented 
the dual-representation strategy for Experiment 1 of Borst, Taatgen, and Van Rijn 
(2010) and for the model-based analysis reported in Borst et al. (2011).
Borst, Taatgen, and Van Rijn (2010)
The design of Experiment 1 (Borst, Taatgen, & Van Rijn, 2010) is reported in “Multiple 
Intermediate Representations cause Multitasking Interference”. Figure 6.6 in the main 
text shows the original model fit, Figure 6.15 the model fit with a dual-representation 
strategy. The effect of a dual-representation strategy for the text-entry task is small: the 
costs in response times and accuracy for the text-entry task are slightly over-estimated. 
This is caused by the model now having to swap out two intermediate representations 
for the text-entry task throughout the experiment. In the easy subtraction – hard text-entry 
condition this leads to slightly higher response times, because the new model has to 
retrieve an intermediate representation from memory on each step of a trial, even in 
this condition. However, most of these costs are absorbed in the normal costs of doing 
the task (i.e., perceptual and motor costs). In the hard-hard condition the model now 
has to retrieve two intermediate representations from memory at each step of a trial, 
leading to similar interaction effects as observed before. Taken into account that we 
did not refit the model parameters, this shows that a dual-representation strategy can 
account for the data of Experiment 1 of Borst, Taatgen, & Van Rijn.
Model-Based fMRI: Borst, et al. (2011)
In “Neuroimaging Evidence for Two Separate Memory Stores” we discussed a model-
based fMRI analysis that showed that the problem state resource and declarative 
memory are best represented by two different brain areas (Figure 6.8, main text). We 
now reanalyzed the data with a dual-representation model. Figure 6.16 shows the 
results. The analysis still found two separate regions for the problem state resource 
and declarative memory. This indicates that a dual-representation model is also 
compatible with the brain results we found before, which, in turn, correspond to the 
standard mapping between ACT-R modules and brain regions (e.g., Anderson, 2007).
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Figure Results of the model-based fMRI analysis with a dual-representation model. The best fitting 
areas for a) the problem state resource and b) declarative memory. The white squares indicate 










































































































































































Subtraction / Text-Entry Subtraction / Text-Entry
Figure Results of Experiment 1 with a dual-representation model. Error bars 




172 Chapter 6 An Integrated Theory of Intermediate Representations in Multitasking
Appendix C:  
Additional Methods of the Support Experiment
In this appendix we describe the subjects, design, and statistical procedure of the 
experiment described in the section ‘The Strategic Nature of using the Problem State 
Resource and the Environment.’ In this experiment subjects had to alternate between 
a subtraction task and a text-entry task (as in Borst, Taatgen, & Van Rijn, 2010). Both 
tasks were presented in two versions: an easy version in which there was no need to 
maintain a intermediate representation, and a hard version in which participants had 
to maintain an intermediate representation from one response to the next. In addition, 
in one condition external support was displayed on the screen for the subtraction task. 
The general design of the task is discussed in the main text.
Subjects
33 students of the University of Groningen participated in the experiment for course 
credit or monetary compensation of 110. Four participants were rejected because they 
scored less than 75% correct where the other participants scored >95% correct. Two 
subjects were rejected because they did not adhere to task instructions, and three 
because of recording problems of the eye tracker. This leaves 24 complete datasets (17 
female, age range 18-43, mean age 20.5). All subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal 
visual acuity. Informed consent as approved by the Ethical Committee Psychology of 
the University of Groningen was obtained before testing.
Stimuli and Apparatus
The stimuli for the subtraction task were generated anew for each subject. The 
subtraction problems in the hard version always featured six carries, and resulted in 
10-digit answers. The 10 letter words for the hard version of the text-entry task were 
handpicked from a list of high-frequency Dutch words (CELEX database; Baayen et 
al., 1993) to ensure that similarities between words were kept at a minimum. These 
stimuli were also used in the easy text-entry task, except that the letters within the 
words were scrambled (under the constraint that a letter never appeared twice in a 
row). Thus, participants were presented pseudo-random sequences of letters that they 
had to enter one-by-one in the easy condition. By scrambling the words, we controlled 
for letter-based effects, while preventing the use of strategies to predict the next letter. 
The experiment was presented full screen on a 20.1” monitor. Participants were 
sitting at a normal viewing distance, about 70 cm from the screen.
Procedure
Each trial started with the presentation of a fixation cross for 6 seconds. The fixation 
cross was followed by two horizontally aligned colored circles representing the tasks. 
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The color of the circles indicated the difficulty levels of the tasks (on the left for the 
subtraction task, on the right for the text-entry task; green for easy, red for hard). The 
circles stayed on the screen for 1 second, followed by a fixation cross for 600 ms, after 
which the subtraction and text-entry tasks appeared. Subjects had to begin with the 
subtraction task, and then alternate between the two tasks. After completing both 
tasks, a feedback screen was shown for 2 seconds, indicating how many letters/digits 
were entered correctly. Before the next trial started, a fixation screen was shown for 2 
seconds. 
The experiment consisted of a practice block and two experimental blocks. One of the 
experimental blocks contained the support condition; the order was counter-balanced 
over participants. The practice block consisted of 12 single task trials (4 subtraction 
trials with 10 columns visible, 4 subtraction trials with one column visible, and 4 text-
entry trials), followed by a block of 4 multitasking trials: all combinations of subtraction 
and text-entry (easy-easy, hard-easy, easy-hard, and hard-hard). Both experimental blocks 
consisted of 28 multitasking trials. Before the second block the subtraction task was 
practiced again, to familiarize the participants with using the carry indicator if they 
did not use this in the first block, or with performing the task without the indicator in 
the other case. Subtraction and text-entry conditions were randomized within a block. 
The complete experiment consisted of 56 experimental trials, and lasted for about 90 
minutes. In between blocks participants could take a short break.
Statistical Procedure
We only analyzed the data from the experimental phase of the experiment. A response 
time in the subtraction task is defined as the time between a response in the text-entry 
task and a response in the subtraction task; a response time in the text-entry task as 
the time between a response in the subtraction task and a response in the text-entry 
task. First responses of each trial were removed. Outliers were removed from the 
data (RTs < 250 ms or > 10,000 ms), after which we removed data exceeding three 
standard deviations from the mean per condition per participant (in total 2.2% of the 
data was removed). All F- and p-values are obtained from repeated measure ANOVAs; 
all error bars depict standard errors. Accuracy data were transformed using an arcsine 
transformation before being submitted to the ANOVA.
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Summary & Concluding Remarks
I started this dissertation discussing an application that makes it harder to multitask: 
Concentrate1. According to the application’s website, by enforcing monotasking it 
“helps you work and study more productively”. A possible reason why Concentrate 
might make you more productive is the topic of this dissertation: the problem state 
bottleneck. In the preceding chapters we have shown that, due to this bottleneck, 
having to maintain multiple intermediate representations at the same time leads to 
a decrease in performance, both in time and accuracy. By focusing on a single task 
– for example with the help of Concentrate – it is more likely that you use at most 
one intermediate representation, resulting in better overall performance. In this last 
chapter, I will briefly summarize our findings and the resulting theory, and along the 
way discuss some high-level implications (more detailed discussions of the results can 
be found in the previous chapters). This chapter is organized around the different 
methodologies that we applied: behavioral experiments, cognitive modeling, pupil 
dilation, and neuroimaging.
Behavioral Results
First evidence for a problem state bottleneck came from the three behavioral 
experiments that we discussed in Chapter 2. In the first experiment, by varying the use 
of intermediate representations and thereby the use of the problem state resource, we 
showed that performance decreased considerably when more than one representation 
was required at a time. The second and third experiment were carried out to show 
that this decrease in performance was not caused by an effect of memory load or by 
a phonological loop bottleneck, respectively. In Chapter 3, we extended the support 
for a problem state bottleneck by showing that the interference was indeed due to 
the use of intermediate representations: when such a representation was presented 
in the environment, performance suffered less than when a representation had to be 
maintained mentally. These results run counter to classical working memory theories 
that assume that people can maintain up to 7±2 items in short-term memory (Miller, 
1956). However, they match more recent theories, which propose a very limited focus 
of attention in working memory of only one or two items that can be used without 
a time cost (e.g., Cowan, 1995; Garavan, 1998; Jonides et al., 2008; McElree, 2001; 
Oberauer, 2002, 2009).
Following these results, in Chapter 6 we took a closer look at what happens 
to intermediate representations that cannot be maintained in the problem state 
resource. According to the underlying theories, ACT-R and threaded cognition, these 
representations are stored in a declarative memory store in which their memory 
strength decays over time. To test this assumption, we conducted two so-called 
interruption experiments. In these experiments, a primary task was interrupted for 
varying durations by a secondary task. The data showed that (1) when both tasks needed 
1
 http://getconcentrating.com/
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an intermediate representation the time to resume the primary task was higher than in 
the other conditions, and (2) that in that condition the time to resume the primary task 
increased with interruption duration. This matched the predictions of our theory, and 
indicated that intermediate representations are indeed stored in a declarative memory 
store when they cannot be maintained in the problem state resource.
Cognitive Models
To account for the results of the experiments we developed computational cognitive 
models. These models were instantiated in the cognitive architecture ACT-R (e.g., 
Anderson, 2007). To simulate the multitasking aspects of the experiments we used 
threaded cognition theory (Salvucci & Taatgen, 2008, 2011). On the one hand, the 
models show that the observed results can indeed be explained by a bottleneck in the 
problem state resource. On the other hand, the modeling results also cross-validate the 
ACT-R theory and threaded cognition. First, our models add new tasks to the expanding 
set of data ACT-R can account for (see also http://act-r.psy.cmu.edu/), and show thereby 
that ACT-R is a plausible psychological theory and at the same time a useful modeling 
framework. With respect to threaded cognition, the modeling accounts show that a 
multiple-bottleneck theory can explain our datasets, while this would have been difficult 
with a single central bottleneck account (e.g., Pashler, 1994). For example, while we 
mostly focused on the problem state bottleneck, to explain the effects of the listening 
task (Experiment 3, Chapter 2) the bottleneck in declarative memory was crucial. This 
also shows the added value of using a cognitive architecture: the different effects of, 
and the interactions between, the problem state resource (Experiment 1 & 2, Chapter 2), 
the visual resource (Chapter 3), and declarative memory (Experiment 3, Chapter 2; the 
interruption experiments, Chapter 6) were all necessary to explain the data. The effects 
of the different resources automatically follow from using a cognitive architecture, 
because the resources were implemented and supported previously (Anderson, 2007; 
Cooper, 2007; Kieras & Meyer, 1997; Newell, 1990; Van Maanen et al., 2009). If 
one would want to model our datasets with ‘single-issue models’, many more ad-hoc 
assumptions would have to be made, resulting in weaker modeling accounts.
Pupil Dilation Results
To investigate whether the decrease in performance due to the problem state bottleneck 
was accompanied by an increase in mental workload, we measured people’s pupil 
dilation in Chapter 3. In addition to the interaction effects in the response time and 
accuracy data, we indeed also observed an over-additive interaction effect in pupil 
size, with most dilated pupils in the conditions where more than one intermediate 
representation had to be used. As it is well known that pupil dilation reflects mental 
workload (for reviews, see e.g., Beatty, 1982; Steinhauer & Hakerem, 1992), we 
interpreted this as evidence for increased mental effort when the limits of the 
problem state resource were reached. While it is still unclear what exactly is reflected 
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by the pupillary response, these results could indicate that one factor is the use or 
maintenance of intermediate representations.
Neuroimaging Results
As the behavioral, modeling, and pupil dilation results all indicated a problem state 
bottleneck, the next step was to locate the neural correlates of this bottleneck. To 
this end we conducted two fMRI experiments (Borst et al., 2009, and Chapter 4 & 
5). To analyze the fMRI data we first applied a Regions-of-Interest technique that is 
commonly used in combination with ACT-R (e.g., Anderson, 2007; Anderson et al., 
2008). We used this method to see whether our model was able of making a priori 
predictions of the fMRI data in various regions in the brain, to thereby validate the 
model (Borst et al., 2009 and Chapter 4). In general the model’s predictions were 
accurate, indicating that the model captures important aspects of the data. However, a 
discrepancy between the model’s predictions and the data was found in the posterior 
parietal cortex, a region that is associated with the problem state resource. There are 
at least two possible reasons for this discrepancy: the model’s assumptions could be 
incorrect or the ACT-R–brain link could be incorrect or incomplete.
Because the behavioral data in combination with the model delivered strong support 
for the problem state bottleneck, we focused on how we could improve the ACT-R–
brain link. First, based on the broader fMRI literature and an unpublished dataset (Kao 
& Anderson, personal communication), we hypothesized that the area in the parietal 
cortex not only reflects problem state actions, but also visual-spatial activity. When we 
added this hypothesis to the model, the model-data match improved considerably (Borst 
et al., 2009). As this is based on a single experimental paradigm it cannot yet be 
used to validate other models. However, it does warrant deeper investigation, to further 
improve the mapping between ACT-R and the brain.
The results above are all based on the existing mapping between ACT-R’s resources 
and brain areas. However, this naturally means that the results depend on the correctness 
of this predefined mapping. To investigate where the resources of our model are best 
represented in the brain – and to see whether that corresponds to the predefined 
mapping – we applied a novel model-based fMRI analysis technique in Chapter 5. This 
analysis technique, in which we regressed the model’s predictions directly against 
the fMRI data, showed that the predictions of the problem state resource mapped 
best onto a region in the posterior parietal cortex that is slightly anterior to ACT-R’s 
predefined region (in general, the results were surprisingly consistent with the ACT-R 
mapping). The measured BOLD response in this region was much closer to the model 
predictions than the response in the predefined region. However, the fit was still not 
perfect, meaning that either the model has to be improved, or the connection between 
the model and the brain (for example by adding visual-spatial activity, as implied 
above). One way to investigate this would be by entering all model resources in a single 
linear model instead of in several separate linear models (as we did in Chapter 5). By 
using one linear model, it is possible to have a combination of model resources predict 
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activity in one brain area. However, for that analysis to work we first need a better 
experimental paradigm, which dissociates all different resources of the model.
Besides yielding a better mapping between ACT-R and the brain, the model-based 
fMRI analysis method also leads to more precise function-brain mappings than 
traditional fMRI analysis methods. Traditionally, fMRI data is regressed against the 
different conditions of an experiment. The results of those regressions are then 
subtracted from each other, in principle isolating a certain cognitive function. However, 
by using a cognitive model – especially one developed in a cognitive architecture  – this 
link between function and data is much more direct, as now a very well described 
(computationally implemented and previously validated) function is directly regressed 
against the brain data. While this does not completely solve the problem of fMRI 
data only showing that “the mind happens […] north of the neck” (Fodor, 1999), the 
combination of computational models and fMRI data at least brings us one step closer 
to understanding the mind.
Conclusion: Working Memory in Multitasking
In Chapter 6 we introduced our over-arching theory: Working Memory in Multitasking 
(WMM). As this theory is based on all results presented in this dissertation, you 
could say that it is the conclusion of this dissertation. In that sense, Figure 7.1 is the 
summary of this dissertation. As shown in Figure 7.1, the core of the WMM theory 
is a single-sized problem state resource, which leads to interference when it has to 
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Working Memory in Multitasking (WMM)
Figure Overview of the Working Memory in Multitasking theory.7.1
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is removed from the problem state resource it is automatically stored in declarative 
memory, where it starts to decay. This means that the longer a representation cannot 
be used in a multitasking situation, the harder it will be to retrieve it and resume an 
interrupted task. To support the WMM theory we have presented behavioral (Chapter 
2 & 3), pupil dilation (Chapter 3), fMRI (Chapter 4 and 5), and computational cognitive 
modeling support (all chapters). To me, this is the essence of cognitive science: using 
formal methods in an interdisciplinary manner to investigate and understand the 
human mind.
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Samenvatting
Deze samenvatting, en ook grote delen van dit proefschrift, zijn geschreven met 
behulp van het programma ‘Concentrate’1. Concentrate is geen normaal programma, 
het kan niet gebruikt worden om mee te chatten, te schrijven, of te internetten. Nee, 
Concentrate zorgt er juist voor dat er niet teveel dingen tegelijkertijd gedaan kunnen 
worden, het dwingt monotasking af. Want terwijl in onze samenleving multitasken 
langzamerhand tot de standaard wordt verheven – hoe vaak zie je wel geen bellende 
fietsers? – hebben wetenschappers juist laten zien dat mensen vaak minder goed 
presteren als ze meerdere dingen tegelijkertijd doen.
Dit proefschrift gaat over één van de oorzaken van multitaskingproblemen: een 
beperking in het verwerken van tussenresultaten (bijvoorbeeld ‘3x = 12’ wanneer 
‘3x – 7 = 5’ opgelost moet worden) . We laten zien dat als mensen een tussenresultaat 
voor meerdere taken tegelijkertijd moeten onthouden, hun prestatie op deze taken sterk 
vermindert. Volgens onze theorie worden de tussenresultaten namelijk opgeslagen in 
de zogeheten werkgeheugen-module in ons brein. Deze module kan echter maar één 
tussenresultaat tegelijkertijd opslaan, en fungeert dus als een beperkende factor in 
het multitasken wanneer mensen meerder tussenresultaten nodig hebben. Als dat het 
geval is moeten de tussenresultaten namelijk constant uitgewisseld worden tussen de 
werkgeheugen-module en het gewone geheugen. Deze uitwisseling kost tijd en kan 
soms misgaan, en leidt daarom tot een verminderde multitaskingprestatie.
In deze samenvatting zal ik proberen duidelijk te maken hoe we deze beperking 
in het verwerken van tussenresultaten (door ons de problem state bottleneck 
genoemd) onderzocht hebben, en wat de specifieke resultaten waren. Ik zal eerst de 




We hebben de problem state bottleneck met een aantal verschillende methoden 
onderzocht. Ten eerste hebben we gebruik gemaakt van gedragsexperimenten. In deze 
experimenten hebben we proefpersonen verschillende taken laten uitvoeren achter de 
computer, en gekeken hoe de eigenschappen van de taken hun prestaties beïnvloedden. 
Hierbij hebben we gekeken naar reactietijden en naar fouten die proefpersonen maken 
(bv. in Hoofdstuk 2), maar ook naar wat het effect van de taken was op de pupilgrootte 
van de proefpersonen (Hoofdstuk 3). Sinds de jaren zestig is het namelijk bekend dat 
de grootte van onze pupillen beïnvloed wordt door hoe moeilijk een taak voor ons is: 
hoe moeilijker de taak, hoe groter onze pupillen. Door het meten van pupilgrootte 
is het dus mogelijk om uit te vinden hoe moeilijk een taak is, zonder dat het de 




wordt. Naast deze standaard psychologische onderzoeksmethoden hebben we echter 
ook gebruik gemaakt van twee methoden die waarschijnlijk iets meer uitleg behoeven: 
cognitief modelleren en modelgebaseerde neurowetenschap.
Cognitieve Modellen
Na het doen van een aantal gedragsexperimenten, is het relatief gemakkelijk om een 
theorie te bedenken die de resultaten verklaart. Stel dat proefpersonen altijd meer 
fouten maken als ze twee tussenresultaten moeten onthouden in plaats van één. Dat 
zou uitgelegd kunnen worden met een theorie die stelt dat we een werkgeheugen-
module hebben die maar één enkel tussenresultaat tegelijkertijd kan opslaan. Maar wat 
betekent dat? Vergeten we het andere tussenresultaat dan? Als blijkt dat proefpersonen 
de taak in de helft van de gevallen nog wel goed doen, maar veel trager zijn dan in 
een situatie met maar één tussenresultaat, dan kan de theorie uitgebreid worden met 
het idee dat het tweede tussenresultaat opgeslagen wordt in ons normale geheugen. 
Omdat het ophalen uit ons normale geheugen meer tijd kost leidt dat tot tragere 
reacties, en soms zal een tussenresultaat vergeten worden. Maar… hoeveel tijd kost het 
dan om een tussenresultaat op te halen, en hoe vaak wordt het vergeten?
Zoals hopelijk duidelijk is geworden uit dit voorbeeld zijn verbale theorieën vaak 
niet precies genoeg beschreven om voor een goede uitleg te zorgen. Aan de ene kant is 
het vaak onduidelijk of een verbale theorie eigenlijk wel leidt tot de gevonden resultaten 
(wat betekent ‘langzamer’?), en aan de andere kant kan een verbale theorie vaak op 
meerdere manieren geïnterpreteerd worden, en kan de theorie daarom niet goed 
getest worden in een experiment. Vanuit een behoefte aan meer precieze theorieën 
zijn psychologen daarom computationele cognitieve modellen gaan ontwikkelen. 
Een computationeel cognitief model is niets anders dan de implementatie van een 
psychologische theorie als een computerprogramma. Dit programma kan dan gebruikt 
worden om gedrag te simuleren. Aan de ene kant dwingt dit af dat alle details van een 
theorie expliciet gemaakt worden – anders werkt het programma simpelweg niet – en 
aan de andere kant maakt het precies duidelijk welke voorspellingen de theorie doet.
In dit proefschrift heb ik gebruik gemaakt van modellen die de complete taak 
kunnen uitvoeren. Dat wil zeggen dat het model dezelfde interface ‘ziet’ als de 
proefpersonen, en ook antwoord moet geven met behulp van een virtueel toetsenbord 
en een virtuele muis. Als het ware zijn deze modellen dus virtuele proefpersonen 
die één of meerdere taken kunnen uitvoeren. Dit betekent dat we direct de prestaties 
(bijvoorbeeld reactietijden en fouten) van onze modellen konden vergelijken met die 
van onze echte proefpersonen, en zo konden kijken waar onze theorie klopte en vooral 
waar de theorie nog verbeterd moest worden.
Hoewel een cognitief model al een stuk beter is dan een verbale theorie, bestaat 
er nog steeds het gevaar dat een model alleen maar werkt voor de taak waar het voor 
ontwikkeld is. Het kan bijvoorbeeld zijn dat het geheugen van een model allerlei 
eigenschappen wordt toegedicht die wel werken voor de huidige taak, maar niet voor 
andere taken. Om dit probleem te voorkomen zijn alle modellen in dit proefschrift 
geïmplementeerd in een cognitieve architectuur. Kortgezegd is een cognitieve 
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architectuur een verzameling cognitieve modellen die sterk op elkaar lijken, en gebruikt 
worden om data van meerdere verschillende taken te verklaren. Voor de specifieke 
taak waarin een onderzoeker geïnteresseerd is moeten dan nog wel de details van 
het model geïmplementeerd worden, maar daarbij kan gebruik gemaakt worden van 
(bijvoorbeeld) een geheugensysteem dat al gebruikt is om andere taken te verklaren. 
Hierdoor wordt voorkomen dat modellen alleen maar de resultaten van één specifieke 
experiment verklaren.
In dit proefschrift heb ik gebruik gemaakt van de cognitieve architectuur 
ACT-R, ontwikkeld door John Anderson. In het verleden is ACT-R gebruikt om 
taken te modelleren die variëren van simpele reactietijd-taken tot autorijden en 
luchtverkeersleiding. Voor het modelleren van onze experimenten hebben we 
bijvoorbeeld gebruik gemaakt van ACT-R’s geheugen, maar ook van ACT-R’s visuele 
en motorieke systeem. Wat wij specifiek hebben toegevoegd zijn de eigenschappen 
van de werkgeheugen-module, en hoe die een rol spelen in multitaskinggedrag en 
-problemen.
Modelgebaseerde Neurowetenschap
Tot nu toe heb ik het alleen over gedrag (en pupilgrootte) gehad, maar dit gedrag komt 
natuurlijk voort uit onze hersenen. In Hoofdstuk 4 en 5 van dit proefschrift hebben we 
daarom gekeken naar waar de problem state bottleneck zich in het brein bevindt. Ook 
hierbij hebben we gebruik gemaakt van cognitieve modellen. In plaats van te kijken 
naar waar de hersenen actief zijn wanneer onze proefpersonen een experiment doen, 
zoals gebruikelijk is in de neurowetenschappen, hebben we in Hoofdstuk 4 gekeken 
naar hoe goed ons model hersenactivatie kan voorspellen. Op deze manier wilden we 
in meer detail beoordelen hoe goed of slecht het model is – als het naast reactietijden en 
fouten ook nog hersenactiviteit kan voorspellen, dan is het natuurlijk waarschijnlijker 
dat het een goede afspiegeling van de werkelijkheid is dan wanneer het ‘alleen maar’ 
reactietijden kan voorspellen.
In Hoofdstuk 5 hebben we daarnaast een nieuwe hersenanalysemethode toegepast: 
modelgebaseerde fMRI-analyse (fMRI is een techniek die laat zien welke delen van 
de hersenen actief zijn op een bepaald moment). Terwijl bij een standaard analyse 
gekeken wordt naar waar in het brein een experiment activatie veroorzaakt, wordt 
bij modelgebaseerde fMRI-analyse gekeken naar waar in het brein de onderdelen 
van een model zich bevinden. Dit klinkt ingewikkelder dan het is: de analyse 
vergelijkt simpelweg wanneer de onderdelen van een model actief zijn en wanneer 
de verschillende gebieden in de hersenen actief zijn. Als een specifiek onderdeel van 
een model en een hersengebied vaak tegelijkertijd actief zijn (vaker dan bij toeval het 
geval zou zijn), dan kan er geconcludeerd worden dat het betreffende hersengebied 
wellicht dit onderdeel van het model implementeert. Hierdoor is het mogelijk om heel 
precies de verschillende onderdelen van een model aan hersengebieden koppelen, 
preciezer dan over het algemeen mogelijk is met standaard analysemethoden. Wij 
hebben deze methode voor het eerst toegepast op een model dat geïmplementeerd is 
in een cognitieve architectuur. In de volgende sectie zullen we de resultaten hiervan 
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Het onderzoek in dit proefschrift begon met de gedragsexperimenten in Hoofdstuk 
2. Naar aanleiding van een voorspelling die voortkwam uit de multitaskingtheorie 
threaded cognition van Dario Salvucci en Niels Taatgen, hebben we onderzocht of 
het tegelijkertijd bijhouden van meerdere tussenresultaten tot een verslechterde 
multitaskingprestatie leidt. Om dit te onderzoeken hebben we onze proefpersonen 
twee taken laten uitvoeren: het maken van kolomaftreksommen en het invoeren van 
tekst (Figuur 8.1). Beide taken hadden twee condities: een makkelijke conditie waarin 
de proefpersonen geen tussenresultaat nodig hadden om de taak uit te voeren, en een 
moeilijke conditie waarin ze wel een tussenresultaat nodig hadden. 
Voor de kolomaftreksommen betekende dit dat er in de makkelijke conditie nooit 
geleend hoefde te worden, terwijl er in de moeilijke conditie in elke som van 10 
kolommen 6 keer geleend moest worden. Figuur 8.1 laat de moeilijke conditie zien, 
voor de eerste kolom (1 – 4) moet er bijvoorbeeld direct al geleend worden. Het idee 
is dat de proefpersonen als tussenresultaat steeds moeten bijhouden of ze wel of niet 
geleend hebben in de voorgaande kolom. Voor het teksttaak, aan de rechterkant van 
Figuur 8.1, moesten de proefpersonen in de makkelijke taak steeds op de letter klikken 
die getoond werd in het venstertje boven de letter-knoppen (in dit geval een ‘I’). Zodra 
ze op een letter klikten verscheen er een nieuwe letter. In de moeilijke variant werd 
er steeds een woord van 10 letters getoond dat de proefpersonen moesten invoeren. 
Zodra de proefpersonen op de eerste letter klikten, verdween het woord, en moest 
het verder uit het hoofd ingevoerd worden. In deze taak moesten de proefpersonen 
dus bijhouden welk woord ze aan het invoeren waren en bij welke letter ze waren 
(bijvoorbeeld ‘fluisteren, 5de letter’). Het interessante aan dit experiment is dat de 
proefpersonen steeds na elke letter en elk cijfer tussen de taken moesten wisselen. 
Dit betekende dat als een taak moeilijk was, het tussenresultaat bijgehouden moest 
worden terwijl er een respons op de andere taak gegeven werd.
Het achterliggende idee van het experiment was dat proefpersonen alleen in de 
conditie wanneer beide taken moeilijk waren meer dan één tussenresultaat nodig 
hadden. Onze hypothese was dat het daarom in deze conditie veel slechter zou gaan 
dan in de andere condities. Dit is precies wat er uit het experiment kwam: terwijl 
proefpersonen natuurlijk trager reageerden en meer fouten maakten in de moeilijke 
condities, werden ze extra traag en maakten ze extra fouten wanneer beide taken 
moeilijk waren. Dus omdat de andere taak ook moeilijk was – omdat ze voor de andere 
taak ook een tussenresultaat bij moesten houden – werden de proefpersonen trager en 
gingen ze meer fouten maken (in beide taken).
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Hoe kunnen we dit verklaren? Zoals ik hierboven al kort beschreven heb gaan wij 
ervan uit dat mensen een werkgeheugen-module in hun hersenen hebben die maar 
één tussenresultaat tegelijkertijd kan bevatten. Zodra er een tweede tussenresultaat 
bij komt wordt het eerste tussenresultaat automatisch naar het normale geheugen 
verplaatst. Informatie ophalen uit het normale geheugen kost tijd en kan fout 
gaan, wat logischerwijs tot tragere reacties en fouten kan leiden. In de context van 
het experiment betekent dit dat proefpersonen zonder problemen de taken konden 
uitvoeren zolang geen of één van de twee taken moeilijk was: dan was er namelijk 
maar één tussenresultaat nodig (natuurlijk werden de proefpersonen al wel langzamer 
in de moeilijke taken omdat bijvoorbeeld de aftreksommen moeilijker werden). Alleen 
wanneer beide taken moeilijk waren moesten proefpersonen steeds tussenresultaten 
opslaan en weer ophalen uit hun geheugen, wat leidde tot de hogere reactietijden en 
meer fouten in deze conditie. 
Dit idee hebben we geïmplementeerd als een cognitief model, dat vervolgens 
precies dezelfde taak moest uitvoeren als de proefpersonen. De specifieke reactietijden 
en fouten van het model hebben we vergeleken met de resultaten van de proefpersonen, 
en het bleek dat het model het patroon van de proefpersonen bijna perfect kon verklaren 
(zie ook de figuren in Hoofdstuk 2). Onze conclusie is daarom dat een werkgeheugen-
module die maar één enkel tussenresultaat kan vasthouden een goede verklaring geeft 
voor de resultaten van het experiment.
Hoewel ons model liet zien dat dit een mogelijke verklaring was, zijn er natuurlijk 
ook andere manieren om de resultaten van het experiment uit te leggen. In twee andere 
experimenten in Hoofdstuk 2 hebben we twee andere verklaringen getest. In het eerste 
Figuur De interface van het experiment.8.1
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experiment hebben we getest of de effecten misschien toe te schrijven waren aan het 
feit dat het vasthouden van informatie over het algemeen alle cognitieve processen 
vertraagt. Dus, in plaats van een werkgeheugen-module die maar één tussenresultaat 
kan vasthouden, kunnen er bij deze verklaring wel meerdere tussenresultaten worden 
bewaard, maar leidt dit tot een algehele vertraging van ons cognitieve systeem. Om dit 
te testen hebben we een vergelijkbaar experiment gedaan als het eerste experiment, 
maar nu moesten de proefpersonen steeds twee letters en twee cijfers achter elkaar 
invoeren voordat ze tussen de taken wisselden. Volgens onze verklaring zou er 
alleen een vertraging moeten optreden bij het eerste cijfer en de eerste letter, omdat 
dan de inhoud van de werkgeheugen-module gewisseld moest worden. Volgens de 
alternatieve verklaring zou de vertraging juist op beide stappen moeten optreden, 
omdat het cognitieve systeem algeheel vertraagd is. De resultaten waren eenduidig en 
in lijn met ons model: we zagen alleen een vertraging op het eerste cijfer en de eerste 
letter in een reeks van twee. In het derde experiment in Hoofdstuk 2 hebben we nog 
een tweede alternatieve verklaring getest – een beperking in ons taalsysteem – maar 
ook die verklaring bleek niet op te gaan.
Op basis van deze eerste set van drie experimenten concludeerden we daarom dat 
de meest plausibele verklaring voor onze resultaten een werkgeheugen-module is die 
maar één tussenresultaat tegelijkertijd kan vasthouden: de problem state bottleneck.
Pupilgrootte
In Hoofdstuk 3 van dit proefschrift hebben we het bewijs voor een problem state 
bottleneck verder uitgebreid met nog een gedragsexperiment. In dit experiment moesten 
de proefpersonen wederom kolomaftreksommen oplossen en tekst invoeren, maar nu 
werd er op het scherm getoond of de proefpersonen net geleend hadden in één van de 
condities. Dit betekende dat in deze conditie het tussenresultaat op het scherm stond, 
en proefpersonen het dus niet hoefden te onthouden. Zoals verwacht presteerden 
de proefpersonen in deze conditie beter dan wanneer het tussenresultaat niet op het 
scherm stond.
Tijdens dit experiment hebben we ook de pupilgrootte van de proefpersonen 
gemeten, om te kijken of de conditie waarin beide taken moeilijk waren ook samenging 
met een toename in mentale belasting. Het bleek dat de pupilgrootte ten opzichte 
van de grootte vóór het experiment inderdaad het meest toenam in de conditie waarin 
beide taken moeilijk waren. Net als met de reactietijden en fouten, nam ook de 
pupilgrootte onevenredig veel toe in vergelijking tot de condities waarin maar één van 
de taken moeilijk was. Dit wijst erop dat de mentale belasting veruit het hoogst was 
als – volgens ons model – de tussenresultaten in de werkgeheugen-module verwisseld 
moesten worden.
Uitwisseling	via	het	Geheugen
Volgens ons model worden tussenresultaten die niet in de werkgeheugen-module 
passen opgeslagen in het normale geheugen. Volgens de gangbare geheugentheorieën 
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in de psychologie verliest informatie in ons geheugen langzaam aan activiteit, en 
wordt het daarom steeds moeilijker om informatie op te halen die lang niet gebruikt 
is. Dat betekent voor onze theorie dat tussenresultaten die in het normale geheugen 
bewaard moeten worden langzamerhand steeds moeilijker zijn op te halen. We 
hebben dat getest in Hoofdstuk 6 met twee zogenaamde interruptie-experimenten. 
Interruptie-experimenten zijn bedacht om te kijken hoe mensen reageren op 
onderbrekingen van een taak. Het meest gebruikte voorbeeld hierbij is waarschijnlijk 
het schrijven van een lange email dat onderbroken wordt door een telefoontje. Na het 
beantwoorden van de telefoon kost het altijd weer even tijd om terug in het verhaal te 
komen. Interruptie-experimenten worden gebruikt om uit te vinden waarom dit het 
geval is.
Wij hebben twee experimenten gedaan waarin we respectievelijk de teksttaak en 
het maken van kolomaftreksommen onderbraken met een geheugentaak. Ook in 
deze experimenten hadden de taken weer een makkelijke en een moeilijke versie. De 
resultaten hiervan kwamen overeen met de andere experimenten: de proefpersonen 
waren het traagst en maakten de meeste fouten wanneer beide taken moeilijk waren. 
Interessanter echter was dat in dit experiment de onderbreking met de geheugentaak 
4, 8, of 12 seconden kon duren. Geheugentheorieën in aanmerking genomen zou dat 
moeten betekenen dat proefpersonen de meeste moeite hadden om weer verder te 
gaan met de eerste taak na een onderbreking van 12 seconden, omdat dan de activiteit 
van het tussenresultaat in het normale geheugen het meeste was weggezakt. Volgens 
het model zou dit echter alleen het geval moeten zijn in de conditie waarin beide 
taken moeilijk waren, omdat alleen dan een tussenresultaat in het normale geheugen 
terechtkwam. De resultaten van de experimenten bevestigden deze voorspelling. Dit 
betekent dat tussenresultaten die niet in de werkgeheugen-module passen in ons 
normale geheugen worden opgeslagen. Het verklaart ook deels waarom interrupties 
van een taak vaak zo vervelend zijn. Neem het voorbeeld van het schrijven van een 
email dat onderbroken wordt door een telefoongesprek: na een telefoontje is de 
schrijver waarschijnlijk weer vergeten wat hij of zij op dat moment aan het schrijven 
was – het tussenresultaat – en moet dat weer opgehaald worden uit het geheugen (of 
opnieuw bedacht worden).
Neuroresultaten
Omdat de gedragsexperimenten en ons model op een problem state bottleneck wezen, 
hebben we in Hoofdstuk 4 en 5 geprobeerd om de locatie hiervan in de hersenen 
te bepalen. In Hoofdstuk 4 hebben we gekeken hoe goed ons model voorspellingen 
kan maken van hersenactiviteit in een aantal vooraf gedefinieerde gebieden. Over het 
algemeen bleek dit verrassend goed te zijn, wat aangaf dat het model een plausibele 
afspiegeling is van wat er in ons brein gebeurt als we dit soort taken uitvoeren. 
Omdat niet alle onderdelen van het model goede voorspellingen maakten, hebben 
we daarna in Hoofdstuk 5 gekeken wat de meest waarschijnlijk gebieden zijn om 
aan de verschillende onderdelen van het model te koppelen. Hiervoor hebben we de 
modelgebaseerde fMRI-analyse techniek gebruikt die ik eerder kort heb geïntroduceerd.
190 Nederlandse Samenvatting
Modelgebaseerde fMRI-analyse laat zien wat de meest waarschijnlijke locatie van 
de verschillende onderdelen van een model is. In Figuur 8.2 staan de resultaten van 
de analyse: (a) laat de meest waarschijnlijke locatie van de werkgeheugen-module 
zien, (b) van het geheugen, (c) van de visuele perceptie – de ogen – van het model, en 
(d) van de manuele acties, dus van het gebruik van de muis en het toetsenbord van 
het model. Zoals verwacht bevond het meest waarschijnlijke gebied voor de visuele 
perceptie van het model zich helemaal aan de achterkant van ons brein, dit is namelijk 
het gebied dat standaard geassocieerd wordt met visuele perceptie. Ook de acties van 
het model werden gelokaliseerd op de verwachte locatie: de motor cortex, het gebied 
in de hersenen dat al onze bewegingen aanstuurt. De interessantere onderdelen van 
het model, de werkgeheugen-module en het geheugen bevonden zich volgens de 
analyse respectievelijk in de pariëtaalkwab en de prefrontale cortex. Ook dit is in 
overeenstemming met de literatuur.
Conclusie: Werkgeheugen in Multitasking
Gebaseerd op alle experimenten in dit proefschrift hebben we in Hoofdstuk 6 onze 
uiteindelijke theorie gepresenteerd: Werkgeheugen in Multitasking. Figuur 8.3 laat 
een overzicht van deze theorie zien, met alle elementen die ik hierboven al kort 
Figuur Resultaten van de modelgebaseerde fMRI-analyse. De witte vierkantjes geven aan 
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besproken heb. Het belangrijkst element hierin is natuurlijk de werkgeheugen-module 
in de pariëtaalkwab, die informatie kan uitwisselen met het geheugen in de prefrontale 
cortex. Omdat de werkgeheugen-module maar één tussenresultaat tegelijkertijd kan 
opslaan, leidt het gebruik van meerdere tussenresultaten – wat vaak nodig is in een 
multitasking situatie – al snel tot behoorlijke multitaskinginterferentie. Dit is één van 
de redenen waarom multitasking niet altijd een goed idee is. In dit proefschrift hebben 
we daarvoor ondersteuning gevonden, niet alleen met gedragsexperimenten, maar ook 
met behulp van een cognitief model en neurowetenschappelijke experimenten.








• Het kost tijd om een 
element op te halen
•  Elementen verliezen 
activatie
• Prefrontale cortex
Als een nieuw tussenresultaat wordt 
opgeslagen in de werkgeheugen-module dan 
wordt het vorige tussenresultaat automatisch 
naar het normale geheugen verplaatst.
• Eén element
• Direct bruikbaar
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